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Abstract 
The thesis aims to answer two research questions. The first is whether it is good to 
introduce a consumer ADR scheme that is specially designed for China’s financial 
service market and the second is what this financial consumer ADR scheme for 
China’s financial service market may look like. The two research questions are 
important, because there has been no work discussing why a special designed 
financial consumer ADR scheme is good for Chinese financial service market in the 
Chinese context and how this should be designed, this is the gap the thesis tries to fill. 
For the first research question, the thesis argues that a financial consumer ADR 
scheme is good for Chinese financial service market. Because a financial consumer 
ADR scheme that is specially designed for China can provide consumers with a place 
to resolve their disputes in a cheap, fast, and efficient way. A good designed financial 
consumer ADR scheme may also have functions such as consumer advice, collect and 
feedback data and improve the market behaviour. These functions may balance the 
imbalance of power between financial firms and consumers and increase confidence 
on Chinese financial service market. For the second research question, the thesis 
argues that the government or regulators may impose such new financial consumer 
ADR scheme through legislation or establish such scheme firstly and then seek for a 
legislation later. An independent ADR body may be established to operate the 
scheme. It may have compulsory jurisdiction on most financial firms and financial 
service. A multilayer working process used in sequence could be the working 
procedure of the scheme. The outcome produced by the new ADR scheme may be 
binding while providing the consumer with a full or limited unilateral opt-in right. 
The new ADR scheme may provide the consumer with a free service and collect its 
funds mainly form the financial industry by charging a levy and case fee.   
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
Mapping the Introduction 
1. The thesis aims to study whether it is good to introduce a special designed 
financial consumer ADR scheme in China and what this scheme should look like. 
The financial consumer ADR scheme is an important place for consumers to 
access to justice and can also protect the financial service market. The practice of 
financial consumer ADR can be observed in many leading financial service 
markets such as UK, Hong Kong, Australia, Japan, and Singapore1. In the 
introduction chapter, the thesis will discuss the two core research questions, the 
methodology of the thesis, and the structure of the thesis.  
2. The main research questions here are two, the first question here is whether it is 
good to introduce an ADR scheme specially designed for financial service market 
in China2. And the second is what it should look like in China. Currently there are 
already many researches on why an ADR scheme is important for consumers in 
 
1 Ali, Shahla F, Consumer Financial Dispute Resolution in a Comparative Context, Principles, Systems 
and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi 
Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer-to-business Dispute Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 
2012) 
2 Currently there are already some ADR practice in China’s financial service market, such as a financial 
mediation practice and a consumer hotline operated by China’s central bank, as we will fully discussed 
in chapter III, these existing financial consumer ADR practice does not work well, they can only cover 
very limited scope, cannot produce binding result and only little consumers know or use it.  
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general3, and particular in financial service market4, and there has been some 
rather general work suggesting the idea of a financial consumer ADR system in 
China.5 However, there has been no work doing what the thesis doing here: 
discussing why it is good to introduce a special designed financial consumer ADR 
scheme in the Chinese context and considering in detail how it should be 
designed. These are the important gaps being filled here.    
3. For the first research question, the thesis argues that it is good to introduce an 
ADR scheme that is specially designed for financial service market in China. 
Some previous work made similar conclusion on this question6, however, none of 
these works give a good analysis on why it is good. In another word, these works 
did not give a good explain on how a special designed financial consumer ADR 
scheme can protect the consumer and benefit the financial service market. The 
 
3 Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer-to-business Dispute 
Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 2012); Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to Justice Movement’ (1993) 
Vol.56, No.3 The Modern Law Review 282; Deborah R. Hensler, ‘Our Courts, Ourselves: How the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System’ (2003) 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 
165, 170; Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 
2007)   
4 Ali, Shahla F, Consumer Financial Dispute Resolution in a Comparative Context, Principles, Systems 
and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Ali, Shahla F, ‘Globalization and Financial Dispute 
Resolution: Examining Areas of Convergence and Informed Divergence in Financial ADR’ (2013) 
vol.331 Journal of Dispute Resolution 213; Merricks, W, ‘The Financial Ombudsman Service: not just an 
alternative to court’ (2015) Vol. 15 No. 2 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 135  
5 Li Jingwei & Zhou Zhongfei, ‘The UK’s financial service supervision and its meaning for China’ (2002) 
Vol. 2002 (2) Foreign Economy and Management 78; Xu Huijuan, ‘Financial Ombudsman System in UK 
and Protection of Consumers’ Rights and Interests – Comment on Our Financial Regulations’ (2005) 
Vol.1 Finance Forum; Yang Xiaoxing & Liu Yue, ‘Research on the Protection of Financial Consumers in 
the Context of Globalization’ (2008) Vol.2008 (6) Modern Management Science 37 
6 Li Jingwei & Zhou Zhongfei, ‘The UK’s financial service supervision and its meaning for China’ (2002) 
Vol. 2002 (2) Foreign Economy and Management 78; Liu Yingshuang, ‘Research on the Protection of 
Financial Consumers' Rights, and Interests in China--- Also on the Protection of Financial Consumers in 
American Financial Supervision Reform’ (2011) Vol. 33 (3) Modern Law Science,116; Liu Yizhan, ‘Some 
Ideas on Constructing the Protection Mechanism of Financial Consumers in China-Based on the 
Experience of UK, Australia and America’ (2011) Vol.27 (2) Consumer Economics 
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research here is filling this gap. The research here would provide with reasons 
why it is good to introduce a special designed financial consumer ADR scheme in 
China’s financial service market, by analysing how this scheme would protect the 
consumer and benefit the financial service market. The analysing is, there is a gap 
of bargaining ability between consumers and financial firms, financial firms are 
much stronger than consumers.  
4. When there are disputes between consumer and financial firms happen, if disputes 
are resolved only by financial firms and consumers, financial firms can easily get 
a solution in favour of them or left disputes unresolved. Therefore, there should be 
a place to provide consumers with an opportunity to access to justice and let an 
independent third person to join the dispute resolution process to balance the gap. 
Usually, the court should be the place to provide consumers with such opportunity 
and the judge should be the independent third person. However, in financial 
service market, many consumers are reluctant to go to the court due to the cost, 
time and efficient of the litigation. Therefore, it is good to introduce a financial 
consumer ADR scheme to provide the consumer with a cheap, fast and efficient 
alternative to access to justice. By doing so, the consumer receive protection and 
the confidence on financial service market is increased7.   
 
7 The reason why an effective and comprehensive financial consumer ADR scheme can benefit not 
only financial consumers but also financial service market as whole is because just as we will fully 
discussed in later of this chapter and Chapter II, for many reasons, consumers choose to not bring 
their disputes to court and financial firms stand in an advantaged position if disputes were resolved 
only between financial firms and consumers. This may lead to an abuse of this advantage and bad 
practice in financial service market, which can reduce consumers’ confidence in this market and 
decrease consumers’ willingness to use service in this market. This will finally damage the financial 
service market. An effective and comprehensive financial consumer ADR scheme can reduce the 
above risk by balance the gap of ability in dispute resolution process between financial firms and 
consumers and provide consumers with an opportunity to access to an alternative justice. Consumers 
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5. For the second research question, currently there are some works on researching 
financial consumer ADR in different jurisdictions
8
, and some works on 
establishing a special designed financial consumer ADR in China by learning 
overseas experience
9
. However, these works did not give a discussion on what an 
advanced model that China may learn from and what a financial consumer ADR 
scheme in China may look like. This is the gap that the thesis aims to fill. Here the 
thesis argues that China can learn from an advanced model of financial 
Ombudsman used for example, by UK and Australia. The government or 
regulators may impose a new financial consumer ADR scheme through or not 
through legislation, with merging existing relevant ADR practices into it. It may 
be operated by an independent public institute. A multilayer working process 
where, negotiation procedure, mediation procedure, and Ombudsman, are used in 
 
will then feel that the financial service market is a generally fair market and their interests are secured 
in this market. This will enhance their confidence in the market and increase their willingness to use 
the service in this market. Therefore, the financial consumer ADR scheme benefit the financial service 
market. More arguments about this idea can be seen in Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi 
Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer-to-business Dispute Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 
2012); Li Jingwei & Zhou Zhongfei, ‘The UK’s financial service supervision and its meaning for China’ 
(2002) Vol. 2002 (2) Foreign Economy and Management 78; Yang Xiaoxing & Liu Yue, ‘Research on the 
Protection of Financial Consumers in the Context of Globalization’ (2008) Vol.2008 (6) Modern 
Management Science 37 
8 Ali, Shahla F, Consumer Financial Dispute Resolution in a Comparative Context, Principles, Systems and 
Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-
Banda, Consumer-to-business Dispute Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 2012); Ali, Shahla 
F, ‘Globalization and Financial Dispute Resolution: Examining Areas of Convergence and Informed 
Divergence in Financial ADR’ (2013) vol.331 Journal of Dispute Resolution 289 and Alan Ewins, Catherine 
Husted, Juliana Lee, & Joyce Woo, ‘The Lehman Aftermath: Hong Kong and Singapore Regulatory 
Reforms in the Structured Product’ (2010) 5 CAPITAL MARKETS LAW J. 301, 303. 
9 Li Jingwei & Zhou Zhongfei, ‘The UK’s financial service supervision and its meaning for China’ (2002) 
Vol. 2002 (2) Foreign Economy and Management 78; Yang Xiaoxing & Liu Yue, ‘Research on the 
Protection of Financial Consumers in the Context of Globalization’ (2008) Vol.2008 (6) Modern 
Management Science 37; Yang Ziqiang, ‘Perfecting the protection framework of financial consumers' 
rights and interests’ (2012) Vol.2012 (7) China Finance 89  
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sequence may be the working procedure of the scheme. It may have 
characteristics as follow: compulsory jurisdiction on most financial firms and 
financial service, ability to produce binding and enforceable results while 
consumers have unilateral opt-in right, easy to use, transparent, fast, having a 
close relationship with financial authority, and provide free or almost free service 
to consumers.  
6. The reason is there is a significant imbalance of power between financial firms 
and consumers, public authority needs to be involved to balance this gap and 
financial industry seems no motivation to spontaneously create a financial 
consumer ADR scheme in China. The existing ADR practices may be merged 
because by doing so existing ADR resources such as their staff and experience can 
be used. The scheme may be operated by an independent institution instead of be 
operated by financial authority as it may help to secure independence and 
impartiality. The multilayer working process may be used because it can fully use 
different advantages of different kinds ADR techniques and it may also save the 
time and cost, if many cases could be resolve in the early stage. The scheme may 
have these characteristics because these characteristics could encourage 
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Research Methodology 
7. There are two main research methodologies are used in this thesis to answer the 
two research questions. The first is the doctrinal method including literature 
review. We will go through many literatures of the financial consumer ADR 
scheme and its practice, including but not limited to relevant legal instruments, 
policy documents, academic papers, cases, reports, and statistics. For example, 
regarding the UK’s FOS, we use books and papers written by scholars10, legal 
instruments11, the annual reports and statistics published by the FOS company, 
and cases reported by the scheme. And regarding the Hong Kong’s FDRC 
scheme, we use the white paper book published by Hong Kong’s financial 
authority, the constitution of FDRC, papers, annual reports and sample cases 
reported by FDRC itself. These literatures will become the basis and main 
materials of the research. Further, we use both deductive and inductive reasoning 
to give a logical analysis on these materials with considering those existed 
principles, theories, and common sense in the area of financial consumer sector 
and ADR to illustrate and prove our conclusions.  
8. The other main research method we use here is the comparative method. We will 
compare financial consumer ADR scheme and practice in three different 
jurisdictions, namely UK, Hong Kong, and Australia. These three jurisdictions 
 
10 For example, Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer-to-business 
Dispute Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 2012); Sharon Gilad, ‘Juggling Conflicting 
Demands: The Case of the UK Financial Ombudsman Service’ (2009) Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, Volume 19, Issue 3, 661; Merricks, W, ‘The Financial Ombudsman Service: not 
just an alternative to court’ (2015) Vol. 15 No. 2 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 135  
11 Such as the Financial service market regulation (2000) and the hand book of dispute resolution 
published by the FCA, FCA Hand Book, insurance ombudsman scheme 
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were picked for their typical characteristics. The comparative study will cover 
many aspects of the scheme which are relevant with our research questions, for 
example, who will establish the scheme and who will operate them, what working 
process they will use, what characteristics of their program design, what principles 
they are following, etc. We hope this comparative study could help us to find out 
and prove what an ideal financial consumer ADR scheme should looks like. For 
example, the coherence of practice in these three jurisdictions may suggest that 
there are golden rules and principles that should be followed by all financial 
consumer ADR schemes, and for the difference, we will analyse why there is a 
difference and find out which is a better model by considering their effect in 
practice.   
9. UK’ financial ombudsman service (FOS) was chosen because it’s currently most 
used financial consumer ADR scheme in the world, a few hundred thousand cases 
were submitted to the FOS in every year12. And the UK’s FOS is a very typical 
representative of the ombudsman approach of financial consumer ADR scheme.  
10. The Hong Kong’s Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) was chosen 
because the Hong Kong is a popular financial centre in Asia and also part of 
China, therefore, the context of Hong Kong is very similar to the China 
(mainland), for example, the financial consumer live in Hong Kong and China 
mainland shares similar culture background, economic situation and 
understanding on what is fairness or justice, therefore can contribute much value 
 
12 FOS Financial Ombudsman Service | annual review 2016/2017 33 
                                                                                       11 
 
when we discuss on establishing a financial consumer ADR scheme in China. 
Another reason to choose Hong Kong is because of its dispute resolution 
techniques.  
11. The Australia was chosen because this jurisdiction just reformed its financial 
consumer ADR scheme, therefore, the research on Australia’s financial consumer 
ADR scheme will help us to find out some new trends of the development of the 
financial consumer ADR scheme.   
 
Brief introduction of following chapters   
12. The following chapters of the thesis will focus on answering the two main 
research questions we give in this introduction chapter. The next chapter, Chapter 
II will demonstrate the development of ADR and history of ADR’s development 
in general. It would also try to analysis why ADR is popular and widely accepted 
in some jurisdictions. Then in Chapter III, the thesis will discuss the criteria of a 
quality ADR scheme. These criteria includes both constitutional criteria such as 
independence, impartiality, and transparency and performance criteria such as 
cost, time, and efficiency. This discussion would set up criterion to further 
comparison study on the three chosen financial consumer ADR schemes. 
13. In Chapter IV, the thesis will discuss many different ADR techniques and models, 
which show the diversity of ADR. The thesis will try to classified ADR schemes 
according to techniques and models of them and discuss advantages and 
disadvantages for each category of them. In chapter V, The thesis will discuss 
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why a special designed consumer ADR scheme is needed in financial service 
market. The thesis will examine current situation of consumer ADR scheme in 
regulated markets, such as energy, telecom, and financial service market and then 
analysis why there is a trend to introduce consumer ADR in these regulated 
markets especially the financial service market. In Chapter VI, the thesis will give 
a detailed examination on the three chosen financial consumer ADR schemes, 
namely the UK’ FOS, the Hong Kong’s FDRC and the Australian AFCA. The 
thesis will then give a comparison on these schemes to find a probably current 
best model which can be learnt by China.  
14. In Chapter VII, the thesis will discuss ways that ADR schemes may be created. 
The thesis will examine possible ways to create an ADR scheme, and advantages 
and disadvantages of these ways. This discussion will the further discussion on 
how to introduce a financial consumer ADR scheme with an advanced model of 
financial Ombudsman in China. Chapter VIII, the thesis will discuss China’s 
features, that is to say discussing why introducing a financial consumer ADR 
scheme in China is good, and how to introducing a financial consumer ADR 
scheme with an advanced model of financial Ombudsman in China in the context 
of China. After these Chapters, there is a short conclusion to summary the thesis 
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Chapter II The Development of ADR and Possible Reasons 
for the Development  
 
Development of ADR  
1. ADR has an extremely long history in relation to dispute resolution between 
people, and was used by pre-historic and tribal communities13. However, in the 
evolution of all modern and industrialised states, courts are assumed to be the 
exclusive, or at least dominant, role in dispute resolution14. As a result, ADR had 
largely disappeared from dispute resolution until it was rediscovered in the late 
twentieth century15. After been rediscovered in the late of the last century, the 
ADR experienced a rapid development and becomes popular and widely accepted 
in many jurisdictions.  
2. For example, in UK, one of the first ADR schemes was the arbitration scheme 
established by the travel sector trade association in the 1950s16, which was aim to 
resolve disputes between travel traders and consumers. By 2012, at least 40 such 
ADR schemes existed in the UK administered by the Centre for Effective Dispute 
Resolution (CEDR)17. Besides, there are many sectoral ADR schemes operating 
 
13 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 
14 Fukuyama F, The Origins of Political Order. From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (New 
York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux 2011) 
15 C Hodges, ‘The private sector Ombudsman’ in Marc Hertogh and Richard Kirkham (eds) Research 
Handbook on the Ombudsman (Edward Elagar Publishing 2018) 
16 C Hodges, I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2012); C 
Hodges and A Stadler (eds), Resolving Mass Disputes: ADR and Settlement of Mass Claims (Edward 
Elgar, 2013) 
17 C Hodges, Delivering dispute resolution a holistic review of models in England and Wales (Hart 
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under sectoral codes of practice, and may be approved as self-regulatory schemes 
under the Consumer Codes Approval Scheme if they conform to the requirements 
of the Chartered Trading Standards Institute18. A major development of ADR in 
UK is the creation of Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) in 2000. The 
government merged several sectoral private Ombudsmen into a single ADR 
scheme and placed the entity firmly within the new architecture of the regulatory 
system for financial service firms19. Other examples of national Ombudsmen 
created by statute are the Pensions Ombudsman20 and Legal Ombudsman21. 
3. The ADR in UK was also regarded as an important part of civil procedure reform. 
The model of dispute resolution adopted by Lord Woolf placed significant 
emphasis on encouraging parties to settle cases through ADR before and during 
litigation22. While ADR was also encouraged in administrative justice23. Further 
Jackson LJ requires all small claims were automatically referred to mediation, on 
the basis that this is not compulsory mediation, but a requirement to engage with 
a small claim mediator in his reform in 201324. In 2017 a Civil Justice Council 
 
Publishing 2019) 
18 C Hodges, Delivering dispute resolution a holistic review of models in England and Wales (Hart 
Publishing 2019) 
19 C Hodges, Delivering dispute resolution a holistic review of models in England and Wales (Hart 
Publishing 2019); C Hodges, I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart 
Publishing 2012) 272 – 281. 
20 Established under the Pension Schemes Act 1993, s 145(3). 
21 Established as the Office for Legal Complaints under the Legal Services Act 2007, s 114. 
22 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales (HMSO, 1995); Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on 
the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (HMSO, 1996). 
23 A Le Sueur, ‘Administrative justice and the resolution of disputes’ ch 10 in J Jowell and D Oliver, The 
Changing Constitution (7th edn, OUP, 2011). The courts have tried to push mediation and other forms 
of ADR in preference to litigation: Re Cowl (Practice Note); Cowl v Plymouth City Council [2001] EWCA 
Civ 1935; [2002] 1 WLR 803. 
24 Solving disputes in the county courts: creating a simpler, quicker and more proportionate system: a 
consultation on reforming civil justice in England and Wales – The Government Response (The 
                                                                                       15 
 
(CJC) ADR Working Group issued a report that called for wider use of ADR 
before and during court processes,25 The CJC also recognized the ‘enormous 
success’ of Ombudsman processes, and suggested ‘exploring the wider use of 
conciliation and Ombudsmen within or alongside the civil justice’26. 
4. The development of ADR in the UK is the epitome and of its development in the 
EU. The EU highly appreciate the value of ADR and has issued some directives 
and regulations on it. For example, in 2013 the European Union recognised that 
ADR provided huge advantages for resolving disputes between consumers and 
traders, which involve many small claims that no rational consumer or trader 
would wish to litigate them27 even in a small claims process, and created an EU-
wide system of consumer ADR entities28, in which recognised ADR bodies are 
subject to a regulatory regime, and an e-portal for cross-border C2B disputes 
between Member States29.  
5. The trend of using ADR may also be observed in jurisdictions out of EU. For 
example, in China, for a long time, the Chinese judge were strongly encouraged 
 
Stationery Office, 2012) Cm. 8274. 
25 C Hodges, Delivering dispute resolution a holistic review of models in England and Wales (Hart 
Publishing 2019) 
26 ADR and Civil Justice. Interim Report (Civil Justice Council, 2017). 
27 A 2004 EU survey found that only 29% of European citizens would be prepared to bring a claim of 
less than € 500 to court: Special Eurobarometer, European Union citizens and access to justice 
(European Commission, 2004), 28. See also Special Eurobarometer 342. Consumer empowerment 
(European Commission, 2011). 
28 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR). See P Cortes, 
‘A new regulatory framework for extra-judicial consumer redress: where we are and how to move 
forward’ (2015) 35 (1) Legal Studies 114 – 41. 
29 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on 
online  
dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) [2013] OJ L165/1. 
                                                                                       16 
 
to resolve cases submitted to them by using mediation30. The Hong Kong has a 
culture to highly support arbitration which makes the Hong Kong becomes an 
arbitration center in Asia31. In Australia, the ADR scheme has a long history to be 
used to resolve consumer complaint in financial service market, which is know as 
External Dispute Resolution (EDR)32. One reason for the development of ADR 
may be the detriments of litigation were noticed by more and more jurisdictions.   
6. For a long time, in the western world and especially in those leading jurisdictions, 
the civil litigation was regarded as the nominate method, or at least, the main 
method to access to justice. The court was praised as the place, sometimes even 
the only place in a state, which produces the justice. The judicial independence 
was enthroned and for many people, the civil litigation and the independent 
judicial system are symbols of liberalism and the rule of law.  
7. However, some criticism points out that the promise of liberalism brought by 
civil litigation and judicial system may be a failure promise as due to the 
economic, social, and cultural obstacles, some people have no capacity to access 
and to benefit from the justice brought by the court and the liberties linked to this 
justice33. The criticism towards the accessibility of the civil justice is never rare to 
see. As early as 1850, Abraham Lincoln said that “Never encourage litigation. 
Persuade your neighbours to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them 
 
30 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 
31 Ali, Shahla F, ‘Approaching the global arbitration table: comparing advantages of arbitrations seen 
by practitioners in east Asia and the west; (2009) 28 REv. LITIG. 791, 793. 
32 Ali, Shahla F. (2013). ‘Globalization and Financial Dispute Resolution: Examining Areas of 
Convergence and Informed Divergence in Financial ADR’ (2013) Vol.2013 J. Disp. Resol. 331 
33 Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-
Wide Access-to Justice Movement’ (1993) Vol.56, No.3 The Modern Law Review 282 
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how the nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, and expenses, and waste of 
time.34 ” These words from Lincoln, a lawyer and an enthusiastic advocate of 
liberties and rule of law, indicate that the civil litigation may be not the best way, 
or even a sensible way to resolve particular ‘justiciable’35 problems, especially 
when these problems come from everyday life36. 
8. The high level of legal cost of litigation procedure or other corresponding 
adjudicative procedure is a frequent observed and discussed problem. According 
to a survey made by the Europe Union, the estimated cost to resolve a dispute 
valued about 200,000 euros in UK’s court is 51,536 euros37, which is about 
25.8% of the case value. The legal cost in other member states can be even 
higher, for example, the estimated cost in Sweden is 65,710 euros. Although the 
estimated cost is not such high in some member states with civil law tradition38, 
the average estimated cost is still 25,337 euros, which counts 13% of the case 
value39.  
9. In UK the Legal Services Board asserted in 201240: ‘A range of research between 
2007 and 2010 has repeatedly reported a general perception that legal services are 
 
34 Abraham Lincoln, ‘Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture’ (1850), in Roy P. Basler (ed) The Collected 
Works of Abraham Lincoln: Supplement 1832-1865 (Greenwood Publishing Group 1974) 
35 ‘A matter experienced by a respondent which raised legal issues, whether or not it was recognised by the 
respondent as being “legal” and whether or not any action taken by the respondent to deal with the matter 
involved the use of any part of the civil justice system’: H. Genn Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think About 
Going to Law (Hart Publishing1999) 12. 
36 For example, those ‘bread and butter issues’ described by the Consortium on Legal Services and the Public 
(1996) Agenda for Access: The American People and Civil Justice, Chicago: American Bar Association, p.vii. 
37 ADR Centre The Cost of Non ADR – Surveying and Showing the Actual Costs of Intra-Community Commercial 
(Rome, 2010) p.49 accessed at 
https://mediatorsfederatienederland.nl/content/uploads/sites/2/2014/05/Cost_of_Non_ADR.pdf 
38 For example, the estimated cost in France is 20,500 euros and in Germany is 9,854 euros. Ibid.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Evaluation: How can we measure access to justice for individual consumers? A discussion paper (Legal Services 
Board, 2012). 
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expensive and unaffordable.41’ Briggs LJ observed that wildly disproportionate 
expenditure still occurs, albeit not at the claimant’s risk42. The Lord Chief Justice 
reported in 2016, ‘costs issues continued to be the subject of dispute between 
parties, and to generate litigation in their own right.43’ Briggs LJ also confirmed 
that the introduction of costs management had not led to a reduction in the 
costs44. And average costs in cases involving under £ 25,000 still vastly exceed 
sums in dispute45. 
10. The high cost of litigation makes the litigation becomes a cost choice for people 
to use to resolve disputes, especially when there is no much value involved in the 
case. When the plaintiff did not get a judgement in favour of himself/herself in 
the litigation, the whole litigation may become a waste of money which will 
make the plaintiff suffer the extreme financial loss. Even when the plaintiff was 
win, whether the compensation received can cover the cost may be still 
questionable.   
11. In addition, the litigation is also time consuming. The duration of litigious court 
proceedings in the first instance courts is: Austria, 129 days; Norway, 158 days; 
Germany 184 days; France, 279 days; and Italy 493 days46. And this is only for 
 
41 Evaluation: How can we measure access to justice for individual consumers? A discussion paper (Legal Services 
Board, 2012), quoting: GfK, Consumer attitudes towards the purchase of legal services (Solicitors Regulation 
Authority 2010); Study of Defendants in Magistrates’ Courts (Legal Services Research Centre 2009); Legal Advice 
for Small Businesses: Qualitative Research (AIA Research Ltd, 2010); IPSOS MORI, Perceptions of barristers – 
Research study conducted for the Bar Standards Board (Bar Standards Board 2007). 
42 Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Court Structure Review: Interim Report (Judiciary, 2016) para 5.46. 
43 The Lord Chief Justice’s Report 2015 (Lord Chief Justice, 2016). 
44 Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Court Structure Review: Final Report (Judiciary, 2016) para 5.23. 
45 C Hodges, Delivering dispute resolution a holistic review of models in England and Wales (Hart 
Publishing 2019) 169 
46 Council of European (The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice), European Judicial 
Systems – Edition 2018 (Data 2016)  
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the first instance, considering that most cases can be appealed twice, and the 
duration for an appealed case may longer than the first instance, the duration for 
finally resolving a case may take years. For example, the estimated time to finally 
resolve a dispute valued 200,000 euros is 2205 days in Italy, 700 days in 
Netherlands and 540 days in Austria47. The long period of litigation leaves the 
dispute in a pending position in a long time, which leave the parties in an 
uncertain position and may put negative influence on their other issues or 
transactions48. Further, the long duration of litigation may also mean a long term 
economic and mentality burden of parties.  
12. Besides, the time and cost, parties who participate a litigation may also need to 
endure the bureaucratic procedure, the endless cross-examination, publication of 
their privacies relevant with the dispute, and the antagonistic atmosphere in the 
court. All of these may put a serious mentality burden on parties and make them 
suffer anxiety, depression, anger or put them mental state in an unstable and 
uncomfortable position. That is probable explain why large percentages of people 
believe that the civil litigation or other formal legal processes are usually 
expensive49, terrifying, frustrating, infuriating, humiliating, time-consuming, 
perhaps all-consuming50. With these problems, there is no wonder that radical 
critics believe that “formal legal institutions, including the courts, are 
 
47 Council of European (The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice), European Judicial 
Systems – Edition 2018 (Data 2016) 
48 For example, a pending litigation will be regarded as a potential risk by banks and thus increased 
the parties cost for a loan.  
49 An American report shows that “two-third of surveyed Americans agree that it is ‘not affordable to 
bring a case to court.” See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 43  
50 David Luban, ‘Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm’ (1995) 83 GEO. L.J. 2621 
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mechanisms for maintaining the power of elite groups,” and that these institutions 
“impose dispute resolution norms that may be alien—or even harmful—to other 
members of the community.”51 
The effort of the first and the second wave of access-to-justice movement 
13. As a response to these problems and criticism of civil litigation and civil justice, 
scholars hope to find methods to improve the accessibility of the civil litigation, 
and this effort results to the first and second wave of access-to –justice 
movement. In the first and second wave of the movement, scholars aim to resolve 
the economic and organizational obstacles of civil justice52. Answers found by 
scholars in the first wave are legal aid system and legal advice mechanism, which 
aims to resolve the economic obstacle of access-to –justice53. The legal aid 
system aims to provide the poor people with free or almost free legal service by 
using public funds or legal aid lawyers, while the legal advice mechanism aims to 
provide the poor with opportunity to obtain legal advice as “the lack of access to 
reliable legal advice can be a contributing factor in creating and maintaining 
social exclusion.”54 The aim of the legal aid system and the legal advice 
mechanism is to rebalance the unfairness of legal resources and they do play a 
positive role to a certain extent. However, they also bring states’ economic 
 
51 Deborah R. Hensler, ‘Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is 
Re-Shaping Our Legal System’ (2003) 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 170 
52 Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-
Wide Access-to Justice Movement’ (1993) Vol.56, No.3 The Modern Law Review 282  
53 Ibid.  
54 Lord Chancellor’s Department and Law Centres Federation (2001) Legal and Advice Services: A 
Pathway out of Social Exclusion (London: Lord Chancellor’s Department) 11. 
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burden and then may influenced by governments’ budget. For example, in UK, by 
2014, the National Audit Office (NAO) found that the Ministry of Justice was 
going to meet its main objective of significantly reducing, in a short time, 
spending on civil legal aid55. Legal aid and advise may be not the fundamental 
solution for the unfairness of legal resources, especially the unfairness due to the 
gap of ability of people56.   
14. The second wave of the access-to-justice movement aims to provide weaker 
persons in the society, such as children, racial or linguistic minorities, disabilities, 
women, old people, consumers, and people who suffer environmental damages a 
method to effectively access to justice57. The main approaches risen in the second 
wave are class action and citizen action. The idea of class action is, although the 
individual alone is usually in capable of vindicating the rights involved 
effectively, they can manage that as a group58.This approach do change the 
traditional way of civil litigation, by forging individuals’ power to a group’s or 
class’s power, which may influence the decision-making of government and save 
the individual cost. Further, every successful class action may change the policy 
and practices towards corresponding issues59. Although the class action was 
criticism by some scholars for “breach” the traditional “due process” in some 
 
55 Implementing reforms to civil legal aid (National Audit Office, 2014). 
56 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 167. 
Also see, Atiyah, P. S. Law and Modern Society (Chinese translation version, Liaoning Education 
Publishing2010) 67   
57 Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-
Wide Access-to Justice Movement’ (1993) Vol.56, No.3 The Modern Law Review 282 
58 Ibid.  
59 Yu Fan, The Research on Class Action Issues (Peking University Press 2005) 
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cases,60the Kenneth Scott’s slightly harsh appraisal61 shows that the value of 
class action is significantly higher than the value of due process it sometimes has 
to damage.  
15. However, the case-based civil litigation is hard to change the situation of legal 
resources allocating and imbalance power between different social members 
fundamentally, on contrary, it may result to conflict between different groups’ 
rights and the confusion of policy62. Another problem of class action is that the 
action is usually dominated by some representatives or general lawyers, the 
legitimacy of such representation may be questionable, especially when 
individuals join the class without have a clear idea about their rights63. Besides, 
we should notice that the civil litigation, even under the class action approach, it 
is sometimes too extravagant to solve some disputes in daily life64.  
16. Legal aid may help here, as legal aid service can provide consumers with free or 
almost free legal representative service. However, there are also problems of legal 
aid. Not all people are eligible to use or apply for the legal aid service. Legal aid 
 
60 Sometimes the traditional due process is just impracticable in the class action. For example, in the 
case Eisen V Carlise & Jacquellin, due notification to even limited “absent” parties whose address was 
relatively easy to find, would have cost US$225,000: an impossible cost to bear for any plaintiff. See 
(1974) 417 US 156.   
61 The Kenneth’s comment is “it is a landmark in judicial sophistry to use the due process concept in 
the name of protecting the interests of class members, to reject the only litigation procedure capable 
of doing so.” See K. Scott, ‘Two Models of the Civil Process’ in J.H.Merryman (ed), Stanford Legal 
Essays (Stanford 1975) 413,420   
62 Yu Fan, The Research on Class Action Issues (Peking University Press 2005) 
63 For example, lawyers may find some individuals, told them that their interests are damaged and 
thus are capable to join a class action. Those individuals are told that they do not need to pay or do 
anything except to give an authorization to those lawyers to recognize them as representatives and 
they will receive compensation if the class action success. In this situation, interests of weak persons 
may become a profit-making tool of lawyers as the lawyer fee may significantly higher than the 
compensation.  
64 Yu Fan, The Research on Class Action Issues (Peking University Press 2005)   
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is not a real “free” service, it is free to parties because the government or the 
society pay for it. Therefore, the legal aid service cannot cover all cases, usually it 
only covers criminal cases65 or civil cases which involved people in extremely 
poor situation or have significant social impact, such as labor case66.  
17. However, sometimes, parties who need help, such as financial consumers, are 
usually not people in extremely poor situation, if they are, they properly would 
not buy financial products. Financial consumers are at a poor situation when 
against financial institutions, but they may be still not eligible to apply to the 
legal aid. For example, in China, only people under poverty line and criminal 
suspect would be covered by the legal aid, which leaves most financial consumers 
could not rely on the legal aid67. Also, most financial consumer disputes are small 
claims, so that they may not significant enough to apply to the legal aid.  
18. Another problem of legal aid is the quality of legal aid service. For many reasons, 
people can sometimes observe that lawyers who provide legal aid service are less 
experienced or motivated that their hiring peers, which may decrease people’s 
confidence on legal aid service.  
19.  Critics may argue that these problems are not problems of legal aid but problems 
of the development of legal aid. In another word, with the development of legal 
aid, these problems can be resolved. It may be true that the development of legal 
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aid could relieve these problems, the legal aid could cover more cases and more 
experienced and motivated lawyers will join this cause. However, just as 
mentioned above, the legal aid is not real “free”. The government and society pay 
for it. Therefore, an excessive legal aid may bring heavy economic burden to the 
government and society.   
Alternative justice and the third wave of access-to-justice movement  
20. The legal aid system, legal advice mechanism and the class action risen in the 
first and second wave of access-to-justice movement improved the accessibility 
of the civil justice, however, as many reasons discussed above, they cannot 
resolve the accessibility problem of civil justice fundamentally. In the third and 
the last wave of the access-to-justice movement, scholars move their eyes on the 
emerging ADR and the alternative justice68 brought by ADR.  
21. The key point of the third wave of access-to-justice movement is to argue that the 
civil litigation is not the only way that can provide justice. The scholars in this 
movement argue that there is an alternative justice besides the formal justice. 
Comparing to the formal justice produced by the courts, the alternative justice is 
argued as a more specific and more practicable justice. And it is also argued that 
 
68 The alternative justice is also known as co-existential justice or conciliatory justice to emphasize the 
most significant characteristics of this justice, as informal justice to emphasize it is not as formal as 
civil justice. We use the term alternative justice here to emphasize it is an alternative of civil justice 
produced by civil litigation (judicial system). Regard to the co-existential justice and conciliatory 
justice, see Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the 
World-Wide Access-to Justice Movement, The Modern Law Review, Vol.56, No.3 Dispute Resolution. 
Civil Justice and Its Alternatives. (May,1993), 287,289. Regard to the informal justice see Simon 
Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-Making 
(Second Edition), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.10.  
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people have right, namely “the right of dispute resolution”69, to access to the 
alternative justice. M. Grant then further demonstrate this idea. He wrote, the 
main contribution of court should be providing the society with a legal 
background of negotiation and order; that is to say, the court just provides people 
with a starting point of dispute resolution, and then most disputes should be 
resolved by people through negotiation from this starting point70.   
22. After that, ADR experienced a rapid development in many jurisdictions and, just 
as discussed above, become more and more popular in many jurisdictions, and 
there is a trend that ADR may replace some functions of courts in some 
jurisdictions like UK71. Reasons of this trend could be advantages of ADR.  
23. The first advantage of ADR (alternative justice) always been argued is the high 
accessibility to ordinary people. It is argued that ADR can help to remove 
bureaucratic obstacle in dispute resolution processes, making process of dispute 
resolution more relative to social life and more familiar by common people. This 
argument is supported by facts that some ADR scheme does not dependent on the 
services of those expensive legal professionals, but by staff who experienced a 
special training. Some supports of ADR believe that this makes alternative justice 
is more affordable to the ordinary people72. Although some observers may notice 
 
69 M Grant, ‘Dispute Resolution, and the Alternative Policy of litigation – the Third Wave of Access-to-
Justice Movement’ in Mauro Cappelletti (ed) Welfare State and Access-to-Justice (Chinese translation 
version, Legal publishing, 2000) 125 
70 Ibid. 
71 C Hodges, ‘The private sector ombudsman’ in M Hertogh and R Kirkham (eds), The Research 
Handbook on Ombudsman (Edward Elgar, 2018) 
72 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 
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that some kinds of ADR scheme, such as international commercial arbitration 
may even more complex than most litigation processes.   
24.  It is also be argued sometimes that ADR is more fast, more user-friendly, and 
familiar to people than litigation processes, and therefore, more accessible than 
litigation processes. A further argument is that with the development and widely 
used of administrative ADR, ADR can help more disputes which used to be 
invisible become visible73. This will help the government and the lawmaker 
realize the real situation in these fields and then help them to develop more 
practicable policies and laws.      
25. Another advantage of ADR always been argued is the flexibility. It is argued that 
some ADR schemes do not need to rigidly follow those hard law, these ADR 
processes may refer to soft law such as virtues and principles of law, relevant 
codes of conduct, general understanding of fairness or common-sense thinking74. 
It is argued that the alternative justice usually based on “substantive and 
procedural ‘rules’ that are flexible and good common sense – so that ‘the law’ 
does not stand in the way of achieving substantive justice in the ‘instant’ 
case.75”This may be an advantage of ADR process in certain areas, where relevant 
 
73 These disputes may be ignored because victims tend to endure these disputes due to the problem 
of accessibility of civil litigation but they may enter into public sight if victims can use more accessible 
administrative ADR schemes. For example, after the establishment of the Financial Ombudsman 
Service (FOS) in 2001, complaints dealt by the FOS increased form 22,100(2001-2002) to 336,381 
(2016-2017). It is hard to image that reasons for this significant increase is the number of UK’s 
financial consumer disputes increased 10 times during this period of time. A reasonable interpretation 
is that more and more financial consumer were encouraged to bring their disputes to the FOS which 
results to more and more financial consumer disputes were brought into the public sight. Regard to 
the data of FOS, see FOS Annual Review 2001-2002 13,17 and FOS annual review 2016/2017 p9. 
74 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 
75 Ibid.  
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hard laws are not well developed or the development of law cannot catch the 
rapid development of practice, such as the fields of internet and digital content. 
Considering the rapid development of techniques in these fields, law-maker may 
find it is hard to follow the pace. As consequence, observers may sometimes find 
that some practices in these fields fall into the vacuum of law. In this situation, 
ADR may be helpful to resolve these problems by using already existing virtues 
of law, good common-sense and general understanding of fairness. Experience 
gained through these ADR practices may help the law-maker to draft relevant law 
later.   
26. Besides these advantages above, it is also argued that one of ADR advantages is 
ADR may resolve disputes in a ‘peace’ way. To be specific, it is argued that 
litigation processes could lead to an adversarial atmosphere, which could 
seriously damage the relationship between parties. Comparing to litigation 
processes, ADR processes may lead to a more friendly atmosphere between 
parties, which can maintain or even restore the relationship between parties to a 
certain extent. It is believed that this maintenance and restoring of relationship 
between parties could benefit both the development of markets and harmonious 
of society76. It is also believed that this “peace” and “autonomy” brought by ADR 
may help to create and maintain a code of conduct, a moral system, and an 
identity in a community, which could increase the cohesion, autonomy, and self – 
discipline in a community77. Further, ADR may be able to increase the autonomy 
 
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid.  
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ability of a community; reduce the extent of need of public power involved and 
reduce the need of public resources such as budgets for legal aid system and free 
legal advice.    
27. Besides these advantages above, it is also argued that ADR can help to explore 
the new model of judicial system. People who argue that believe that the aim of 
ADR is never replacing the role of judicial system and civil litigation in general, 
instead ADR is a part of the reform of modern judicial system78. It is believed that 
as increasing accessibility and flexibility of litigation processes is also an aim of 
modern judicial reform, experience of ADR could be introduced to judicial 
system to help judicial system reform itself. It is true that some ADR techniques, 
such as mediation and negotiation, was already be emerged into some 
jurisdiction’s legal system and are encouraged by court and judges79. In future, 
ADR may have more close connection with judicial system, which may create a 
new negotiable or harmonious judicial model80.  
28. Some scholars have criticised ADR, described ADR as a place can only produce 
‘Second-Class’ justice81, essentially on the basis that ADR does not have as good 
mechanism as courts’ to protect procedural justice and hence may put the weaker 
party in a danger position. However, the focus of those criticisms was on those 
traditional ADR models such as mediation and arbitration and was irrelevant with 
 
78 Ibid.  
79 Loukas A. Mistelis, ‘ADR in England and Wales’ (2012) 12 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 167; also see Harry T. 
Edwards, ‘Commentary: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?’ (1999) 99 Harv. L. 
Rev. 671, 672  
80 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007)  
81 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-Making 
(3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020)  
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new ADR models such as Ombudsman. It also fails to address the empirical 
evidence that consumer, who are widely accepted as weaker party in consumer 
disputes, tend to use ADR like consumer Ombudsman instead of courts-including 
small claims procedure82.  
29. Just like observed by Prof. Hodges, justice is not the only criterion on which 
people wish to live, and resolve their disputes: many people apply cost-
proportionality and various other factors83. From this aspect, rather than say ADR 
produce ‘Second-Class’ justice, it may better to say ADR provides people with a 
more specific, more practicable, and more accessible justice – an alternative 
(informal) justice. Although this alternative justice sometimes may not as justice 
as a civil (formal) justice, it may still be a good justice and is better than no 
justice84. 
30. Another criticism of ADR is that ADR may lead to unfairness and misleading of 
laws. 85This criticism focus on sometimes ADR may issue a solution or an award 
referring to its own rules, principles, and virtues instead of state’s law. However, 
as observed by Mnookin and Kornhauser, those rules, principles, or virtues an 
ADR scheme often refer to, if not law itself, is still the ‘shadow of law’86.  
 
82 C Hodges, ‘The private sector Ombudsman’ in Marc Hertogh and Richard Kirkham (eds) Research 
Handbook on the Ombudsman (Edward Elagar Publishing 2018) 
83 Ibid. 
84 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 
85 Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, ‘The End of Law’ (2004) 84 B.U.L. REV. 1 13,14 
86 R.H. Mnookin and L.Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ (1988) 
88 Yale Law Journal I 950.  
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31. A good example is the UK’s FOS scheme. The rules of the FOS said that 
Ombudsman will resolve disputes according to the general understanding of 
fairness. It seems that the FOS refer to common sense instead of law, however, 
one may notice that it is also in UK’s law that financial firms are required to treat 
their consumers fairly, so it is possible to argue that the FOS also refer to law, 
virtues and principles of law87. From this aspect, supporters of ADR may argue 
that an ADR resolve disputes also by following law, the only difference between 
ADR and litigation processes is that ADR follows a more flexible form of laws, 
or virtue of laws, which may broad the application of law.     
32. In summary, although situations are different in different jurisdiction and the 
advantages and disadvantages of ADR and litigation processes depending on 
local conditions, it seems possible to identify a general trend that ADR is more 
and more popular in some leading jurisdictions and in some advanced 
jurisdictions people using ADR more often than classic litigation. It seems 
suggest that ADR may have already be widely accepted by many jurisdictions as 
a useful part of diversity dispute resolution system in modern society and a useful 
alternative of litigation processes.  
33. A possible explain may be that ADR have some advantages than litigation 
processes. These advantages could be accessibility, flexibility, fast, easy-to-use, 
friendly atmosphere, and sometimes help to achieve substantive justice. With 
 
87 C Hodges, ‘The private sector Ombudsman’ in Marc Hertogh and Richard Kirkham (eds) Research 
Handbook on the Ombudsman (Edward Elagar Publishing 2018); C Hodges, ‘Consumer Ombudsman: 
Better Regulation and Dispute Resolution’ (2014) Volume 15, Issue 4 ERA Forum 593 
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these advantages, ADR may produce results which, far from being “second-
class”, are better, even qualitatively, than the results of contentious litigation88. 
This may explain why ADR is popular now in some jurisdictions and sections. 
However, a man should bear in mind that these advantages of ADR and weakness 
of litigation processes also depending on local condition. ADR may not suitable 
for all jurisdictions and a successful ADR scheme in one jurisdiction may fail in 
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Chapter III Criteria of a Quality ADR Scheme 
1. Before the thesis begin to discuss whether an ADR scheme specially designed for 
financial service market, it is necessary to discuss criteria of dispute resolution 
firstly. By discussing criteria of dispute resolution, a standard of quality ADR 
scheme could be set up as a basement for further discussion about comparing 
between litigation and ADR and comparing between financial consumer ADR 
practice in different jurisdictions.    
2. In continuous development of ADR, there are many criteria were used to examine 
whether an ADR scheme is quality or not. For the sake of discussion, these criteria 
would be divided into two categories in this thesis, namely constitutional criteria, 
and performance criteria.  
Constitutional Criteria of a Quality ADR Scheme 
3. Constitutional criteria are those criteria established by law or constitution of an 
ADR scheme, which aim to secure an ADR scheme works in line with general 
understanding of virtues of dispute resolution system, to prevent an ADR scheme 
to produce a poor solution, and to keep people’s trust and confidence on an ADR 
scheme.   
4. An often-mentioned constitutional criteria of ADR is independence and impartiality. 
It is argued that independence and impartiality are key criteria for all dispute 
resolution system including ADR and litigation processes89. Without independence 
and impartiality people would hardly to believe that an ADR scheme can provide 
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them with a fair solution, even in the situation that solution may generally fair 
indeed. 
5. To fulfil the criteria of independence and impartiality, means to fulfil many relevant 
requirements. For example, the governance. The ADR scheme should ensure that it 
is governed and operated by an independent body which has no significant interest’s 
connection with its main users. Directors of the scheme should have no conflict 
interests and should be selected in an appropriate way through due process. A 
separate supervision board or an administrative office can be established to oversee 
the activities of ADR entities to secure their independence and impartiality.  
6. The ADR scheme should also ensure that the sources of funds would not influence 
its independence and impartial. If an ADR scheme collects its funds from a certain 
industry, and the industry is highly relevant with disputes resolved by this scheme, 
the designer of the scheme should make an appropriate arrangement to ensure it 
would not suffer, or seems to suffer, improper influence from this industry. For 
example, the UK’s FOS collects most of its funds from financial service industry, 
but this funds mainly comes from a levy required by law and was collected by the 
UK’s financial authority (FCA), and then give to FOS by the FCA90 . With this 
arrangement, the FOS has no directly economic connection and the number of funds 
would not link to the outcome of the procedure. A (Financial) Consumer ADR 
scheme governed by financial firms’ society and funded mainly by financial firms 
would always trigger consumers’ concern about independence and impartiality and 
 
90 Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer-to-business Dispute 
Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 2012) 
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decrease consumers’ confidence on it and willingness to use it. 
7. The scheme should also ensure that people in charge of ADR process should be 
appointed for a term of sufficient duration and are not liable to be relieved from 
their duties without just cause. It also requires to ensure that these people are not 
subject to any instructions from either party or their representatives and are 
remunerated in a way that is not linked to the outcome of the procedure. Further, 
these people should have a continuing obligation to disclose to the ADR body any 
circumstances that may, or may be seen to, affect their independence and 
impartiality or give rise to a conflict of interest with either party to the dispute they 
are asked to resolve91.     
8. Another important constitutional criterion is the transparency. It is also a criterion 
required by EU directive.92To be specific, the EU directive requires Member 
States ensure that ADR entities make publicly available clear and easily 
understandable information on many essential issues, such as contact details, the 
natural persons in charge and their expertise, impartiality and independence, 
details of working procedure and enforceability of result. 
9. This publicity may help people who hope to use ADR scheme access it and use it 
in a correct way. There are many methods to fulfil this requirement, for example, 
ADR institutions may provide users with free consultation service online or on 
phone and publish all information on its website.  
 
91 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes Art.6 
92 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes 
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10. By fulfil this criterion, an ADR scheme could deliver correct information of itself, 
such as procedure rules, the scope of jurisdiction, whether the result is binding or 
not, and other key information to the public. This could be useful to help parties 
receive the clear and accessible information they need to help them made an 
informed decision before engaging in an ADR procedure. 93”   
11. Fairness is another important constitutional criterion which is also be emphasized 
by EU directive94. This criterion mainly emphasizes that parties should be treated 
fairness during the whole process of dispute resolution procedure, including the 
notice of accepting solution or not. For example, Directive 2013/11/EU on 
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes requires member states to 
ensure that a consumer ADR scheme would provide both parties opportunity to 
express their point of view and been provided with arguments, evidence, 
documents, and facts put forward by the other party.  
12. The directive also requires member states to ensure that both parties would receive 
a writing notice of the outcome produced by a consumer ADR scheme with a 
statement of the grounds on which the outcome is based. Besides, parties should 
also be fully noticed that they have right to choose to accept the outcome or not, 
with knowledge that only participating in the procedure does not preclude 
possibility to seeks remedy through litigation processes and the outcome produced 
 
93 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC section 39. 
94 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, Art.9 
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by a consumer ADR scheme may be different with the outcome determined by a 
court applying legal rules.  
13. It could be observed from the above that the criterion of fairness mainly concerns 
whether parties received a generally fair treatment in procedure. This procedural 
fairness was argued as very important because parties would tend to believe the 
outcome is generally fair if they receive generally fair treatment in the 
procedure95. While the procedural fairness would also help parties to believe the 
ADR scheme and dispute resolution process is independent and impartiality96.  
14. In summary, fulfil criterion of fairness may increase users’ confidence on ADR 
scheme and make the outcome or solution easier to be accepted, as procedural 
fairness making the outcome more likely to be fair, too. However, observers may 
notice that some consumer ADR scheme gives consumer a little better treatment 
in procedure. For example, in UK’s FOS scheme, if consumer choose to accept 
the outcome, the outcome would become binding for both parties. Whether this 
practice would trigger a concern of fairness would be discussed later in chapter 
VI. 
15. Another constitutional criterion emphasized by EU directive is liberty97. This 
criterion mainly includes two aspects. The first is an agreement between a 
consumer and a business to submit disputes to an ADR scheme before the disputes 
were occurred and would depriving consumer’s right to bring the disputes to the 
 
95 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 195 
96 Ibid. 
97 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, Art.10 
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court is not binding. The second is an outcome produced by an ADR scheme may 
be binding of parties only if they were informed of this binding force in advance 
and specifically accept it.    
16. The aim of this requirement could be to protect parties, especially consumers’ 
rights to bring disputes to court. Reasons behind this requirement may be the 
litigation was regarded as the last defense of social justice and seeking justice 
through litigation was regarded as a part of human right. However, it should be 
noticed that this special protection was mainly towards consumers, an agreement 
made before disputes occurring would be binding if it only depriving traders’ right 
to bring the case to the court. And, it is accepted by the directive that specific 
acceptance by the trader is not required if national rules provide those solutions 
are binding on traders. Reasons of these exception may be that consumers are in a 
weaker position and therefore deserve a special protection.   
17. Besides those constitutional criteria required by EU directive above, legality is 
also a constitutional criterion required by EU directive98. This criterion mainly 
requires that a solution or outcome produced by an ADR scheme should not 
deprive any special protection to consumers provided by laws of consumers’ 
resident.  
18. This criterion could be observed combing with the criterion of liberty, as the 
criterion of liberty aims to ensure that special protection to consumers provided by 
procedure law would not be deprived by an ADR scheme, the criterion of legality 
 
98 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, Art.11 
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aim to ensure that special protection to consumers provided by substantive law of 
consumers’ resident would not be deprived by an ADR scheme.  
19. These two constitutional criteria of consumer ADR scheme put forward by EU 
directive seems to imply that the law-maker of EU believe that the aim of 
consumer ADR scheme is to provide consumers with a protection beyond or at 
least no worse than a protection provided by national laws.    
20. Confidentiality may be considered as another constitutional criterion, as 
confidentiality was sometimes regarded as one main advantage of ADR99. 
Reasons behind could be an ADR scheme usually tries to encourage parties to 
reach a both accepted settlement by communicating with each other with no 
reservation. In this case, confidentiality and privacy are crucial as parties cannot 
have an open and honest conversation if they know what they said may become 
unfavourable evidence in further procedure or may be realised to the public. Thus, 
unless required by law to make it public, a quality ADR entity should always pay 
attention to confidentiality and privacy protection.  
21. However, it should be noticed that in some consumer ADR scheme, disclosure 
information about cases could become deterrence to those traders refusing to 
enforce a settlement. And in some ADR schemes, information of disputes would 
be published with a pseudonym. However, in almost all consumer ADR schemes, 
information of consumers is usually kept confidentiality.         
 
99 EU regulations on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes article 12, 13 and 14; EU 
Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters section 16,23 
and article 7; EU Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes 
section 29 and EU commission implementing regulation (EU)2015/1051 article 6. 
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22. Besides those constitutional criteria discussed above, expertise could be also an 
important constitutional criterion of an ADR scheme. A quality ADR scheme 
should always be operated by competent staff with code of conduct. IT would be 
hard to regard an ADR scheme as quality if its staff are not component and well 
trained. Although people in charge of ADR processes are not obliged to be 
qualified legal professionals, it reasonable to say that they should at least possess 
the necessary knowledge, including a general understanding of law and relevant 
knowledge in dispute occurred fields100. Besides that, it may also important for a 
quality ADR scheme to establish a code of conduct and relevant ethical rules for 
its staff and make sure these rules are also available for the public so that parties 
can reasonably expect ADR staff’s act and complaint when ADR staff breach the 
code of conduct101.  
 
Performance Criteria of a Quality ADR Scheme 
  
23. Comparing to constitutional criteria of an ADR scheme using to test whether an 
ADR scheme is constituted well or not, performance criteria of an ADR scheme 
are those criteria using to test whether an ADR scheme is performed well. For 
example, whether an ADR scheme can deal with disputes submitted to it in a 
reasonable time, whether an ADR scheme could provide its service with charging 
a cheap fee, and whether an ADR scheme can produce a general fair outcome.  
 
100 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC section 36. 
101 Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters section 17. 
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24. Comparing to constitutional criteria which are usually care about by legal 
professionals, it could be say that performance criteria are more care about by 
users and common people. It could say that an ordinary person who never receive 
legal education may not know a dispute resolution process is independent or not 
but it is sure thing that he could know a dispute resolution process is fast or slow.  
25. An always mentioned performance criterion of an ADR scheme is fast or slow. 
This criterion is also used to test litigation process. For example, European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) uses the figure of disposition 
time in its report as a performance indicator on court efficiency102. According to 
the report, the average disposition time of litigation process is 233 days in 2016103.   
26. Comparing to litigation processes, it could be saying that an ADR scheme was 
hoped to resolve disputes in a much faster way than litigation processes. For 
example, in EU, an ADR scheme was required to make their outcomes available 
within a period of 90 calendar days after the ADR scheme has received the 
complaint file104. This high criterion of disposition time of ADR scheme may 
imply that there is a common understanding that an ADR scheme should and 
could resolve a case much faster than litigation processes. 
27. Besides time, cost is another important performance criterion. When people bring 
their disputes to court or to an ADR institution, most people would take cost into 
 
102 CEPEJ, European judicial systems - Efficiency and quality of justice - CEPEJ Studies No. 26, 239 
103 CEPEJ, European judicial systems - Efficiency and quality of justice - CEPEJ Studies No. 26, 251 
104 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC article 8 (c) and article8(e) and Directive 
2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters section 15 and 16. 
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considering. After all, in most cases, people who bring their disputes to court or 
ADR institution hope to seek economic remedy. Therefore, if cost of a dispute 
resolution process is higher than claims, most people may decide to not use it as it 
would become economic unreasonable. 
28. The cost could be another important criterion, a quality ADR would be supposed 
to be able to provide dispute resolution in a reasonable cost. This could be even 
more correct in consumer ADR, as data clearly shows that most consumer 
disputes involve very small sums105, and consumer ADR systems is supported to 
provide speedy and fair dispute resolution at very low cost106. Therefore, a quality 
consumer ADR scheme should try its best to control consumers’ cost of using it. 
That could be why the EU directive requires ADR schemes should be free of 
charge or only charge a nominal fee for consumers. Besides, controlling cost of 
consumer does not only mean reducing consumers’ case fee, it may also include 
reduce other cost which may occur in the process. For example, to reduce the 
travelling cost and salary lose of consumers, an ADR scheme may hold its 
meeting online or in weekend. To control cost of hiring a professional legal 
representative, a consumer ADR scheme may require business cannot use a legal 
professional representative in the process like we can observe in UK’s FOS. 
29. Besides time and cost, accessibility is another important performance criterion of 
an ADR scheme. This criterion mainly cares about whether the information of an 
 
105 C Hodges, ‘Consumer Redress: Ideology and Empiricism’ in K Purnhagen and P Rott (eds), Varieties 
of European Economic Law and Regulation. Festschrift for Hans Micklitz, (Springer, 2014). 
106 C Hodges, ‘Consumer Ombudsman: Better Regulation and Dispute Resolution’ (2014) Volume 15 
Issue 4 ERA Forum 593  
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ADR scheme is easy to access by potential users and whether the service provided 
by an ADR scheme is easy to use.  
30. The publicity of information is essential, because no matter how good an ADR 
scheme are, people would not use it if they do not know it. On the other hand, 
people may tend to use an ADR scheme, if they always hear of it and can easily 
find sufficient information of it. An ADR scheme may use many methods to 
publicity its information, for example, it can publish its information online, 
advertising online or on TV, providing free consulting service, and hold public 
campaigns.  
31. Easy to use is also an essential part of accessibility criterion. This criterion could 
be tested by what users need to do during the dispute resolution processes. For 
example, if a person uses a litigation process or an ADR scheme using adversarial 
model such as arbitration, this person may need to submit formal application in a 
certain form and claims in written. The user then needs to produce relevant 
evidence according to relevant rules of evidence, submit this evidence to the court 
or arbitrator and then produce copies according to the number of other parties and 
forward these copies to other parties. If the user cannot submit enough evidence to 
fulfil his duty of proving, he may suffer unfavourable consequence. 
32. However, if a user uses a, for example, ombudsman service, which uses 
investigation model. The user may only need to submit a simple application form 
stating his claims, statement of fact, prima facie evidence and willingness to 
submit his complaint to ADR institution. After that, the institution will investigate 
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the case and collect evidence positively to suggest a solution or produce a result. 
In this situation, it could be said that the ADR scheme using investigative 
approach provide a service with a higher accessibility. 
33. In this thesis, the level of accessibility would be tested by the data of total 
enquires and complaints received and the data of enquires and complaints 
received per ten thousand people. The logic behind is that the concept of 
accessibility is intended to indicate the difficulty level for users to discover and 
use a dispute resolution system. Therefore, the scheme with higher accessibility 
would have more users while the scheme with less accessibility would have less 
users. As the two data mentioned above have a positively correlated with the 
number of users of a scheme, it would be able to indicate the level of accessibility 
to some extent.                    
 
34. Besides those performance criteria discussed above, effectiveness is also an 
important performance criterion. Whether an ADR scheme could be regarded as 
effective or not could be test by some figures. The first figure is caseload per year, 
which means how many complaints can be resolved in one year. Usually, it could 
argue that an ADR scheme with high caseload per year is more effective. 
However, it should also be noticed that sometimes an ADR scheme has a high 
caseload figure because the jurisdiction that scheme located has higher population. 
Therefore, the figure of caseload per year per person should be taking into 
considering. It should also notice that in case that caseload of an ADR scheme is 
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significantly low, problems may be not come from effectiveness but other criteria 
such as time, cost, and accessibility.        
 
35. Another figure that needs to be looked here could be clearance rate per year. The 
clearance rate is a simple ratio, obtained by dividing the number of resolved cases 
by the number of incoming cases, expressed in a percentage. A clearance rate per 
year close to 100 % indicates the ability of an ADR scheme to resolve 
approximately as many cases as the number of incoming cases within the given 
year. A Clearance Rate per year above 100 % indicates the ability of the scheme 
to resolve more cases than those received, thus reducing the number of pending 
cases at the end of the year, including any existing backlog. Finally, a Clearance 
Rate per year below 100 % appears when the number of incoming cases is higher 
than the number of resolved cases. In this case, the total number of pending cases 
will increase. Essentially, the clearance rate shows how an ADR scheme is coping 
with the in-flow of cases.   
 
36. Another data may be used to test efficiency criterion is cost per case. This data 
could be obtained by dividing the expenditure of an ADR scheme in one year by 
all disputes the scheme resolved in this year. This data could show how much 
money was spent to resolve one dispute. In theory, an ADR scheme with a lower 
cost per case is more efficient than a scheme with a higher cost per case, as the 
former may resolve disputes with less expenditure.   
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Chapter IV The Diversity of ADR 
1. In last two chapters, the thesis discussed reasons of development of ADR and 
criteria of quality ADR schemes. In this chapter, the diversity of ADR would be 
mainly discussed to show readers a comprehensive image of many different 
models, techniques, and policies about ADR. This discussion of the diversity of 
ADR would establish a basement for further comparison in models, techniques, 
and policies in financial consumer ADR schemes in UK, Hong Kong, and 
Australia. This comparison would be made in chapter VI.   
2. ADR comes in many different types and contexts: arbitration, mediation and so 
on. Much of the early literature on ADR was about different types of mediation, 
mainly because when this term was firstly been used in America, it did mean 
different mediation practices in or out of litigation procedure which aims to help 
both parties to enter a settlement and end the litigation107. However, with the 
development of ADR in these years, ADR in more recent context includes many 
different practices such as arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, and 
Ombudsman. In this situation, referring to ADR without being more specific 
could lead to confusion and irrelevance, this would be one of reasons why the 
diversity of ADR would be discussed here. 
3. In the modern context, ADR could be divided into different categories according 
to different standard. For example, according to whether the ADR is part of 
litigation, ADR could be divided into ADR in court and ADR out of court. An 
 
107 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 
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ADR in court could happen before a litigation as a part of mandatory preceding 
procedure of litigation108, or during the process of litigation109. While an ADR out 
of court usually does not have directive relation with litigation processes.  
4. Another example is that, according to whether judicial power or administrative 
power was involved, ADR could be divided into private ADR, judicial ADR, and 
administrative ADR. An example of private ADR could be an International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration, it holds by an international non-
government institution, which has no significant relation with legal or 
administrative power.  
5. An example of judicial ADR could be judicial mediation in China, judicial 
mediation happens during the process of litigation and is chaired by a judge. 
Judges could make a judgement according to the content of settlement made in 
judicial mediation to make it binding and enforceable.    
6. Administrative ADR is ADR where administrative power is involved. An 
example of administrative ADR could be financial consumer hotline in China. 
This service was hold by People Bank of China (PBC), which is China’s national 
bank and one of financial authorities. Financial consumer could phone this 
 
108 For example, in China, there is a mandatory arbitration procedure before an employment 
litigation. Employer and employee who hopes to start a litigation must firstly apply for an employment 
arbitration. Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 
2007) 127  
109 For example, in China, both parties could agree to enter in a mediation hold by judge during the 
process of litigation. Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University 
Press 2007) 127 
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hotline to complaint banks’ service, and staff of PBC would try to mediate 
disputes110.        
7. Among many ways to classify ADR, an important way is to classify ADR 
according to techniques. Techniques of ADR are those decision-making methods 
used in ADR schemes to resolve disputes. Techniques of ADR is keeping 
evolving, in late of last century, when ADR firstly appears in America, mediation 
was regarded as main and almost only technique of ADR, at that time, mediation 
was considered as another name of ADR111. With the development of ADR, 
helped negotiation and arbitration become widely used in ADR, and become 
techniques of ADR. In later years, Ombudsman were introduced into ADR and 
become another main techniques of ADR112. According to techniques used, ADR 
could be divided into four different models, helped negotiation model, mediation 
model, arbitration model and Ombudsman model.  
 
8. These four techniques could be further divided into two categories, consultative 
techniques, and adjudicative techniques113. Helped negotiation and mediation 
belong to consultative techniques. They try to provide parties with help such as a 
friendly atmosphere and legal professional advice to help parties reach an 
 
110 See, People Bank of China, 12363 guidelines for the use of financial consumer rights protection 
hotline, access at http://www.huainan.gov.cn/wap/public/content/1258311715 last visited 9/8/2021 
111 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020); Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute 
Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 15 
112 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 
113 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 270 
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agreement or settlement of disputes. Procedure of helped negotiation and 
mediation could be very flexible and there is usually no mandatory procedural 
requirement or evidence rules applied to these procedures.  
9. Advantages of consultative procedures are flexibility, friendly atmosphere, 
informality, and possibility to resolve disputes at the early stage. However, the 
main problem of consultative procedure is that whether an agreement or a 
settlement could be reached or not is not secured. And if there is no agreement 
and settlement achieved, time and money spend in these procedures could be 
wasted. Another problem of these procedure is that it is concerned that as these 
techniques may be too flexible, there is a risk that agreement or settlement would 
‘in practice be forced on parties—especially weaker parties such as individual 
consumers—irrespective of the merits of their case, and without proper advice or 
consent’114.  
10. Arbitration and Ombudsman belong to adjudicative techniques. These techniques 
usually have a procedure to secure a binding award or decision would be made at 
the end of the procedure. However, approaches used in these procedures could be 
different. For example, most arbitration procedures use an adversarial approach 
like litigation processes, and arbitrators stand in a passive position. On the 
contrary, many Ombudsman procedures use an investigative approach, where 
Ombudsman will investigate disputes and collect evidence proactively.   
 
114 See C Hodges, ‘The private sector ombudsman’ in M Hertogh and R Kirkham (eds), The Research 
Handbook on Ombudsman (Edward Elgar, 2018) 
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11. In the early time of ADR, even very knowledge legal professionals would 
believe, only consultative processes such as negotiation and mediation are ADR 
processes and adjudicative process is not a part of ADR.115However, the modern 
concept of ADR is broad and is not rare to see an adjudicative process is used in 
the ADR practice116. For example, there are many kinds of arbitration, such as 
‘commercial arbitration’, ‘court-annexed arbitration117’, ‘final offer 
arbitration118’and ‘rent a judge119’.  
12. Besides those different kinds of arbitration, a technique introduced from public 
law sector, namely Ombudsman, was also introduced to ADR.120The term 
‘Ombudsman’ is a word ordinarily used to name an official appointed by 
government to receive and examine complaints made by citizens against the 
administration121. But it later walks into the private sector to serve as an 
institution for investigating and dealing with complaints made by members of the 
public against individuals or bodies in particular areas of commercial and 
 
115 Owen M. Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1993) 93 Yale L.J. 1073,1983; Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to Justice Movement’ 
(1993) Vol.56, No.3 The Modern Law Review 282; Deborah R. Hensler, ‘Our Courts, Ourselves: How the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System’ (2003) 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 
165 
116 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 331; Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute 
Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 270  
117 R J Broderick, ‘Court-annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works’ (1972) 72 4 Judicature 219  
118 R Posner, ‘The Summary Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: Some 
Cautionary Observations’ (2012) 53 University of Chicago Law Review 366, 387 
119 A S Kim, ‘Rent-a-Judge and the Cost of Selling Justice’(2015) 44 Duke Law Journal 166  
120 M Adler (eds), Administrative Justice in Context (Hart Publishing 2010) 
121 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 
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professional activity – energy, insurance, banking, media, etc. in some 
jurisdictions such as UK122.  
13. The Ombudsman not only offer an informal and cost-free alternative to courts but 
they possess other advantages, including a freedom to arbitrate, negotiate and 
redress the balance of power between individuals and large institutions123. 
Initially, Ombudsman listen to the complaint. Then they investigate. Then if they 
find the complaint legitimate, they engage others in resolution of the dispute. 
They may require the production of records and witness from anyone in the 
organization, including the top officers124. Unlike litigation, the role of an 
Ombudsman office is not viewed as a battle of adversaries. And unlike a 
mediator, ombudsman person can take sides, not in favour of the complaint and 
against the respondent, but in favour of honesty, integrity, legality, and 
principle125. 
14. However, it is true that sometimes, the line between these techniques, models, 
procedures, and approaches are ambiguous, especially the line between the 
helped negotiation and mediation126. But that it is not to say this distinction does 
not have any value, the basic analytical value of the distinction can never be 
ignored. Just like observed by Gulliver, even in those marginal cases, the 
distinction is still both valid and usefully suggestive if careful observation and 
 
122 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn Cambridge 2009) 401,404   
123 Ibid. 
124 S A Weigand, ‘A Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model’ (2012) 12 
1 Ohio State Journal and Dispute Resolution 120 
125 Ibid. 
126 P Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Academic Press 1979) 29  
                                                                                       51 
 
analysis were given, therefore, it would be more so in other cases where the 
contrast is more marked127. Further, the aim of this discussion here is to help 
readers knowing that there are many kinds of ADR in the world, and this 
classification does provide readers an aspect to know the difference between 
different ADR schemes.   
15. However, it should also be noticed that ADR techniques and models are not 
static, they are keep evolving. There are many tries to innovate new ADR 
techniques and models which now regard as vanguard of the ADR 
development128. For example, under the idea of helped negotiation, there are 
some innovations aiming to encourage the parties to achieve an agreement or 
further enter a mediation to make a settlement.  
16. In the area of mediation, processes have developed around attempts to reinforce 
mediation by infusing or jointing it with other forms of dispute resolution. One of 
principal forms of this development is mediation-arbitration129. The hybrid can be 
regarded as two-layer or multi-layer process where different techniques are used 
in sequence, parties will move on from one process to another only where 
attempts to achieve an outcome through the first have been exhausted130. A 
typical mediation-arbitration process is that the parties will first chair by a 
mediation to try to achieve a settlement, and if there is no settlement achieved, or 
 
127 Ibid. 
128 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 277 
129 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 287. 
130 J L Comaroff and S Roberts, Rules and Processes (University of Chicago Press 1981) 108.    
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the chair believe that there is no opportunity to achieve a settlement, the 
mediation will end with an arbitration start, the mediator will become the 
arbitrator and deliver an arbitration award.  
17. Although suffered many doubts and criticisms,131the mediation-arbitration is 
currently be accepted widely as a good process for an ADR scheme. This 
provides us with one very important information. That is, it is possible to use a 
multi-layer process, which consultative process and adjudicative process are used 
in sequence, in one single ADR scheme, after resolving some key problems and 
concerns132. This multi-layer process has at least two advantages. The first is that 
considering not every consultative process can achieve a settlement, an 
adjudicative process followed can make sure that there is a result produced by the 
ADR scheme to avoid the ADR scheme becomes a waste of time and money133. 
The second is that for those parties who hope to use an adjudicative process at the 
first, the use of a multi-layer process provide parties an opportunity to rethink the 
 
131 For example, fully argued that mediation and arbitration are essentially different in their perpose 
and morality – the morality of mediation is optimum settlement, while the morality of arbitration is to 
be found in the contractual agreement to enter arbitration. L L Fuller, ‘Collective Bargaining and the 
Arbitration’ (2003)18 3 Wisconsin Law Review 39. Spencer and Zammit argued that in no event should 
the mediator ever serve as arbitrator, even if requested to by the parties. Because the possibility that 
the mediator might later become the arbitrator would tend to make the parties less open and candid 
during mediation. In addition, the arbitrator must be impartial. His activities as a mediator in the same 
dispute may easily have an adverse effect on this necessary characteristic. J M Spencer and J P 
Zammit, ‘Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for Private Resolution of Dispute between Divorced or 
Separated Parents’ (2005) 911 Duke Law Journal, 932. Newman doubts the neutral’s capacity legally to 
act in an adjudicative capacity while at the same time undermining the efficacy of the initial mediation 
where the mediator should seek to create an atmosphere of trust and a willingness to impart 
confidences to him in the caucus sessions. P Neman, ‘Mediation –Arbitration (MedArb): Can it Work 
Legally?’ 60 3 Arbitration 174 And Elliot concerns the natural justice and lack of control. D C Elliot, 
‘Med/arb: Fraught with Danger or Ripe with Opportunity’ 62 3 Arbitration 175      
132 Such as whether the same person can act as both mediator and the arbitrator.  
133 Although, actually, even there is no agreement achieved in the consultative process and there is 
adjudicative process followed, the consultative process should not be regarded as a pure waste of 
time and money as parties can get better understanding on their legal positions and the other parties’ 
argument during the process and sometimes, no settlement is better than a bad settlement.  
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possibility of achieving a settlement, which is highlight one of advantages of 
ADR scheme.  
18. Although this mediation-arbitration model would be regarded as an arbitration 
model in the standard of this thesis, as it can be seen as just an arbitration 
procedure which provide the parties an opportunity to first have a mediation. It 
may become a new technique or model in future if it is keep evolving.   
19. The evolution of ADR techniques makes the classification of ADR techniques 
and models becomes even harder. As this evolution shows that techniques are 
generic and an ADR scheme may use more than one techniques, it put a question 
that how could classify them. For example, if an ADR scheme using mediation-
arbitration procedure, which model should it belong to? The answer of this 
question has not be determined, but in this thesis, for the purpose of facilitating 
discussion and comparison, if an ADR uses different techniques in sequence, it 
would be classified according to the technique used in the final stage. For 
example, UK’s FOS scheme uses mediation and Ombudsman in sequence. As 
discussed above, when a consumer complaint to the FOS, staff of FOS will firstly 
try to mediate consumers and financial firms in a mediation procedure, and then 
if a settlement cannot be made, disputes would be moved to an Ombudsman for 
the final decision. So, FOS scheme would be classified as using Ombudsman 
model, because although FOS using a mediation in its procedure, the technique 
used in its final stage is Ombudsman. 
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20. And, if different techniques were used parallelly by one ADR institution, it may 
be classified as two ADR service using two ADR models. For example, the ICC 
provides both mediation and arbitration service, but there is no significant 
connection between these two services. If parties using ICC mediation and fail to 
make a settlement, hope to use ICC arbitration, they have to make a separate 
arbitration agreement and start the arbitration procedure all from the beginning. 
Therefore, ICC mediation and ICC arbitration would be classified as two ADR 
services using mediation model and arbitration model in this thesis. This method 
of distinguish was used in this thesis only to avoid confusion, it certainly not the 
only method to distinguish ADR.  
21. Another place may lead confusion is that sometimes many different names used 
to call ADR using same model and technique. For example, people may see 
lawyer negotiation134, mini-trial135 and early neutral evaluation,136but in view of 
this thesis, they are all ADR using helped negotiation model and using helped 
negotiation as their main technique. In summary, the four-model classification 
 
134 Lawyer negotiation means that the negotiation occurs mainly between lawyers of both parties 
instead of parties themselves. It is argued that lawyers usually have better understanding about the 
main points and possible legal consequence of the dispute and it is easier to keep claim, therefore, it 
will easier to reach an agreement.  
135 The mini-trail is described as an ‘alternative’ device invoked in aid of settlement during lawyer 
negotiation. It first developed in North America in the context of commercial disputes. The mini-trial 
will let the lawyers discuss with their clients, to tell them their strengths and weakness of the case and 
provide them with an indication of the likely outcome of adjudication to promote the settlement. J K 
Lieberman and J F Henry, ‘Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement’ (1986) 53 424 
University of Chicago Law Review 427 
136 The early neutral evaluation is a procedure that the respective legal teams put a case, at a relatively 
early point, to a neutral or group of neutrals to obtain for the client a forecast of the possible judicial 
outcomes to encourage the settlement. Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and 
the Primary Forms of Decision-Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 
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could be a helpful starting point, although variations, overlaps and hybrids can be 
found.  
Negotiation Model          
22. Negotiation represents the primary and the universal route to decision and action 
in the social world. It means a process that information flows in both directions 
are bilaterally exchanged, position and arguments from both parties are 
understood and on the base of that, an outcome is achieved137.The fundamental 
characteristic of negotiation is the absence of a third-party decision-maker.138A 
significant advantages of helped negotiation is easy-to-use, as there is almost no 
threshold of ability of using. Ordinary people without any training may use 
negotiation smoothly to resolve disputes in their daily lives. At the meantime, the 
cost of helped negotiation could be lower than mediation and arbitration. Another 
advantage of helped negotiation is that it could be very flexible as it is wholly 
controlled by parties themselves. They are free to quickly reach agreement 
without having to consider many procedural requirements. Also, there is no 
concern about the rigid application of state’s law which means that parties can 
free to give up something they do not care about to exchange something they 
want. An agreement achieved by this way may be acceptable by both parties and 
in line with the common sense.  
 
137 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 
138 P Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Academic Press 1979)  
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23. However, the problem here is that although helped negotiation has many 
advantages, it could be hard in a helped negotiation process to rebalance the gap 
of bargain ability between parties. In negotiation, a stronger party may abuse its 
advantages to force the weaker party to give up legitimate or reasonable 
demands139. Besides, when the stronger party gains benefits in the event where 
disputes raise from, the stronger party could simply refuse to negotiate. 
24. To address this problem, many mechanisms were introduced to negotiation.  In 
practice, most disputes need a dispute resolution scheme to deal with are those 
disputes cannot achieve an agreement through negotiation or the stronger party 
just refuse to negotiate. However, it may be appropriate to be used as the first 
process in a multi-layer process. Because, it can help to filter out those disputes 
that do not really need the involvement of dispute resolution scheme, providing 
financial firms with a second opportunity to actively resolve disputes without the 
involvement of third parties, and contribute to the aim of low cost of dispute 
resolution, easy to use, high flexibility and produce result more in line with 
common sense.  
Mediation Model 
25. Mediation is a very broad concept which is difficult to define140. It is often 
described as a process of facilitating agreement between the parties, presided over 
 
139 The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 
140 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 153 
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by a mediator141. While the mediator is defined as a non-aligned, non-
determinative role who participates a process to facility parties to achieve an 
agreement, while a contrast with the partisan supporter and the arbitrator helps to 
provide an identity for the mediator in rough and ready terms142. In this sense, 
mediation can be used to refer to the broad middle zone between negotiation and 
arbitration. Therefore, the fundamental characteristic of the mediation is that there 
is a mediator involved into the process and the mediator could not deliver any 
determinative opinions, such as an award in arbitration.    
26. Mediation has long been regarded as the main model of ADR143. It is said that 
there are many advantages of mediation, for example, informality; the parties 
autonomy; the process is confidential so the parties can make admissions without 
legal consequences; the parties could be more focused on finding solutions than 
resolution of one or more points of law or rights; outcomes can be more flexible 
than the remedies available to courts; the process can restore trust or 
relationships.144. Mediation is a very popular model of ADR and experience a 
good development. It is regarded as “shadow of the court” that applies to the 
 
141 G Simmel, ‘The Sociology of Georg Simmel’ in K Wolff (eds) (Free Press 1950) 148,149   
142 Ibid.  
143  Owen M. Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1993) 93 1073 Yale L.J. 1983,1984; Mauro Cappelletti, 
‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to Justice 
Movement’ (1993) Vol.56, No.3 The Modern Law Review 282 
144 J Zekoll, M Bälz and I Amelung (ed), Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Formalization – 
Formalization of Alternatives? (Brill Publishing 2014); M Palmer, ‘The Revival of Mediation in the 
People’s Republic of China: Extra-judicial Mediation’ in W E Butler (ed) Yearbook on Socialist Legal 
systems 1987 Transnational Books (Dobbs Ferry 1988) 244; P Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A 
Cross-Cultural Perspective (Academic Press 1979) 272 
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concept of ADR145, and were supported and regulated by the EU Mediation 
Directive146. 
27. Recently, with the development of ADR, mediation has been introduced 
to the context of litigation procedures, to assist in dispute resolution before or 
during a court’s decision147. An example of how mediation was integrated into a 
central position within the civil justice system can be seen in England and Wales 
from 1998148, following Lord Woolf’s recognition that the result of almost all of 
the formal disputes commenced in the state’s litigation system was not judicial 
adjudication but settlement between the parties149. The English system was re-
focused to encourage parties to settle earlier. The scope of this encouragement 
comes from pre-action protocols for sharing information, costs, rules, and case 
management150. Settlement of legal disputes appears to be an important 
phenomenon that is manifesting itself not only in Europe but also worldwide151.  
28. Comparing to helped negotiation, mediation can somehow rebalance the gap of 
bargain ability between parties while let the process remain in the scope of 
consultative procedure and thus enjoy those advantages attached to consultative 
 
145 J Zekoll, M Bälz and I Amelung (ed), Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Formalization – 
Formalization of Alternatives? (Brill Publishing 2014) 
146 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain 
aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, [2008] O.J. L 136/3. 
147 C Hodges, Delivering dispute resolution a holistic review of models in England and Wales (Hart 
Publishing 2019) 
148 Ibid. 
149 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report (1995) and Access to Justice: Final Report (1996). 
150 Civil Procedure Rules, reformed in 1998 after Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (HMSO 
1996). 
151  Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer-to-business Dispute 
Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 2012) 
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process152. As there is a mediator involved in the process, the mediator can help 
the weaker party fully understand its legal rights as well as help the weaker party 
to make full use of the process. The mediator can also help both parties to fully 
understand what is the potential result if the disputes go further to the arbitration 
or court process and therefore facility parties to achieve a settlement bearing this 
potential result in mind. The mediator also helps when both parties have 
willingness to make a settlement but fail to reach agreements in details, as the 
mediator can advice them on details and help to draft a settlement153.   
29. However, there are two problems of mediation. The first is that there is no secure 
to achieve a settlement in a mediation procedure. Therefore, the whole effort 
spend in a mediation procedure may become waste of time and money. It is also 
suggesting that a failure mediation procedure may exacerbate the hostility 
between the two parties and may make the follow-up efforts to resolve disputes in 
other procedures become difficult154.  
30. The other problem is that the settlement made from a mediation procedure may 
be not binding and enforceable in some jurisdictions. It is true that in some ADR-
friendly jurisdictions such as UK and Netherlands, the settlement made from a 
mediation procedure would be respected by the court and could be recognized 
 
152 Mauro has a great analysis on the advantages of using a consultative procedure to resolve disputes 
and achieve a consultative justice in his article. Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to Justice Movement’ (1993) Vol.56, No.3 
The Modern Law Review 282 
153 For example, there is a case report on a mediation hold by the Hong Kong’s Financial Dispute 
Resolution Centre, which help parties enter into an agreement with excellent imagination. See Hong 
Kong FDRC, Case Study: There is more to a mediated settlement than just money access at   
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/html/publications/casestudies_15081298.php     
154 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 
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and enforced easily155. However, in some other jurisdictions such as China, 
settlement achieved from a mediation procedure may only be seen as a 
contract156. Therefore, if a party hopes to apply to enforce the settlement through 
court, he must start an action for breach of contract.        
31. These two problems may make the single mediation model becomes not attractive 
in the context of financial consumer ADR. Consumers may find it is not attractive 
if they realize that the whole effort, they spend in a mediation procedure may 
become waste of time and money. And this is clearly conflict with the aim of the 
financial consumer ADR to reduce the consumer’s cost of dispute 
resolution157and attract consumers to use the scheme158. Perhaps, experience can 
be learned from those hybrids, for example, it may good to use the mediation as a 
part of a multi-layer process, just behind the negotiation as the first step and 
before the arbitration or Ombudsman as a final step. Therefore, mediator can help 
parties who cannot achieve an agreement by themselves to find a solution if 
possible, and if the second try of achieving a settlement still not success, the case 




155 C Hodges, Delivering dispute resolution a holistic review of models in England and Wales (Hart 
Publishing 2019) 
156 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 
157 Because when the whole effort of the financial consumer ADR scheme goes nowhere, even the 
scheme is free to use to consumers, it will still increase the time cost of consumers.   
158 Consumers may believe that a ADR scheme which cannot secure a result finally is waste of time 
and energy and thus refuse to use it even it is free.  
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Arbitration Model 
32. An arbitration is a process where an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators involving 
into the process and the power of decision is surrendered to the arbitrator or 
arbitrators159. Arbitration has a long history and became a developed industry 
long before the idea of ADR appeared in late of last century. Currently there are 
many arbitration institutions providing arbitration service all over the world. For 
example, there is ICC arbitration which is famous all around the world. In 2020, 
there are 946 new cases has been filled in ICC arbitration, which is quite 
considerable for an international arbitration institution160. Besides, ICC 
arbitration, there is London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) who based 
in London but providing arbitration service globally. This can be proved by the 
fact that over 80% of parties in pending LCIA cases are not of English 
nationality161.  
33. Arbitration is not only active in the commercial field, as a successful ADR model, 
arbitration can be seen in many different sectors. For example, there is Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which aims to resolve those disputes in sport. And 
there is also Hong Kong’s Financial Consumer Dispute Resolution Centre 
(FCDRC) uses arbitration model to try to resolve disputes between financial 
consumers and financial firms to protect consumers’ interests. The American 
 
159 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020) 153 
160 ICC, ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics: 2020, access at https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-
speeches/2020-icc-dispute-resolution-statistics-published/ last visited 12/08/2021 
161 LCIA, Introduction of LCIA, access at https://www.lcia.org/LCIA/introduction.aspx last visited 
12/08/2021 
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Arbitration Association (AAA) also provides consumers with consumer 
arbitration service which is significantly cheaper than its commercial arbitration 
service162.      
34. Comparing to the mediation, a significant advantage of arbitration is that it can 
secure an outcome. However, it is also argued that the most important value of 
ADR is to produce a consultative justice163, which an arbitration usually cannot 
help to achieve it164.however, with the development of the modern ADR, 
especially with the development of Ombudsman, it is more and more accepted 
that consultative justice is not the only value of ADR, adjudicative techniques are 
also important and should be regarded as an important part of the modern 
ADR165.  
35. In the context of the consumer ADR, the advantage of using an arbitration 
process is that it can secure an outcome. If there is no such secure, consumers 
may worry that the whole scheme is meaningless, especially for those consumers 
have already decide not to bring their disputes to the court anyway166. Consumers 
 
162 AAA, Consumer Arbitration Rules, access at 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf last visited 12/08/2021.  
163 Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-
Wide Access-to Justice Movement’ (1993) Vol.56, No.3 The Modern Law Review 282 
164 Actually, during the early period of the ADR, the arbitration procedure is even do not be 
considered as possible choice for ADR, as at that time, the scope of ADR is limited in consultative 
procedure such as negotiation and mediation. Jerome T. Barrett with Joseph P. Barrett, A History of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution – The Story of a Political, Cultural, and Social Movement (Published in 
Affiliation with the Association for Conflict Resolution 2009)  
165 Simon Roberts & Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes – ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-
Making (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2020); Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute 
Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 
166 For example, in a survey hold by EU commission in 2011, there are 8 percent consumers said that 
they would never take the business to court, no matter what the sum involved. See J Zekoll, M Bälz 
and I Amelung (ed), Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Formalization – Formalization of Alternatives? 
(Brill Publishing 2014)  
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will ask why bring their disputes to ADR, if ADR can only tell them at the end 
like “we are sorry, but it is impossible to achieve a settlement. So how about 
bring the case to the court?”. So, if an ADR scheme cannot secure an outcome, 
the whole scheme becomes less attractive to consumers.  
36. However, using arbitration model in consumer ADR may also lead to some 
problems. A frequently mentioned concern of consumer arbitration is that it may 
deprive consumers right to bring their cases to the court. In almost all consumer 
ADR using arbitration model, consumers need to agree to be bound by the award 
or the arbitration167. In some but not all situations, consumers may able to appeal 
the award to the court, but many courts would only examine limited issues, such 
as issues of procedure and law in this situation168.     
37. Another concern of arbitration model is user-friendly. As most arbitration 
processes have a certain extend of formality and use the adversarial approach, it 
could make the process difficult for consumers to use. For example, Consumers 
may need to choose and appoint an arbitrator, collect and submit evidence by 
themselves, and express their views on legal issues. It is questionable that 
whether consumers can achieve enough professional help and advice on these 
issues when they need. 
38. Arbitration model may also lead to concern of cost. Just as discussed above, 
arbitration could be difficult to use for consumers so consumers would have to 
 
167 J Zekoll, M Bälz and I Amelung (ed), Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Formalization – 
Formalization of Alternatives? (Brill Publishing 2014) 
168 Yu Fan, Research on Non-litigation Dispute Resolution Mechanism (China Renmin University Press 
2000) 
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seek help from legal professionals or hire a professional legal representative, all 
these would significantly increase the cost of consumers to use the arbitration 
process. Besides, arbitrators were usually chosen from those experienced and 
reputational people in legal professional or relevant industries, which may lead to 
a high arbitration fee. Although consumer arbitration is usually cheaper than 
arbitration in other sectors, it could still too high to a consumer. 
Ombudsman Model   
39. The Ombudsman model, was introduced form public sector. It was introduced 
firstly into Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and 
Norway169, and then European countries such as UK and German. With the 
development in these years, Ombudsman bodies can now be observed in many 
countries all around the world and in many different sectors such as consumer, 
energy, telecom, and health, etc.  
40. In consumer sector, some Ombudsman are public schemes established by law, 
such as the U. K’s (FOS) or the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman, while some 
are private sector bodies, such as the German Insurance and Transport 
Ombudsmen. No matter public or private, those quality Ombudsman bodies pay 
high attention to those criteria such as impartiality, independence, expertise, and 
performance. There is a notable absence of complaints that such values are not 
observed, or that the Ombudsman have conflicts of interest or are biased. Just as 
observed by the Prof. C Hodges, almost all Ombudsman in the U.K are subject to 
 
169 C Hodges, ‘Delivering Redress through Alternative Dispute Resolution and Regulation’ in WH van 
Boom and G Wagner (eds), Mass Torts in Europe: Cases and Reflections (De Gruyter, 2014) 
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oversight by regulatory bodies, which have issued standards and exercise strong 
control, with reports being reviewed by the media, consumer bodies and 
parliament170. 
41. Comparing to private Ombudsman, those public Ombudsman established by law 
could have additional advantages. These additional advantages providing by 
legislation are usually three. First, legislation could give the Ombudsman a 
compulsory jurisdiction over a given scope of traders. So, if consumers hope 
bring their disputes to the Ombudsman, traders cannot refuse. This is important, 
as lacking traders’ agreement to use is one of main reasons why a consumer ADR 
procedure close171.     
42. Second, legislation can specify that all traders of a given scope are bound by the 
decisions of the ombudsman if consumers accept the decisions. This approach 
preserves the consumers rights, since the consumer is not bound by a decision 
unless he or she accepts it. With this unilateral opt-in policy, consumers can 
always take their cases to court, either before or after the ombudsman’s 
decision172. 
43. Third, legislation can require traders to pay the fees of the ombudsman, by 
requiring traders to pay an annual standing fee to cover general budgets and a 
case fee, which is usually payable as soon as a particular stage is reached173.   
 
170 Ibid. 
171 Yu Fan, Research on Non-litigation Dispute Resolution Mechanism (China Renmin University Press 
2000) 
172 C Hodges, ‘Delivering Redress through Alternative Dispute Resolution and Regulation’ in WH van 
Boom and G Wagner (eds), Mass Torts in Europe: Cases and Reflections (De Gruyter, 2014) 
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44. Besides, these advantages in dispute resolution, a consumer Ombudsman model 
could also offer several additional advantages such as the ability to give advice 
and assistance to consumers, ability to give collective redress, collecting data on 
case types and incidence, and to provide feedback that lead to improvement of 
general practice174.Just like what is fully discussed in Prof. C. Hodges’s work175, 
there are five functions of consumer Ombudsman model; including, consumer 
advice, dispute resolution, collecting and analysis data, publication of above data, 
and improving market behaviour. And besides the dispute resolution, the other 
four functions are only possessed by Ombudsman model, which makes 










174 C. Hodges, ‘The Consumer as Regulator’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The 
Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2016) 
175 C. Hodges, ‘Consumer Ombudsmen: Better regulation and dispute resolution’ (2014)  
15(4) ERA Forum 593; C. Hodges, ‘The Consumer as Regulator’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz  
and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free  
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Chapter V Reasons for Establishing a Consumer ADR Scheme in  
Financial Service Market 
1. The consumer market involves imbalances of power and many possibilities for 
abuse of consumers in different methods. This is even more true in those 
regulated consumer markets such as financial service, energy, communication, 
medicines and so. Common characteristics of these regulated markets are first, 
with the development of economic and global trading, the trend of business 
concentration became more and more obvious in these markets. Therefore, those 
traders who eventually survive in these markets usually become large 
multinational companies which have much bigger power than those traders in 
other markets.  
2. Second, many products and service provided by these markets are necessary for 
consumers’ daily life, which leaves consumer no choice but to deal with these 
businesses. For example, even if a consumer is dissatisfied with all these 
businesses, he still needs to buy food produced by a food company or open a 
bank account in a bank. The consumer’s choice in these markets is limited. 
Therefore, the imbalances of power are more significant and possibilities for 
abuse of consumers are bigger in these regulated markets.     
3. Taking financial service market as an example. It is an essential market for most 
people’s daily life in many countries. In modern society, people usually have at 
least one bank account to receive the salary. Besides this basic financial service, 
people also use credit cards, deposit account, loan, mortgage, property insurance, 
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stock exchange, life insurance, investment service and many financial services. 
Even people who live in isolation may need financial service, as they need a bank 
account or credit card to pay anything they buy through e-business. It is observed 
in Europe that the financial service and products are increasingly be regarded as 
an essential part to the daily life177. The similar trend can also be observed in 
other developed countries in the world such as America, Japan, and Australia178, 
as well as emerging countries such as China179.  
4. Besides, the financial products and services have a long-lasting and significant 
influence on consumers’ life. For example, a mortgage service or an investment 
product may last for decades, which means that any potential risks and problems 
in these long-term transactions may have long-term negative effect on 
consumer’s and their family’s wellbeing, leading to, for example, over-
indebtedness, unexpected financial difficulty, and financial exclusion180. Besides, 
the risk of financial products could high, especially those high-stake investment 
products combined with high-risk transaction such as futures. For example, 
 
177 World Bank, Finance for All? Politices and Pitfalls in Extending Access (World Bank 2008) access at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFINFORALL/Resources/4099583-
1194373512632/FFA_book.pdf; Elaine Kempson, Sharon Collard, Developing a vision for financial 
inclusion (Friends Provident Foundation 2012) access at: 
https://www.fincan.co.uk/repository/uploads/sectionpdfs/95%20Developing%20a%20Vision%20for%
20Financial%20Inclusion%20-%20Kempson%20&%20Collard%20March%202012.pdf  
178 World Bank, Finance for All? Politices and Pitfalls in Extending Access (World Bank 2008) access at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFINFORALL/Resources/4099583-
1194373512632/FFA_book.pdf 
179 IResearch The Report for Chinese financial markets (2017) 
180 Reseau Fina cement Alternative, Financial Services Provision and Prevention of Financial Exclusion 
(EU Commission 2008) access at: 
https://www.bristol.ac.uk/medialibrary/sites/geography/migrated/documents/pfrc0807.pdf and also 
see Civic Consulting, The Over-indebtedness of European Households (EU Commission 2013) access at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/final-report-on-over-indebtedness-of-european-households-
synthesis-of-findings_december2013_en.pdf 
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recently in China, due to the price of oil in futures slump to even negative, 600,00 
Chinese consumers suffer ¥ 4,200,000,000 (£477,234,660) loss181, this could be 
an un bearable disaster for those people and families involved.    
5. Besides, the financial service market is also a complex market, where is full of 
frightening terminologies, lengthy and confused standard terms, complex interest 
calculation and unclear and cumbersome procedures. These makes consumers in 
financial market sometimes can hardly understand the contract they signed, which 
left a hidden trouble. Moreover, financial service market usually dominates by 
those giant financial institutions, multi-national banks, huge insurance group and 
their subsidiaries and those professionals who know much more of financial 
knowledge than ordinary consumers. Consequently, there is a huge gap of bargain 
ability between financial consumers and financial firms in this market., which 
lead to a significant imbalance of power.  
6. Therefore, many countries try to provide consumers with protection partly by 
setting rules and rights, and partly by providing regulatory systems. For example, 
the EU published Markets in financial instruments (MiFID) - Directive 2004/39/EC, 
Markets in financial instruments (MiFID 2) - Directive 2014/65/EU and Markets in 
financial instruments (MiFIR) - Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 to protect financial 
consumers’ substantive rights and interests and consumer’s trust on law and the 
market by requiring financial firms to provide with enough information before the 
decision-making, to make sure that consumers understand the risks and benefits 
 
181 BBC News, access at https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-52566029 
                                                                                       70 
 
of the transactions182. Some more protective EU financial consumer law provide 
financial consumers with more directive protection, for example, the Mortgage 
Credit Directive requires Member States to have measures in place to limit 
consumer exposure to exchange rate risk.183  
7. Among these responses to protect consumers, an important act is to establish 
consumer ADR schemes to help consumers resolve their disputes with traders. 
For example, in Sweden, there is a national CADR scheme funded by the state 
covering consumer disputes in all consumer sectors namely “ARN” (Allmanna 
reklamationsnamnden). Besides it, there are also some sectoral ADR bodies 
operated by sectoral associations in financial services and insurance. 184 
8. In the UK, there are a variety of CADR schemes covering a lot of different 
consumer sectors. Some of these CADR schemes are statutory, such as FOS, 
pensions Ombudsman and lawyers Ombudsman, some of them are private 
Ombudsman schemes (travel, motor, vehicles) and some of them are private 
sectoral disputes resolution schemes operated by sectoral associations185.  
9. In Netherlands, a single national private sector foundation (DGS) administrates 
an extensive network of CADR bodies (geschillencommissie), which covers more 
than 50 consumer sectors186. Besides this, there is also a separate CADR scheme 
 
182 Chris Willett, ‘Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law 
Journal 412, 425-429; Iain Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy (3rd ed, Hart publishing 2012) Chapter 2 
183 Andrea Fejős, ‘Mortgage Credit in Hungary’(2017), 6 Journal of European Consumer and Market 
Law 139 
184 Hodges, C., Benöhr, I. & Creutzfeldt-Banda, ‘N. Consumer-to-business dispute resolution: the power 
of CADR’(2012) 13 ERA Forum 199 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 
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operating in financial markets namely KiFiD. The KiFiD works in a three-tier 
structure, cases going first to an ombudsman, then to a geschillencommissie, and 
finally to an appeal board.  
10. Even in those jurisdictions which have an efficient court system operating based 
on reasonable and predicted costs, combined with a wide insurance coverage for 
legal expenses, such as Germany. Observers could still find some complaints 
schemes in insurance, telecoms, financial services, energy, and transport areas 
operated by Germany regulators or sectoral self - discipline organizations. 187 As 
a part of the popularity of Consumer ADR in European, the EU published a 
Directive to require member states to ensure that there is a Consumer ADR 
scheme in their territories to help consumers resolve disputes with traders188. 
11. A reason why Consumer ADR is popular in EU, may be the consumer’s 
reluctance to bring their disputes to the court. When consumers faced with a 
surcharge levied by a bank or energy provider which may be higher than a 
reasonable sum, or when an online trader fails to deliver a book purchased online, 
consumers may not bother to start court proceedings, if the amount of money 
involved is small which is disproportionate to the contract sum, and if the 
consumer does not have the time to consult a lawyer or start a small claim189. 
 
187 Ibid. 
188 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes 
189 C. Hodges, ‘Unlocking Justice and Markets: The Promise of Consumer ADR’ in Joachim Zekoll, 
Moritz Bälz, and Iwo Amelung (eds), Formalisation and Flexibilisation in Dispute Resolution (Brill 
Publishing, 2014) 
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12. According to a survey in EU, in 2011, more than one in five (21%) of consumers 
surveyed had encountered a problem with a good, a service, a retailer or a 
provider in the previous 12 months, for which they had a legitimate cause to 
complain190. Among these consumers, more than three-quarters took some form 
of action in response (77%) while 22 percent took no action. Those consumers 
who took action were most likely to have made a complaint to the trader (65%), 
16 percent complained to a public authority, 13 percent to the manufacturer, 5 
percent contacted an ADR body, and only 2 percent started court proceedings191. 
13. Reasons for not making a court claim were that the consumer had already 
received a satisfactory response from the trader (40%), the sum involved was too 
small (26%), it would have taken too much effort (16%), or it would have been 
too expensive (13%) or too long (12%)192. Thus, 67 percent of the sample thought 
that a court process was unattractive and unresponsive to their problems. 
14. Some people may believe that using of small claim procedures could resolve this 
problem, however, a 2007 study concluded that small-claims procedures would 
only be used by European consumers if the amount involved exceeded around 
€500.193 The Commission’s 2011 survey found that 53 percent people would go 
to court if they suffer a financial loss between €101 and €2,500, 5 percent said 
they would go to court for a loss under €20, and 3 per cent would only go to court 
 
190 Special Eurobarometer 342. Consumer empowerment (European Commission, 2011), access at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_empowerment/docs/report_eurobarometer_ 
342_en.pdf.last visited 16/08/2021 
191Ibid. 
192Ibid. QA36, p. 204.  
193Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart 
Publishing 2012) 381 
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over a financial loss in excess of €5,000,194 while 8 percent said they would 
never take the business to court, no matter what the sum involved195. Considering 
that EU 2011 figures estimated the average value of consumer losses as €375, and 
median €18.5, it is safe to assume that many consumers would not go to the court 
with knowing or not the existence of small claim procedures.  
15. Comparing to consumers in other sectors, consumer in financial service market 
may more reluctant to go to court. As mentioned above, many consumers 
reluctant to go to the court because it takes too much effort, money, and time. A 
litigation in financial service market may take more effort, money, and time than 
consumer litigation in others. Because, just like mentioned above, financial 
service market is a highly professional and complex market. Consumers may find 
that it is difficult to participate in a financial litigation and therefore must hire a 
legal representative which may significantly increase the cost. Further, financial 
firms usually have enough money for better lawyers and are motivated to win to 
reduce the possibility of being sued for similar reasons in future. Therefore, 
consumers may lose in the first instance and have to appeal, this will also increase 
the cost, the time and the effort. Besides, even consumers win in the first 
instance, financial firms could appeal and then appeal again if they lose in second 
instance, which leads to the increase of cost, time, and effort.        
 
194 Special Eurobarometer 342. Consumer empowerment (European Commission, 2011), access at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_empowerment/docs/report_euro barometer_342_en.pdf. 
Last visited 16/08/2021. 
195 Ibid. 
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16. Thus, data and analysis above seem suggest that existing procedures might not 
suitable for many consumer disputes. The access-to-justice gap leaves a lot of 
customers with unresolved complaints which may lead to negative consequences. 
Recalling the examples at the beginning of this Chapter, the amount of money 
involved may be small on an individual basis, but if the same trader is benefiting 
from similar behaviour in relation to many other consumers, and the activity is 
illegal, the illicit profit could add up to a significant amount. Further, it may lead 
to a bad atmosphere and practice in the market and then damages the consumer’s 
confidence in this market, which may lead to economic recession. All these call 
for the emergence of a dispute resolution method other than litigation in 
(financial) consumer sector.     
17. To answer this call, more and more countries introduced ADR schemes to 
(financial) consumer sector. Some scholars tend to follow Cappelletti in the 
thinking that governments have gradually extended consumer access to justice, 
and that Consumer ADR is part of this trend196. This may be true in relation to 
one of the motivations for the European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Consumer Affairs (DG SANCO), which has certainly been acting on the policy 
that increasing consumer access to justice will drive and improve market 
development and growth197. 
 
196 Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant G. Garth, ‘Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide 
Movement to Make Rights Effective’ (1978) 27 Buffalo Law Review 181 
197 C. Hodges, ‘Unlocking Justice and Markets: The Promise of Consumer ADR’ in Joachim Zekoll, 
Moritz Bälz, and Iwo Amelung (eds), Formalisation and Flexibilisation in Dispute Resolution (Brill 
Publishing 2014) 
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18. However, it does not describe how it happens on the ground in different 
countries. Taking EU as an example, the Oxford research found that there are 
usually two motivations for introducing (Financial) Consumer ADR schemes198. 
First, traders or associations of traders established (Financial) Consumer ADR 
systems because they want cheaper and faster ways of resolving their disputes 
with consumers than were being provided by courts199.  
19. A quality ADR scheme may benefit not only consumers but also traders. The cost 
of litigation including lawyer fee is not only high for consumers, it is also a heavy 
burden for businesses, especially those small and medium ones. A quality ADR 
scheme provides businesses an effective way to resolve their disputes with 
consumers in a much more reasonable price. Although, businesses may need to 
pay more than consumers to use the ADR scheme200, what they need to pay could 
still lower than the litigation fee. For example, in UK, the FOS charges financial 
institutions £550 for every case and charge free for the first 25 cases in a year and 
some financial firms who use this scheme frequently may get an even better price 
by achieving a group-account fee agreement201. A good example of these ADR 
schemes are Germany Insurance Ombudsman and those private Ombudsman 
scheme in UK202.  
 
198 Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, ‘The Origins and Evolution of Consumer Dispute Resolution Systems in 
Europe’ in Christopher Hodges and Astrid Stadler (eds), Resolving Mass Disputes: ADR and Settlement 
of Mass Claims, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 
199 C. Hodges, ‘Unlocking Justice and Markets: The Promise of Consumer ADR’ in Joachim Zekoll, 
Moritz Bälz, and Iwo Amelung (eds), Formalisation and Flexibilisation in Dispute Resolution (Brill 
Publishing 2014) 
200 Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart 
Publishing 2012) 
201 Ibid. 
202 C. Hodges, ‘Unlocking Justice and Markets: The Promise of Consumer ADR’ in Joachim Zekoll, 
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20. Second, some (Financial) Consumer ADR schemes, were established by 
governments, which aim to provide an efficient, speedy, and cheap informal way 
of dispute resolution for consumer disputes in the context of regulation203. An 
ADR scheme could provide consumers with cheap and sometimes even free 
service of dispute resolution by charging annual fee and cease fee from 
businesses to cover its budget. For example, the UK’s FOS charges only from 
financial institutions, by annual levy and case fee204, and is free to use for 
consumers. The Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) also charges 
no fee from consumers. Financial firms through three ways pay all operating 
expenditure of AFCA: a member levy, user charge and complaint fees. In Hong 
Kong, the Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) charges both consumers 
and financial institutions, but fee paid by financial institutions is five times of 
consumer’s payment205. 
21. Besides, many (Financial) Consumer ADR schemes provide consumers with free 
advice and reduce consumers’ potential cost on hiring legal representatives206. 
 
Moritz Bälz, and Iwo Amelung (eds), Formalisation and Flexibilisation in Dispute Resolution (Brill 
Publishing, 2014) 
203 Ibid. 
204 The FOS charges levy fee from every financial firms under its compulsory jurisdiction and £550 
case fee for every individual case. The FOS will not charge the first 25 cases of a financial firm. In the 
financial year 2017-2018, the total income of the FOS is £249m, the levy fee and the case fee from 
firms excluding Lloyds, Barclays, HSBC, RBS, Nationwide, Santander, Aviva and Direct Line contribute 
11% and 29% separately. For the eight business groups mentioned above, the FOS has a group-
account fee arrangement with them, and this group-account fee contributes 58% to the total income. 
See FOS Annual review 2017-2018 18   
205 See the Fee Charging Table of FDRC, access at  
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/html/resolvingdisputes/resolvingdisputes_scheduleoffees.php  
206 For example, the UK’s FOS booklet said that “we do not suggest consumers rely on legal 
representatives or claim management companies”, and they do not allow paid legal representatives 
participate their processes while they welcome consumers’ friends or relationships provide free help.  
The AFCA website said that “our staff will help you (consumers) to deal with your complaints”. 
                                                                                       77 
 
For example, the UK’s FOS suggests consumers not rely on legal representatives 
or claim management companies, and does not allow paid legal representatives 
participate the processes while they welcome consumers’ friends or relationships 
provide free help. In Australia, the staff of AFCA would help consumers to deal 
with their complaints.  
22. Those ADR schemes using an investigation approach can further help consumers 
to reduce their cost. In this approach, if there is a necessity to find out the truth, 
the ADR institution will start an investigation by themselves while consumers 
only need to provide with some basic evidence, such as their bank account details 
or relevant contracts207. This approach would help to reduce the consumer’s cost 
of employing lawyers and collecting evidence, as well as narrow the imbalance of 
legal resources (lawyers and ability of collecting evidence) between consumers 
and financial firms.  
23. A (Financial) Consumer ADR scheme can also resolve disputes in a faster way 
than courts. This was even true in those jurisdictions where courts are generally 
considered as fast and cheap—they were just not fast or cheap enough208. For 
example, the UK’s private Ombudsman schemes responsible for energy, telecoms 
and various other types of disputes now disposes of 30 percent of contacts that 
 
207 For example, the UK’s FOS has an admission team to help consumers at the early stage and if 
consumers and financial firms cannot achieve a settlement in the early stage, the FOS will start its own 
investigation hold by an adjudicator. See FOS Your complaint and the ombudsman, access at 
https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/consumer-leaflet.htm#e and Ombudsman 
News March 2001 p34. The AFCA uses a similar working process. See AFCA The Process We Follow, 
access at https://www.afca.org.au/what-to-expect/the-process-we-follow/  
208 See C. Hodges, ‘Unlocking Justice and Markets: The Promise of Consumer ADR’ in Joachim Zekoll, 
Moritz Bälz, and Iwo Amelung (eds), Formalisation and Flexibilisation in Dispute Resolution (Brill 
Publishing 2014) 
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have crystallised into disputes within 48 hours, which is far beyond the possibility 
of the court.209  
24. The ability of resolving disputes in a fast way may also make a (Financial) 
Consumer ADR scheme more efficient than courts. For example, in UK, the FOS 
scheme receive 642,556 enquiries and 271,468 complaints in 2020, while 
325,342 complaints were resolved,210 the clearance rate was around 120 percent. 
As a contrast, in 2019, county courts of England and Wales received 2.03 million 
claims, while 1.32million cases were resolved, the clearance rate was around 65 
percent. Although cases received by FOS all from financial consumer sector 
while case received by county courts comes from many different sectors, so this 
comparison cannot draw any definite conclusion, these data may still suggest that 
the (Financial) Consumer ADR scheme could be more efficient than the court. 
25. Further, besides providing consumers a fast, cheap, and efficient way of disputes 
resolution, a (Financial) Consumer ADR scheme established in context of 
regulatory could have additional functions. For example, a well-designed 
(Financial) Consumer ADR scheme could have advice function211. For example, 
the UK’s FOS scheme provide consumers with a advice service as an initial 
stage, before complaints are triaged and allocated to internal process tracks212. Its 
data shows that the number of requests for information or advice is generally 
 
209 Ibid.  
210 Annual complaints data and insight 2019/20, access at 
https://www.financialombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/annual-complaints-data last visited 
17/08/2021 
211 C Hodges, ‘Consumer Ombudsmen: Better regulation and dispute resolution’ (2014) Volume 15 
Issue 4 ERA Forum 593 (2015) 
212 Ibid. 
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larger than the number of complaints submit to them213, which suggest that the 
advice service is welcome by consumers. This advice function could help to 
educate consumers as the advice provided by the staff of ADR scheme could help 
consumers to understand the legal nature and possible results of their disputes. 
This could help them to decide what they hope to do follow and help them 
prevent similar situations in the future. Besides, if the consumer advice work can 
be done well be a well-designed (Financial) Consumer ADR scheme, funds spent 
on similar advice bodies could be saved in those countries, where a such 
consumer advice body is existing214. 
26. Another function that a well-designed (Financial) Consumer ADR scheme may 
have is feeding back aggregated data on market trading conditions 215 . Well-
designed (Financial) Consumer ADR schemes could monitor the nature of trends 
in the cases that they receive. This information enables them both to adopt a 
consistent response to similar groups of claims, and to pass on the information to 
traders, customers, regulators, the media, and markets, so that responses can be 
taken216. Thus, emerging mass problems can be identified and noticed by the 
regulators, so that regulators can intervene in time. The combination of (Financial) 
Consumer ADR entities and public regulators that possess powers to intervene and 
 
213 Annual complaints data and insight 2019/20, access at 
https://www.financialombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/annual-complaints-data last visited 
17/08/2021 
214 C Hodges, ‘Consumer Ombudsmen: Better regulation and dispute resolution’ (2014) Volume 15 
Issue 4 ERA Forum 593 (2015) 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
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order mass redress could be powerful217.          
 
27. In summary, it is good to establish an ADR scheme specially designed for 
(financial) consumer sector, as a well-designed (Financial) Consumer ADR 
scheme could not only provide consumers with a cheap, fast, and efficient way to 
resolve their disputes with traders, but also provide additional functions such as 
consumer advice, collecting data, publishing these data as a feed back to traders, 
consumers, competitions, regulators, and investors and improving market 
behaviour218. 












217 C Hodges, ‘Consumer Ombudsmen: Better regulation and dispute resolution’ (2014) Volume 15, 
Issue 4 ERA Forum 593 
218 C Hodges, ‘Consumer Redress: Implementing the Vision’ in Pablo Cortés (eds), The New Regulatory 
Framework for Consumer Dispute Resolution (Oxford Publishing 2016) 
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Chapter VI Financial Consumer ADR Schemes in Practice and 
Comparison in Three Chosen Schemes  
 
1. As fully discussed in the last Chapter, many ADR schemes were created by 
businesses or associations of businesses, or introduced by governments in the 
financial service market to provide consumers with a fast, cheap, and efficient 
means of dispute resolution. For example, there are UK’s FOS scheme, which is 
established by legislation, and using an Ombudsman model to provide consumers 
with free service. In Singapore, the Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre 
Ltd (FIDReC), was established by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 
in 2004, to provide consumers with a one-stop center for the resolution of all 
retail disputes with financial institutions219. In Ireland, the government decided to 
merge the offices of the Financial Services Ombudsman Bureau and the Office of 
the Pensions Ombudsman to form the Financial Services and Pensions 
Ombudsman (FSPO) in 2017. The FSPO was then established formally by the 
Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman Act 2017 and opened for business 
on 1 January 2018, funded by levies on financial firms and by a grant from the 
government220. 
2. In Japan, "dispute resolution organizations" were required to be established in 
every financial service sector by the amendment to the Financial Instruments and 
 
219 Overview and Background of FIDReC, access at 
https://www.fidrec.com.sg/website/background.html 18/08/2021 
220 Introduction of FSPO, access at https://www.fspo.ie/about-us/ last visited 18/08/2021 
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Exchange Act (FIEA). This new ADR system aims to deal with every stage of 
financial-related disputes, strives to resolve disputes before they become 
significant and acts to ameliorate any post-ADR issues that may remain221. In 
Malta, there is Arbiter for Financial Services (AFS), established by the Arbiter of 
the Financial Services Act to provide advice and dispute resolution service to 
consumers222. In Canada, there are External Complaints Body, namely the 
Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI) and ADR Chambers 
Banking Ombuds (ADRBO) providing consumers with free ADR service223.  
3. In Netherlands, there is Dutch Institute for Financial Disputes (Kifid), a private 
financial consumer ADR scheme which helps consumers to resolve their disputes 
with financial firms by using a mediation-arbitration model. In Italy, there is 
Banking and Financial Ombudsman (ABF), which worked as an independent and 
impartial body, assisted in its work by the Bank of Italy224. In Australia, there is a 
Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) scheme using the Ombudsman model to 
provide free service including consumer advice and dispute resolution. This 
scheme was born on 1st November 2018 by merging three existing financial 
consumer ADR schemes after a very recently reform. In Hong Kong, the 
 
221 Japan's New Financial ADR System, published by Bloomberg Finance L.P in the Vol. 1, No. 2  
edition of the Bloomberg Law Reports—Alternative Dispute Resolution, access at 
https://www.hugheshubbard.com last visited 18/08/2021 
222 AFS Annual Report of AFS 2016, access at 
https://www.financialarbiter.org.mt/sites/default/files/OAFS-Annual_Report_2016-FINAL.PDF last 
visited 18/08/2021   
223 How to make a complaint to a financial institution published by Financial Consumer Agency of 
Canada, access at https://www.canada.ca/en/financial-consumer-agency/services/complaints/file-
complaint-financial-institution.html last visited 18/08/2021 
224 About the ABF access at https://www.arbitrobancariofinanziario.it/abf/index.html 18/08/2021 
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Financial Dispute Resolution Centre scheme (FDRC) was established by the 
Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) and the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (“HKMA”) after 2008 to answer the increased need for an effective 
system of dispute resolution in financial service market. This scheme uses an 
arbitration model to try to make full use of Hong Kong's status as one of the 
international arbitration centers225.   
4. There are many highlights of individual elements of these special designed ADR 
schemes for financial service market. For example, the Irish Financial Service 
Ombudsman found it was needed to include mediation in its arbitration model 
recently to fully use advantages of ADR techniques, the Irish government merged 
the Financial Services Ombudsman Bureau and the Office of the Pensions 
Ombudsman to form the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman (FSPO) to 
provide consumers with one-stop service, the Australian government reform their 
traditional separate External Dispute Resolution (EDR) system to a 
comprehensive Financial Ombudsman system to improve the performance, and 
Japan’s innovation on decentralization ADR system.  
5. There is also criticism towards these ADR schemes, especially for those dispute 
resolution function is in the regulator such as Singapore’s FIDReC and Italian 
ABF. Putting dispute resolution function in regulators has its advantages, for 
example, financial firms may have more willingness to comply a 
 
225 Andrew Kwok-Nang Li, Chief Justice, Speech at the Hong Kong Mediation Conference (Nov. 30, 2007), access at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200711/ 30/P200711300131.htm last visited 18/08/2021 
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recommendation or decision made by regulators. It could also make the process 
of transferring the collected data to regulators smoothly. Besides, in countries in 
which financial regulators have a good reputation, it may increase consumers’ 
confidence on the scheme. However, it also triggered concern of independence 
and impartiality, which is a key constitutional criterion of ADR. Critics may argue 
that ADR schemes in regulators may influenced by the position and policy of 
regulators and therefore lose its independence and impartiality, while similar 
criticism could also be observed from aspects of transparency and fairness. 
6. As demonstrated above, there are many ADR schemes in the financial service 
market in the world and there is much discussion on each of them, but this thesis 
would only give an examination and comparison in detail on three chosen Financial 
Consumer ADR schemes, namely UK’s FOS, Hong Kong’s FDRC and Australian 
AFCA. The UK’s FOS was chosen because it’s currently the scheme handling the 
largest number of cases in financial service market, a few hundred thousand cases 
were resolved by the FOS in every year. And the UK’s FOS is a very typical 
representative of the Ombudsman model and investigation approach.  
7. The Hong Kong’s FDRC was chosen because the Hong Kong is a popular financial 
center in Asia and part of China, therefore, the context of Hong Kong is very similar 
to the China (mainland), for example, the financial consumer live in Hong Kong 
and China mainland shares similar culture background, economic situation and 
understanding on what is fairness or justice, therefore can contribute much value 
when we discuss on establishing a financial consumer ADR scheme in China. 
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Another reason to choose Hong Kong is a typical representative of arbitration 
model and adversarial approach. The Australian AFCA was chosen because this 
scheme is just reformed, therefore, the research on Australia’s AFCA would help 
to find out some new trends of the development of the financial consumer ADR 
scheme. 
Detailed examination in UK’s FOS  
8. The practice of financial consumer ADR schemes in England has a long history. 
The insurance industry has already introduced an ADR scheme for disputes with 
private- sector bodies with the Insurance Ombudsman Scheme in 1981226. This 
scheme is a private Ombudsman scheme, on a voluntary basis, to handle 
complaints against those insurance companies, which subscribed to it227. In 1986, 
the Banking Ombudsman was established, as the Building Societies Act 1986, 
requires every authorized building society shall be a member of a recognized 
ADR scheme for member complaints228. Adjudicators in these recognized 
schemes would investigate complaints from members and make a binding 
decision. One important principle that still apply today: decision would be based 
on what was ‘fair and reasonable”,229 could already been observed at that time230. 
 
226 Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer-to-business Dispute 
Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 2012) 275 
227 FCA, FCA Hand Book, insurance ombudsman scheme, access at  
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/glossary/G567.html last visited 19/08/2021 
228 Building Societies Act 1986, part IX  
229 Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer-to-business Dispute 
Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 2012) 275 
230 At that time, this principle is described as “determinations of complaints under recognised 
schemes shall be made by reference to what is, in the adjudicator’s opinion, fair in all the 
circumstances of the case and any direction given to a building society or associated body by an 
adjudicator may (if the complainant accepts the determination) require it or the complainant not to 
exercise or require the performance of any of the contractual or other obligations or rights subsisting 
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Later, some other financial consumer ADR schemes, such as the Personal 
Investment Authority Ombudsman and the Investment Ombudsman were 
established to answer the requirement of the Financial Service Act 1986 for 
investments231.   
9. All these Ombudsman schemes were merged into the Financial Ombudsman 
Service on 1 December 2001, with rationalization of differences in time limits 
and eligibility criteria,232making the FOS becomes the main body of UK’s 
financial consumer ADR scheme. The FOS was established by the requirement of 
Financial Service Market Act 2000 (FSMA 2000)233, to protect financial 
consumers’ interests and prevent from bad practice by trying to overcome the 
clear reluctance of consumers to bring the disputes to court234 and problems such 
as the cost of litigation, the strange feeling about the law and lack of legal 
knowledge and professional help in comparison to a financial institution235, by 
providing consumers with a cheap, fast, and efficient one stop dispute resolution 
service for almost all financial service sectors236.  
10. The establishment of the FOS was also influenced by an increasing interest in the 
UK in ADR techniques, including arbitration, mediation, conciliation, expert 
 
between them”. See Building Societies Act 1986, s. 84.  
231 Christopher Hodges, Iris Benohr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer-to-business Dispute 
Resolution: the Power of CADR (Hart Publishing 2012) 275 
232 H Davies, ‘Reforming Financial Regulation: Progress and Priorities’ in E Ferra and CAE Goodhart 
(eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing 2001).  
233 In the FSMA 2000, the FOS is referenced as “the Ombudsman scheme”.  
234 Banking Services and the Consumer, A Report by the National Consumer Council, (London NCC 
1983),106.  
235 I Ramsay, Consumer Protection, Text and Materials (Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1989)140.  
236 According to the FSMA, the FOS has compulsory jurisdiction on most kinds of financial services, 
including banking, security, insurance, electronic money, and payment service. See FSMA 2000, s. 226. 
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determination, and early neutral evaluation. 237These techniques are promoted as 
alternatives to courts, including the small claims procedure,238and to try to resolve 
consumer disputes quickly and with minimum formality by an independent 
person239. 
11. To encourage consumers to use the FOS scheme, the FOS hold a consumer-free 
policy. FOS does not charge any fee to consumers. It is funding comes from 
government’s subsidiary (in the first years), levies and case fee paid by financial 
institutions covered by FOS according to the law240. All businesses covered by 
the ombudsman service pay a general levy to contribute to FOS’s costs. The 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) collects the levy while it collects both its own 
regulatory fees. The amount of levy that each FCA-regulated business pays 
ranges from around £100 a year for a small business to over £300,000 for a high-
street bank or major insurance company241. 
12. The FOS scheme provides every financial institution a free service for the first 25 
cases every year (previously the first three cases every year) and charges £550 for 
the 26th and each subsequent case242. However, not all enquires and initial 
complaints become chargeable cases. According to the FOS, there is only fewer 
than one in six of the initial complaints and enquiries finally become chargeable 
 
237 E Ferran, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the UK Financial sector (Cambridge UP, 2002) 12 
238 R James, Private Ombudsmen and Public Law (Dartmouth Publishing,1997) 3 
239 See FSMA2000, s.225 (1).  
240 FOS A Quick Guide to Funding and Case Fees access at https://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/QG1.pdf  
241 Ibid.  
242 Ibid.  
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cases. The others are issues not covered by the FOS or cases that can be sort out 
informally at a very early stage243. The case fee is a little lower than the unit cost 
around £684 to £753,244which shows that the FOS also tries to provide financial 
institutions an affordable service. Just like the previous chief ombudsman Walter 
Merricks said, in the long term, harmonized Ombudsman arrangements should 
prove beneficial for the financial services industry, in terms of cost efficiency245. 
13. Besides the cost issue, the FOS also tries to encourage consumers to use the 
ombudsman service by proving consumers with as much convenience as possible. 
In 2000, the first chief ombudsman of FOS clearly demonstrates that resolving 
disputes quickly and with minimum formality is the FOS’s main responsibility 
according to the law and minimizing the formality that the procedures will 
necessarily involving is one of the most priority issues they take into 
consideration when designing the complaint process of FOS246. To resolve 
disputes with minimum formality, FOS deals with consumers as far as possible 
using their preferred medium of communication – by phone, letter, or email as 
appropriate – only formalizing matters when it is necessary to avoid confusion or 
for a final recorded decision247.  
 
243 Ibid.  
244 FOS Annual Review 2001-2002 17 access at 
https://www.financialombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar02/Annual-Review-2002.pdf  
245 FOS Annual Report of the Financial Ombudsman Service 1999 – 2000 8 access at 
https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/first-annual-report/ar-1999-2000.pdf  
246 FOS Annual Report of the Financial Ombudsman Service 1999 – 2000 p6 access at 
https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/first-annual-report/ar-1999-2000.pdf  
247 Ibid.  
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14. The effort of encouraging consumers to have awareness of FOS and encourage 
them to use FOS made significant results. In the first three years (2000-2002) of 
the FOS, FOS received 305,094, 414,722and 388,239 enquiries while 25,000, 
31,347 and 43,330 complaints referred to its case-handling team248. Also, in this 
period, the number of cases resolved and closed by the FOS is 22,100, 28,400, 
and 39,194,249which is quite considerable for a new established ADR scheme. 
And after 15 years good operation, the number of resolved complaints increased 
to 336,381, the growth rate is almost 1000%250. By 2017, 89% English people 
said that they had some awareness of the FOS scheme, while 76% public said 
they trust the FOS251.   
15. The FOS scheme is operated by a “body corporate” as the “scheme operator” 
(under s225 of the Financial Services and Markets Act) takes the form of a 
company "limited by guarantee and not having share capital". The name of the 
company is the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited. It works on a not-for-
profit basis and the only aim of the company is to operate the FOS252. The 
company operate by a board of directors; however, the members of the board are 
non-executive, which means that they don’t get involved with considering 
individual complaints. The main responsibility of the board is to oversee the 
strategy of the FOS and to make sure that it have the resources needed to work 
 
248 FOS, Annual Review 2001-2002 13,17 
249 Ibid.  
250 FOS, Annual review 2016/2017 9 
251 FOS, Annual review 2016/2017 33   
252 FOS, How We Are Governed, access at https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/who-we-
are/governance-funding  
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effectively and independently253. Other responsibilities of the board include 
appoint panel of Ombudsman, who are responsible for considering individual 
complaints; approve annual report and accounts; update the information board 
and forms subcommittees254.   
16. The Financial Ombudsman Service Limited has a special relationship with the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). As the regulator of most financial services in 
the UK, the FCA is responsible for regulating the conduct of businesses and 
setting rules for businesses to follow, including the rules on how financial 
businesses handle complaints. The FCA is responsible to publish the company’s 
official rules, appoint the chairman of the company and appoint members of non-
executive board of directors255. The FOS responds to regulation, by closely 
understanding any changes made by the FCA, the FOS limited shall make sure 
that it is ready for any changes in the types and numbers of complaints 
received256. Besides, the FCA and the FOS limited also share information and 
data with each other257. The FCA and the FOS limited meet and communicate 
regularly to discuss matters of mutual interest and they will consult on one 
another on any issues that may have significant influence on the other 




255 Memorandum of Understanding between the Financial Conduct Authority (the FCA) and the 
scheme operator, the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited s(7). 
256 FOS, Our work with other organisations, access at https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/who-
we-are/work-other-organisations 
257 Ibid. 
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early stage258. They also are members of the Coordination Committee, where 
emerging risks that have the potential to cause wide-ranging problems amongst 
financial services consumers are identified and considered.  
17. Further, the FOS limited will disclose information to the FCA when it believes 
that this information would or might be helpful to the FCA in advancing one or 
more optional objectives of the FCA, while the FCA must regard to this 
information in giving effect to its consumer protection objective259. Subject to 
any restrictions on disclosure of information (confidential or otherwise) at law, 
the FOS limited and the FCA shall disclose information which is helpful to the 
other to discharge its own functions and purposes, which including the 
information about the number and types of complaints handled by the FOS and 
proposed changes to rules or guidance on complaints-handling made by the FCA.  
18. The FOS limited is an independent organization, instead of an agent or a 
subsidiary of the FCA. It works independently. Memorandum of Understanding 
between the FOS limited and the FCA clearly shows that they have different 
responsibilities. The FCA operates as the financial conduct regulator. Its strategic 
objective is ensuring that the relevant markets function well. While the main role 
of the FOS is to operate a scheme to resolve disputes, as an alternative to the civil 
courts. The scheme's statutory purpose is to resolve certain disputes quickly and 
 
258 Memorandum of Understanding between the Financial Conduct Authority (the FCA) and the 
scheme operator, the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited s. 14,15 & 16. 
259 Memorandum of Understanding between the Financial Conduct Authority (the FCA) and the 
scheme operator, the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited s.17. 
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with minimum formality based on what is fair and reasonable in all the 
circumstances. The FCA regulates financial institutions by setting standards that 
these institutions must meet and acting where such institutions may be breaching 
those standards. The FCA does not investigate individuals’ complaints against the 
institutions it regulates, this is the role of the FOS260. 
19. In addition, although the FCA makes the official rules for the FOS, the FOS is 
responsible for fixing standard terms and making rules for the voluntary 
jurisdiction and making scheme rules or standard terms for the compulsory and 
voluntary jurisdictions on: Ombudsman procedures; awards of costs and interest; 
and case fees261. 
20. The FSMA 2000 grants the FOS two kinds of jurisdiction. The first one is 
compulsory jurisdiction. The compulsory jurisdiction applies to those disputes if 
(a) the complainant is a consumer and wish to have the complaint dealt by the 
scheme (the complainant is eligible); (b) disputes relates to an act or omission by 
a firm in carrying on one or more of the following activities provided by the FCA 
in the handbook. (c) the related acts or omissions are carried on from an 
establishment in the United Kingdom; or are ancillary to, regulated claims 
management activities; and (d)the act or omission to which the complaint relates 
occurred at a time when compulsory jurisdiction rules were in force in relation to 
 
260 Memorandum of Understanding between the Financial Conduct Authority (the FCA) and the 
scheme operator, the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited s.6 (c). 
261 Memorandum of Understanding between the Financial Conduct Authority (the FCA) and the 
scheme operator, the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited s.9 (b)&(c). 
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the activity in question, even the financial firms in question do not wish to use the 
FOS scheme and complainants refer disputes to the FOS scheme in time. Besides 
the compulsory jurisdiction, there is also a voluntary jurisdiction applies to those 
disputes which are out of the scope of the compulsory jurisdiction but the 
respondent participating this scheme. 
21. When the FOS was established in 2000, the FOS follows different procedure 
according to the rules of original schemes. At that time, all complaints were 
firstly sent to a common point of entry, namely customer contact division, and 
then were divided into three categories according to their nature. Complaints 
under the previously Banking Ombudsman Scheme and Building Society Scheme 
were sent to the banking and loans division, while complaints under other 
schemes were send to the Insurance division and the investment division.  
22. After 2001, when the FOS ‘s own rules come into force, an Ombudsman-based 
comprehensive multi-layer compliant handling procedure was established and all 
complaints would be dealt with through this procedure. The principle of this 
procedure is to try to resolve disputes at as early stage as possible. To use the 
FOS, financial consumers were told to firstly complain to the financial 
institutions to give them a chance to realize the problems and to correct them. 
23. When financial firms’ internal complaint-handling scheme has received consumer 
complaints, they have eight weeks to deal with them, produce and let consumers 
know the final response of the complaint. In the final response, the firms must tell 
                                                                                       94 
 
consumers that they have right to refer the complaints to the FOS. If the financial 
firms is not able to send a final response in eight weeks, they still must tell 
consumers that they can refer the complaint to the FOS.   
24. In case there is no final response after eight weeks, the consumer may directly 
bring the complaint to the FOS, however, the FOS may decide to not look at the 
complaint immediately if they believe there are some special features in the 
complaint and thus the financial firm deserves more time to process the 
complaint. However, this extension of time would not be given as a matter of 
routine262.       
25. In general situation, when the final response is not satisfactory or there is no a 
final response after eight weeks, consumers can then access to the FOS by 
visiting its website or by phone within six months. The complaint will be sent to 
the assessment team where the complaint will be examined whether belongs to 
the FOS’s jurisdiction. If it is something that cannot be dealt with by the FOS 
then the FOS will explain to consumers why they cannot provide with help. If the 
dispute is belonging to the FOS’s jurisdiction, the assessment team will try to 
resolve the dispute in an early stage by, for example, allocating a caseworker 
seeking to broker a settlement by mediation, or perhaps taking a firmer approach 
and giving the consumer making the complaint or the firm (or sometimes both) a 
 
262 FOS Ombudsman News March 2013 access at 
https://www.financialombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman-news/3/3.pdf last visited 
19/08/2021 
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written initial view of the complaint and its likely outcome263. Most complaints 
were resolved in this step, for example, the Ombudsman scheme resolved 89 
percent of all complaints before Ombudsman in 2019-2020264 while 92 percent 
complaints were resolved in this early step in 2020-2021265. A financial firm then 
may give the consumer a compensation according to the informal view and the 
consumer would give up to seek other remedies such as the civil litigation.   
26. If the complaint cannot be resolved in this step, the complaint will be allocated to 
an adjudicator for a formal investigation. The investigation would be carried over 
the phone and in writing, both parties would not be asked to present themselves in 
person. The consumer has no duty to prove evidence to the adjudicator 
proactively, the adjudicator will decide what documents or record he would likely 
to know to find out what happens and what is reasonable and fair. The adjudicator 
can directly request the firm to submit evidence, what the consumer needs to do is 
to provide the personal details, claims and some key details such as account 
number or policy number266. If during the process of the investigation, the 
adjudicator finds that it is likely to foster a settlement, the adjudicator will try to 
persuade parties to make a settlement. However, if the attempt of achieving a 
settlement failed, the adjudicator will then give a report to summarize the 
complaint and to demonstrate the outcome of the investigation.  
 
263 Ibid. 
264 FOS The FOS Annual complaints data 2019/2020, access at https://www.financial 
ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/annual-complaints-data last visited 19/08/2021 
265 Ibid. 
266 FOS Your complaint and the ombudsman access at https://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/publications/consumer-leaflet.htm#e last visited 19/08/2021 
                                                                                       96 
 
27. In the report, the adjudicator will give conclusion about whether the complaint 
should be upheld and a recommendation for compensation or other 
redress267.This report would be sent to both parties and if both parties decide to 
accept this report, the case is end. If not, the case will then be transferred to the 
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman will then review the complaint according to the 
adjudicator’s report and any other further information that he may think is 
necessary. During this step, a face-to-face hearing may arrange in public or 
private if the Ombudsman believes a case cannot be fairly decided based on the 
documentary evidence and the material that the two sides have already 
provided268.  
28. However, the hearing is rare to see. The firm or consumer may ask for a hearing, 
and the Ombudsman would carefully consider whether the hearing is value 
enough. No private meeting with the Ombudsman would be held to either party 
during this step. After that, the ombudsman will give a decision according to 
“what is fair and reasonable”. This decision would be the outcome of the 
Ombudsman scheme. Where the ombudsman has decided in favor of the 
complainant, the ombudsman’s decision can include a money award, a n interest 
award, a costs award against the respondent and a direction to the respondent269.  
The amount of money award can be decided by the ombudsman according to 
what he/she believe is fair. The money award can cover loss from financial loss, 
 
267 FOS Ombudsman News March 2001 34 
268 FOS Annual review 2011-2012 
269 DISP 3.7.1 
                                                                                       97 
 
pain and suffering, damage to reputation and distress or inconvenience, no matter 
whether a court would award compensation270. Although the ombudsman can 
decide the amount of money award according to his discretion, the discretion is 
not unlimited, there is a cap of money award exists in the FOS scheme. Currently, 
the maximum money award which the ombudsman may make is: £350,000 for a 
complaint concerning an act or omission which occurred on or after 1 April 2019; 
and £160,000 for a complaint concerning an act or omission which occurred 
before 1 April 2019271, exclude possible interest and cost.  
29. Besides the monetary award, the ombudsman may also make a direction to the 
respondent in the decision. A direction may require the respondent to take such 
steps in relation to the complainant as the ombudsman considers just and 
appropriate
272
 (whether a court could order those steps to be taken)
273
. While the 
ombudsman may also ask the respondent to take certain actions as he determines 
the respondent should take (or should have taken) under the scheme
274
.If the 
consumer decides to accept this decision, the decision becomes binding and 
enforceable just like a court judgement. If not, the decision becomes void, both 
parties free to bring the case to court for a civil litigation or to other ADR 
schemes. No matter whether the consumer accept the Ombudsman decision or 
 
270 DISP 3.7.1 
271 DISP 3.7.4. 
272 For example, the ombudsman may require the respondent to make a formal apologize to the 
complainant.    
273 DISP 3.7.11 
274 DISP 3.7.11A 
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not, the procedure of the FOS will close and the FOS will not review this 
complaint.   
Detailed examination in Hong Kong’s FDRC 
30. The HK’s FDRC is a new financial consumer ADR scheme proposed by the 
Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) and the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (“HKMA”) in 2008 to answer the increased need for an effective system 
of dispute resolution in financial service market 275 , in which more and more 
disputants are turning to alternative dispute resolution mechanism to resolve their 
disputes276. Another important reason of this proposal is the 2008 financial crisis. 
At that time, the Hong Kong has a developed financial market and comparing to 
other lead financial markets, small and medium individual investors account for a 
high proportion in Hong Kong’s financial market277. Due to the global financial 
crisis triggered by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, Hong Kong’s financial 
authorities and financial institutions must face a large group of anger and panic 
small individual investors, who are trying seek damages against those financial 
institutions selling them drastically depreciating investment products278. Under this 
background, the SFC and HKMA believe that establishing such a financial 
consumer ADR scheme would help to provide financial consumers a place to 
 
275 Andrew Kwok-Nang Li, Chief Justice, Speech at the Hong Kong Mediation Conference (Nov. 30, 
2007), access at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200711/ 30/P200711300131.htm. 
276 Michael J. Moser & Yeoh Friven, ‘Choosing an Arbitral Institution in Cross Border Commercial 
Arbitration’ in Michael J. Moser (eds) Busness Disputes in China (2d ed, Hong Kong Publishing 2009). 
277 Ali, Shahla F. & Kwok, J. K. W. ‘After Lehman: International Response to Financial Disputes – a Focus 
on Hong Kong’ (2011) Vol.10(2) Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 
278 Ibid. 
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protect their interests and resolve their disputes arising from the 2008 financial 
crisis279.  
31. After the proposal, the government launched a public consultation on it in February 
2010 which received general support280,while many legal professionals suggest the 
government should fully use the Hong Kong’s advantage as an international 
arbitration centre and a place with abundant arbitration resource281. The supporting 
of the consultation paper leads to the establishment of the FDRC on 18 November 
2011 as a non-profit making company limited by guarantee with seed funding from 
the government, the HKMA and the SFC. The Role of the FDRC is to operate a 
financial consumer ADR scheme aiming to provide consumers with an alternative 
avenue which is independent and affordable for resolving monetary disputes with 
the financial institution amicably and in a timely manner by way of primarily 
“mediation first and arbitration next”282.        
32. The operator of Hong Kong’s FDRC scheme is the FDRC, which is a non-profit 
company limited by guarantee and obtained charitable status for tax exemption 
 
279 Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, Proposed Establishment of an Investor Education 
Council and a Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (2010), access at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-
10/english/panels/fa/papers/facbl-l127-1-e.pdf, last visited 19/08/2021; Ali, Shahla F. & Kwok, J. K. W. 
‘After Lehman: International Response to Financial Disputes – a Focus on Hong Kong’ (2011) Vol.10(2) 
Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 
280 H.K. MONETARY AUTH., REPORT OF THE HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY ON ISSUES 
CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF STRUCTURED PRODUCTS CONNECTED TO LEHMAN GROUP 
COMPANIES, (Oct. 26, 2009), access at www.info.gov.hk/hkma/ eng/new/lehman/lehman report.pdf 
last visited 19/08/2021 
281 H.K. MONETARY AUTH., REPORT OF THE HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY ON ISSUES 
CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF STRUCTURED PRODUCTS CONNECTED TO LEHMAN GROUP 
COMPANIES, (Oct. 26, 2009), access at www.info.gov.hk/hkma/ eng/new/lehman/lehman report.pdf 
last visited 19/08/2021 
282 Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) Objectives access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/html/aboutus/aboutus_fdrs.php 19/08/2021 




. There is a memorandum of understanding between FDRC and the SFC 
and the HKMA to set out relationship between them. According to the 
memorandum, the SFC and the HKMA would respect FDRC’s principle of 
impartiality and confidentiality, while the FDRC will also work close with the SFC 
and HKMA for the good of financial service market284.  
33. The FDRC scheme has no compulsory jurisdiction on Hong Kong’s financial 
institutions. It only has voluntary jurisdiction which requires both parties’ 
agreement to set up. However, as all financial institutions which are authorized by 
the HKMA or licensed by/registered with the SFC (except those institutions which 
only provide credit rating services) are required to join the FDRC scheme as 
members, there is no need for consumers to gain a separate agreement from 
financial institutions in every single complaint.  
34. The FDRC has jurisdictions on two groups of disputes. The first group is standard 
eligible disputes and the second is extended eligible disputes. A standard eligible 
dispute is a monetary nature dispute between an eligible compliant and a financial 
institution arise out of a contract entered or enforced in Hong Kong, which is 
brought to the FDRC by an eligible complaint or a financial institution with signed 
consent by the Parties
285
. The FDRC defined eligible complaint as an individual, a 
sole proprietor or a small enterprise, who received financial service from a financial 
 
283 FDRC, Annual report 2012 
284 FDRC, Annual report 2012 
285 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.12.1.1.  




. A financial consumer (eligible complaint) can bring the dispute to the 
FDRC without a separate agreement of financial institution, however, if a financial 
institution hopes to let the FDRC deal with its disputes with financial consumers, 
the financial institution must firstly achieve an agreement from the consumer.  
35. Another issue which influences the jurisdiction is the amount of claim. The FDRC 
set a maximum claimable amount for itself and the dispute which claim higher than 
the cap will not be consider as standard eligible dispute. The current cap for the 
FDRC is 1,000,000 Hong Kong dollars
287
. Besides the cap of claimable amount, 
there is also a limit of time, an eligible complaint must fill his/her application to 
the FDRC within the 24 months from the date that he/she realized there is a loss. 
The rules of jurisdiction also require consumers first to fill a written complaint to 
the relevant financial institution and received a final written reply issued by the 
financial institution before they use the FDRC scheme. If consumers filed a written 
complaint to the financial institution but never received a final written reply from 
the institution after 60 days passed, consumers can then directly go to the FDRC
288
.  
36. The extended eligible dispute is a dispute exceeds the maximum claimable amount 
and/or is beyond the limitation period or including an individual financial 
institution claim or individual financial individual counterclaim. In the 
circumstance of extended eligible dispute, the consent from both parties were need 
 
286 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.13. 
287 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.12 
288 Ibid.  
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to establish the jurisdiction over the case289. 
37. When an eligible consumer or a financial institution hopes to use the FDRC scheme 
to resolve a dispute between them, the consumer will be required to first prove that 
he has already filed a written complaint to the relevant financial institution through 
that institution’s internal complaint handling scheme and received a final written 
reply from the institution or did not receive such reply after 60 days from the data 
of filed290, while the financial institution needs to prove it has gained consents from 
relevant consumers291.    
38. When the applicant success to do that, the applicant will then be required to fill an 
application form set up by the FDRC. To file this application form, the consumer 
is required to clearly listing out the issues in dispute and the amount of monetary 
loss suffered, as well as attaching the relevant correspondence with the relevant 
party292. When submitting the application form, the applicant was also required to 
pay the application fee at the same time293. 
39. After an application form was submitted, the case will then be assigned to a case 
officer, the case officer may require an applicant to provide further information that 
is considered necessary to assess whether the dispute is under the jurisdiction of 
FDRC. The applicant was required to comply with the request within the timeframe 
 
289 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.12.1.2.  
290 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.15.2.  
291 Ibid.  
292 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.17.1.1.  
293 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.17.1.3.  
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specified by the FDRC. 
40. After gained all necessary information he/she needs, the case officer will then 
consider, having regard to the rules of jurisdiction with due reference to the 
definitions of eligible disputes, eligible complaints, and financial institutions, 
whether to accept or reject the application. An application will be rejected or 
decided to discontinue handling in some certain circumstances, even the relevant 
dispute is an eligible dispute and under the jurisdiction of FDRC294. After the case 
officer made his decision on whether accept this case or not, the officer will take 
appropriate measures to let both parties to know his/her decision. If the applicant 
believes that the decision made by the case manager is inappropriate, the applicant 
may make a written representation to the FDRC within 21 days295. Then a senior 
staff of the FDRC will review the decision and make his own decision, this decision 
made by senior staff of FDRC will be final and conclusive and cannot be 
challenged anymore296. 
41. After an application was accepted by the FDRC, the case will be referred to 
mediation and arbitration according to the sequence known as “mediation first, 
arbitration next”, if it is a standard eligible case. Otherwise, the case may be 
 
294 These circumstances include: if, after the Application is lodged with the FDRC, the eligible 
complaint lodges a complaint against the financial institution with the ICB or one of the parties 
commences legal proceedings against the other party while the claim is being processed by the FDRC 
unless the court has ordered a stay of the proceedings or has been provided with proper notifications 
for mediation and/or arbitration. Or if, after the application is lodged with the  
FDRC, it comes to the knowledge of the FDRC that the claim has been the subject of court proceedings 
where there is a decided judgment. 
295 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.18.3.2 
296 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.18.3., and 18.3.4.  
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referred either to “mediation first, arbitration next”, “mediation only” or 
“arbitration only”, provided that the parties have given their signed consent297.       
42. The acceptance of the case also means that from that time, the FDRC has power to 
require a party to an eligible dispute to do anything else that the FDRC consider 
may assist the conduct of mediation and/or arbitration, including requiring a party 
to attend a pre-mediation session, provide a translator at his own cost or provide 
further information except in some special circumstances298 . The timeframe to 
provide this information will be decided and extended by the FDRC.    
43. If the case was referred to a mediation, the mediator will be appointed depends on 
the number of claims involved. If the amount of claim is within the prescribed level 
of HK$200,000, the FDRC shall assign the case to an in-house mediator or a 
mediator from the list of mediators299 . Otherwise, the parties may agree on the 
appointment of the mediator from the list of mediators. If the parties fail to agree 
on the appointment of the mediator, the FDRC will be required to appoint the 
mediator. Then, the FDRC shall appoint a mediator from the list of mediators as 
soon as practicable, considering the parties’ preference so far as practicable300. The 
FDRC has sole authority to set up and maintain a list of mediators as well as the 
power to remove, at its sole discretion, any mediator from the list of mediators who 
 
297 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.18.3., and 18.4.1.  
298 These may include, to provide the information would breach a court order, to provide the 
information would breach a duty of confidentiality to a third party, to provide the information would 
prejudice an ongoing investigation by the police, the regulators or other law enforcement agencies, 
the information does not exist or no longer exists or is not within the party’s reasonable possession or 
control or the information is irrelevant to the eligible dispute. See Terms of Reference for Financial 
Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme s.18.4.2.  
299 Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) Mediation and Arbitration Rules, art.2.1.1(a). 
300 Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) Mediation and Arbitration Rules, art.2.1.1(b). 
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fails to adhere to the terms of reference and/or the FDRS mediation and arbitration 
rules and/or ethics codes for FDRC mediators and arbitrators301. 
44. After the mediator is decided, the mediator shall commence and conduct the 
mediation as soon as possible after his/her appointment. And his/her first job is to 
ensure that the parties made a separate agreement of mediation before the 
substantive mediation is started302. During the process of the substantive mediation, 
the mediator was required to help the parties to identify the issues in the dispute, 
explore each party’s needs and interests, communicate with one another, explore, 
and generate options, reach an agreement regarding the resolution of the whole, or 
part, of the dispute, according to the mediation and arbitration rules303. To facilitate 
the mediator to do his job, the mediator has power to request the parties to provide 
all relevant data, information and materials relating to and necessary for the 
mediations, except where the party satisfies the mediator that there are some certain 
circumstances prohibit the party to do304. The mediator’s role is only to mediate the 
dispute with a view to reach an agreement between parties and in no situation has 
power to adjudicate or make any binding decisions on the substance of the dispute 
 
301 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.19.1.1. 
302 Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) Mediation and Arbitration Rules, art.2.1.  
303 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.19.4.1 
304 For example, these circumstances may include to provide the information would breach a court 
order, to provide the information would breach a duty of confidentiality to a third party, to provide the 
information would prejudice an ongoing investigation by the police, the regulators or other law 
enforcement agencies, the information does not exist or no longer exists or is not within the party’s 
reasonable possession or control or the information is irrelevant to the eligible dispute. See Terms of 
Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial Dispute 
Resolution Scheme s.19.5.1.  
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or make any monetary awards or impose any penalties on the Parties305.    
45. The mediation may end because a settlement between parties was made. Otherwise, 
the mediation may also end if the consumer submits a written notification to the 
mediator that he wants to end the mediation or if the mediator, after consultation 
with parties, believe that further mediation is no longer practicable and thus give a 
written advice to terminate the mediation306. The mediator will try to finish the 
mediation working in the given specified mediation time, which currently is four 
hours 307 . The mediator may conclude his mediation even after the specified 
mediation time. The specified mediation time may be extended by the mediator and 
the FDRC with the agreement of parties. When the specified mediation time was 
extended, the FDRC will charge parties an extra fee according to its fee structure308.  
46. After the end of the mediation, the FDRC shall issue each party a certificate of 
mediation to prove that they have already finish the mediation procedure. If there 
is no settlement was made through the mediation, the claimant can then request an 
arbitration administrated by FDRC within 60 days from the date of mediation 
certificate309. There is only a single arbitrator in the arbitration. The parties can 
make an agreement to choose one arbitrator from the lists of arbitrators. If they 
cannot achieve an agreement, the FDRC shall appoint an arbitrator from the lists. 
 
305 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.19.5.2 &19.5.3.  
306 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.19.8.  
307 In general situation if a settlement cannot made after the specified mediation time is complete 
and the parties cannot achieve an agreement to extend the mediation time, the mediator will issue 
this advice and then terminate the mediation.  
308 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.19.9.2. 
309 Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) Mediation and Arbitration Rules, art.3.2.1.  
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Before appointing an arbitrator, the FDRC will notify the potential arbitrator(s) of 
the nature of the dispute and the identities of the parties. Each potential arbitrator 
must make a reasonable effort to learn of, and disclose to the FDRC, if there are 
any circumstances might preclude himself from rendering an objective, 
independent and impartial determination in the proceeding.  
47. Generally, the arbitration is “documents-only”, which means that the arbitrator 
shall conduct and decide the case based on the documents submitted and evidence 
provided, while each party shall bear the burden of proof for its own case310. No 
legal representative will be allowed in the “documents-only” arbitration 311 . 
However, if the arbitrator determines, in his sole discretion, that an in-person 
hearing is necessary for deciding the case, and both parties agree to take on and 
pay the corresponding fees, there shall be an in-person hearing312. If there is an in-
person hearing, the legal representative may be allowed according to the discretion 
of the arbitrator.  
48. During the whole process of the arbitration procedure, the arbitrator has power to 
make enquiries to both parties, order any party to make any property or thing 
available for inspection, order any party submit documents in their possession, 
receive and consider such written or oral evidence as he/she shall determine to be 
relevant and shall not be bound by the rules of evidence313. However, the power 
 
310 Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) Mediation and Arbitration Rules, art.3.8.1.  
311 Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) Mediation and Arbitration Rules, art.3.8.3.  
312 Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) Mediation and Arbitration Rules, art.3.9.1.  
313 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.20.4.2.  
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and discretion of arbitrator must be limited by the FDRC’s mediation and 
arbitration rules, the ethics codes for FDRC mediators and arbitrators and the Hong 
Kong’s arbitration ordinance (Cap.609) other than section 32 and 33314, while the 
arbitrator also has obligation to always act fairly and impartially in the whole 
process of arbitration procedure315.  
49. The applicable law that will be applied in the arbitration procedure to determine 
substantive issues is the law governing the relevant contract, while the law which 
governs the procedural issues of the arbitration procedure is the Hong Kong’s 
arbitration ordinance (Cap.609) other than section 32 and 33 316 . There is no 
evidence showing that the FDRC uses an extended interpretation method here to 
include those soft laws such as code of industry or good practice in the industry as 
part of laws governing the contract.   
50. The arbitrator can issue and only issue a monetary award at the end of the 
arbitration, subject to the maximum claimable amount for each individual standard 
eligible dispute and extended eligible amount. The arbitrator may also issue an 
award on monetary awards on interests and costs in extended eligible disputes. 
However, the arbitrator cannot issue awards on interests and costs in standard 
eligible disputes, the parties must bear their own costs317. 
51. The settlement achieved through the mediation has no legal binding force and 
 
314 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.20.3.1. 
315 Ibid.  
316 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.20.4.1.  
317 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.20.4.2. 
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cannot be enforced directly by the court. However, as members of the FDRC 
scheme, financial institutions have the obligation to fulfil the terms of mediated 
settlement agreement and arbitration award318. If a financial institution failed to 
fulfil the obligation of enforcing the settlement, the FDRC may issue a non-
compliance letter/notice to the financial institution, with a copy to the regulators 
for follow-up actions319. Although, in theory, the financial institution can refuse to 
enforce the settlement, the negative consequences followed makes it almost 
impossible in practice.  
52. The award made by the arbitrator through the arbitration procedure is final and 
binding to both parties. The award cannot be appealed except it is an appeal against 
award on question of law according to the sections 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Schedule 2 of 
the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609)320. Just like the settlement achieved through 
the mediation, the financial institution has obligation to enforce the award 
proactively as member of the FDRC scheme and may face negative consequences 
issued by the regulator if it failed to do that. Unlike the settlement, the award of the 
arbitration can also be directly enforced by the Hong Kong’s court,321 while it may 
also be enforced by courts in other jurisdictions who are members of the New York 
 
318 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.9.3.  
319 Terms of Reference for Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) in relation to the Financial 
Dispute Resolution Scheme s.10.2.  
320 Financial Dispute Resolution Scheme (FDRS) Mediation and Arbitration Rules, art.3.12.1.  
321 Although it is quiet confusing here whether the award will be enforced as a judgement of court or 
as a contractual debt. According to the art. 84 of Hong Kong’s arbitration ordinance, the arbitration 
award shall be enforced as same as a judgement of court. However, the FDRC’s terms of reference said 
that the monetary award can be recovered or enforced through the courts as a contractual debt, 
which is conflict to the arbitration ordinance as well as FDRC’s own demonstration on enforceability of 
arbitration award. See FDRC Advantages of arbitration, access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/sc/html/resolvingdisputes/resolvingdisputes_mediationarbitration.php  
                                                                                       110 
 
Convention322.  
53. The FDRC charges to both eligible complaints (consumers) and financial 
institutions. The FDRC provides free enquiry service to consumers but consumers 
need to pay HK$200 to file an application form for the purpose of further service. 
The mediation fee and arbitration fee will be charged according to the claim 
amounts of disputes. The mediation fee for consumers is from HK$1,000 to 
HK$2000 in a specified mediation time (4hours), if extended mediation time is 
needed, the charge will vary from HK$750 per hour to HK$1500 per hour. The 
mediation fee for a financial institution is five times the mediation fee of consumers 
in the specified mediation time and as same as the fee of consumer in extended 
time. The mediation fee is not refundable no matter there is a settlement achieved 
or not.  
54. The arbitration fee is charged according to whether there is an in-person hearing. 
If there is only a documents-based arbitration, the FDRC shall charge consumers 
HK$5,000 per case and charge financial institutions HK$20,000. However, if there 
is an in-person hearing was involved in the arbitration, the FDRC will charge both 
consumers and financial institutions HK$12,500. Information in details can be find 
in  
55. The funding of the FDRC mainly comes from contributions from founder members 
and investment interests. The total operating expenditure of FCDR was 
HK$ 9,974,339 in financial year 2020, which was a little lower than last year, 
 
322 FDRC Advantages of arbitration, access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/sc/html/resolvingdisputes/resolvingdisputes_mediationarbitration.php 
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HK$11,580,187. The funds were spent on staff costs (HK$5,395,720), depreciation 
and amortisation (HK$ 1,921,085) and other administrative and operating expenses 
(HK$ 2,657,534). The total income of FDRC in financial year 2020 was 
HK$459,804, but only a small part of this income comes from case fee paid by 
consumers and financial institutions. In the whole year, the FDRC charges 
HK$ 20,000 from its dispute resolution. The main revenue comes from its 
investment interests (HK$ 459,804)323.  
Detailed examination in Australian AFCA 
56. The Australian AFCA scheme is a broad new financial consumer ADR scheme only 
established on 1st November 2018. However, the history of Australia’s financial 
consumer ADR scheme is quite long and the new AFCA scheme is just established 
based on this history. Before the AFCA, the practice of financial consumer ADR 
schemes in Australia are known as the “External Dispute Resolution” (EDR) 
schemes. They are called “external” to distinguish those “internal” complaint 
schemes or redress schemes operated by financial individual financial firms. In 
Australian financial markets, the Corporations Act 2001 required all insurance 
companies, insurance brokers, financial advisers and related entities providing 
financial services must hold a financial services license and the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Act 2009 required all firms that provide consumer credit and 
loans must hold an Australian credit license324. 
 
323 FDRC Annual Report 2020, access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/annualreport/2020/files/download/FDRC_annual_report.pdf last visited 
19/08/2021 
324 Complaints against banking, financial services, insurance companies and super funds published by 
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57. All above licensees are required to have suitable internal schemes to deal with 
disputes by consumers under the standard set by the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) Regulatory Guide 165. Besides these internal 
dispute resolution schemes, Australian laws also require every financial firm, 
which holds either of these licenses or is an authorized credit representative to join 
an EDR scheme approved by the ASIC. Financial firms can only provide retail 
financial products and services in Australia after the two requirements have been 
fulfilled. 
 
58. Before 1st November 2018, there are three ASIC-approved EDR schemes in 
Australia. The first and the biggest one is the Australian Financial Ombudsman 
Service (FOS), which is established in 2008 by merger of the Financial Industry 
Complaints Service (FICS), the Banking and Financial Services Ombudsman 
(BFSO) and the Insurance Ombudsman Service (IOS), which are self –regulatory 
organizations325 . Two other pre-existing EDR schemes approved by the ASIC, 
namely the Credit Union Dispute Resolution Centre (CUDRC) and the Insurance 
Brokers Disputes Limited (IBDL), also joined the FOS after its 
establishment326.The FOS deals with complaints across a diverse range of financial 
and credit products and services - including complaints against banks, credit unions, 
foreign exchange dealers, deposit takers, credit providers, mortgage brokers, 
 
legal services commission of south Australia https://lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ch09s04.php 
325 ASIC-approved dispute resolution schemes https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-
services/dispute-resolution/asic-approved-dispute-resolution-schemes/  
326 Ibid.  
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general insurers, insurance brokers, life insurers, fund’s managers, financial 
advisers and planners, stockbrokers, and some superannuation providers. 
 
59. The two other ASIC-approved EDR schemes are the Credit and Investment 
Ombudsman (CIO) and the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT). The CIO 
focuses on resolving complaints about credit unions, building societies, non-bank 
lenders, mortgage and finance brokers, financial planners, lenders and debt 
collectors, credit licensees and credit representatives, while the SCT deals with 
complaints about superannuation funds, annuities and deferred annuities, and 
retirement savings accounts.  
 
60. From 1st November 2018, all the three ASIC-approved EDR schemes were merged 
into a new comprehensive EDR scheme namely the Australian Financial 
Complaints Authority (AFCA). All existing complaints with the FOS and the CIO 
were transferred to the AFCA but the unresolved complaints with the SCT would 
remain in the SCT, while new complaints will be received and dealt by the AFCA327. 
  
61. The AFCA is now the only ASIC- approved EDR scheme in Australia that aims to 
provide financial consumers with an alternative place to resolve their disputes with 
financial firms. The scheme is operated by an independent not-for profit limited by 
 
327 Because of this new reform, the author will mainly introduce and discuss the information of 
AFCA as materials of comparative study in further chapters, however, the author may also refer to 
some data and statistics produced or collected by the FOS, CIO and SCT, as the AFCA’s operation is still 
too short to produce or collect such data. 
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guarantee that was authorized by the responsible Minister under the Corporations 
Act to do so328. The dispute resolution activities of the AFCA will be governed by 
the AFCA rules, which can be regarded as part of a contract between the AFCA and 
financial firms and consumers329 , and the Operational Guidelines draft by the 
AFCA. The dispute resolution service provided by the AFCA is free for consumers 
and the AFCA suggests consumes that there is generally no need to hire a legal or 
other paid representation to submit or pursue a complaint through the AFCA330.  
62. The AFCA is not a compulsory pre-procedure for financial consumers to seek 
remedies. Consumers are free to use civil litigation procedure or other ADR 
services such as mediation or arbitration provided by other institutions to resolve 
their disputes. Consumers who submit their complaints to AFCA can withdraw 
their complaints at any time. However, a financial firm, as a member of the AFCA, 
must enter the AFCA procedure to deal with its disputes with consumers if 
consumers hope to do so331.  
63. While a complaint is considering by the AFCA, the financial firm shall not begin 
legal proceedings against the complainant, anyone else joined as a party to the 
complaint or other affected party about any aspect of the subject matter of the 
complaint. The financial firm shall also not to seek judgement or take action to 
pursue debt recovery legal proceedings which was started before the complaint 
submitted to the AFCA. A financial firm that refuses to do so breaches the member 
 
328 The Terms of Reference of the AFCA, A1.1 
329 AFCA Complaint Resolution Scheme Rules section (A) 1.2.   
330 AFCA Complaint Resolution Scheme Rules section (A) 1.3. 
331 AFCA Complaint Resolution Scheme Rules section (A) . 
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rules of the AFCA and thus will be punished by the AFCA according to relevant 
rules.  
64. There are two kinds of jurisdictions, compulsory jurisdiction and submitting 
jurisdiction, under the rules of the AFCA. The compulsory jurisdiction applies to 
those complaints arising from customer relationship, or other circumstances 
specified by the AFCA rules, between an individual consumer or a small enterprise 
and a financial firm that is member of the AFCA when the complaint was brought 
to the AFCA332. The disputes must relate to the financial consumer relationship in 
nature and must has sufficient connection with Australia. The AFCA then further 
explain what disputes can be regarded as related to financial consumer relationship 
in nature by giving detail examples such as a guarantee or security for, or 
repayment of, financial accommodation provided by the financial firm to a 
financial consumer, an entitlement or benefit under a life insurance policy, and a 
legal or beneficial interest arising out of a financial investment etc.  
65. Concerning the sufficient connection with Australia, the AFCA demonstrates that 
a complaint arising from ‘a contract or obligation arising under Australian law, 
including but not limited to privacy obligations’, ‘an offer to invest that was 
received in Australia by a complainant in relation to a recognized foreign collective 
investment scheme; or a ‘direct or indirect investment in a product through a 
platform which was offered in Australia’ shall be regarded as has sufficient 
connection with Australia. In summary, to have a sufficient connection with 
 
332 It does not matter if the financial firm is not a member of the AFCA when dispute arising.  
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Australia, the complaint must arise from a financial service received in Australia, 
or a financial service contract governing by the Australian laws.   
 
66. A complaint will not be considered if submitted to the AFCA after the time limit 
even when it is under the AFCA’s compulsory jurisdiction. The AFCA provides 
different time limits for different complaints, for example, the time limit for a 
complaint that the National Credit Code applying is two years after the credit 
contract is rescinded, discharged, or otherwise comes to an end. However, the 
general time limit for complaints is six years after the date when the complainant 
first became aware (or should reasonably have become aware) that they suffered 
the loss333.  
 
67. The AFCA further clarifies its compulsory jurisdiction by listing complaints will 
not be dealt with by the AFCA in a list. There are two groups of complaints would 
not be accepted by the AFCA, one is known as mandatory exclusion and the other 
is exclude by the AFCA’s discretion. The general mandatory exclusion includes a) 
complaints related to businesses’ discretion, such as the level of a fee, premium, 
charge, rebate or interest rate and decisions about how to allocate the benefit 
between the potential beneficiaries, under some exceptions; b) complaints that have 
been previously dealt with by the AFCA without sufficient new facts and events to 
be considered as new complaints; c) complaints have been dealt with by court or 
 
333 The Terms of Reference of the AFCA, B4.3.1. 
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other dispute resolution tribunals; and d) complaints that value of claim exceeds $1 
million, etc. Besides the general exclusion, the AFCA also list special mandatory 
exclusion applying to credit complaint, insurance complaints, investment 
complaints and traditional trustee service complaints.  
 
68. Besides the mandatory exclusion, the AFCA may also refuse a complaint in its own 
discretion when the AFCA believes it is appropriate. Reasons for this exclusion 
includes a) the AFCA believes that there is a more suitable place to deal with the 
complaint, such as a court; b) the subject matter of the complaint has been 
previously dealt with by the AFCA or a predecessor scheme; c) complaints are 
considered to be frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; and d) 
complaints or subject matter of complaints have been brought to a legal procedure 
by consumers, unless the consumers discontinues the legal procedures or promised 
in writing that will not take further steps in the legal procedure, etc.    
 
69. The submit jurisdiction applies to disputes which both parties agree to use the 
AFCA to resolve. It may also apply to those complaints exclude by the mandatory 
exclusion as a such complaint can be accepted by the AFCA if both parties and the 
AFCA itself agree to consider this complaint334.         
70. When the AFCA receives a complaint and decides to consider it, the AFCA will 
give a writing notify to the relevant financial firm to let them know the existence 
 
334 The Terms of Reference of the AFCA, C1.1. 
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of the complaint. Then the AFCA will transfer back the complaint to the financial 
firm to provide the financial firm to either resolve the complaint by themselves or 
explain their position in relation to the complaint in a timeframe set by the AFCA. 
However, if the AFCA believes that it is appropriate to start the investigation or 
deal with the complaint directly or the complaint is a complaint related to payment 
of a death benefit of superannuation, the AFCA may in general do not provide 
financial firm with such opportunity.   
71. If the complaint is not resolved by the financial firm within the time frame, the 
complaint will be transferred back to the AFCA. In general circumstances, the 
AFCA will first try to resolve the complaint through informal methods. For 
example, the AFCA may hold a mediation, 335 to help the consumer and the 
financial firm to achieve settlements. In the mediation, the AFCA may help to 
exchange settlement proposals and advice each party about these proposals. To 
further help parties to achieve a settlement, the AFCA may also provide both parties 
with a guide of possible outcome that may be given by AFCA if there is no 
settlement was achieved and the complaint moves the final step of AFCA’s working 
procedure336 .Besides holding a mediation conference in person, the AFCA may 
also hold a telephone conciliation conference with both parties during this stage.  
 
72. If a settlement is not achieved after a mediation or a conciliation, the complaint 
will then move to the “determination procedure”. This “determination procedure” 
 
335 It is known as “Negotiation” in AFCA’s Terms of Reference.  
336 AFCA The Process We Follow https://www.afca.org.au/what-to-expect/the-process-we-follow/ 
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will be hold by an AFCA’s staff, and he will firstly try to collect information and 
submission from both parties, before he starts to consider the merits of the 
complaint. A party to a complaint must comply with requirements to provide 
information within the timeframe specified by AFCA. Only some very special 
excuses would be accepted when parties refuse to provide required information, 
such as providing information would breach a duty of confidentiality to a third 
person or a court order337. If a party failed to provide with required information 
without these acceptable reasons, the AFCA may then proceed with the resolution 
of the complaint on the basis that an adverse inference will generally be drawn, 
unless some special circumstances apply338. If the party who failed to provide such 
information is the complainant, the AFCA may refuse to continue considering the 
complaint339.  
 
73. The AFCA may also require a party to do anything else that it considers may assist 
its consideration of the complaint340. For example, the AFCA may ask a party to 
attend an interview or ask the financial firm to further investigate the complaint or 
to appoint an independent expert to report back to the AFCA on something relating 
to the complaint.  
 
74. The information gathered by the AFCA from a party will generally be shared with 
 
337 The Terms of Reference of the AFCA, A 9.1. 
338 The Terms of Reference of the AFCA, A 9.5. 
339 Ibid.  
340 The Terms of Reference of the AFCA, A 9.3. 
                                                                                       120 
 
the other party unless the party who provides the information does not consent to 
the sharing, However, if an information is not shared, the AFCA’s decision maker 
cannot decide rely on this information unless special circumstances apply. The 
AFCA also promise that before any decision is made, the parties will be provided 
at least one opportunity to make submissions. 
    
75. After the AFCA collecting the information and submissions from parties, AFCA 
may choose to provide the parties with a preliminary assessment of the complaint. 
This preliminary assessment will demonstrate reasons for any conclusions made 
about the merits of the complaint and will provide a recommendation as to how the 
complaint should be resolved. The parties have 7days (for fast-track complaints) 
or 30 days (for other complaints) to consider whether they are willing to accept this 
preliminary assessment or not. If both parties decide to accept it, the complaint will 
be resolved on this basis. If either party clearly shows disagree with the preliminary 
assessment, the complaint will proceed to the final stage - Determination. If the 
Financial Firm accepts AFCA’s preliminary assessment but the complainant does 
not respond within the timeframe specified by AFCA, the complaint may be closed 
without producing any binding results.  
76. When a complaint proceeds to the Determination, the complaint will be decided by 
an Ombudsman, an adjudicator, or a panel according to the chief ombudsman or its 
delegate’s discretion with considering the complexity, the amount of possible 
compensation, whether the complaint involving a system issue or new issue of law 
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or good practice, and efficiency.  
 
77. The decision maker should determine the complaint, excepting a superannuation 
complaint, rely on what he/she considers is fair in all the circumstances that having 
regard to legal principles, applicable industry codes and guidance, good industry 
practice and previous relevant determinations made by the AFCA 341 .  When 
deciding, the decision maker is not bounded by evidence rules or predecessor 
scheme decisions.  
78. Excepting superannuation complaint and traditional trustee service complaint, a 
determination made by the AFCA’s decision maker is final and binding if the 
consumer choose to accept it within 30 days. If the consumer chooses to accept the 
determination, the financial firm may ask the complainant to provide it with a 
binding release from liability in respect of the matters resolved by the 
determination. This release will be effective from the date on which the financial 
firm fulfils all its obligations under the determination. If the consumer chooses to 
not accept the determination, the consumer is not bound by the determination and 
may bring an action in the courts or take any other available action against the 
financial firm.  
79. In the final award produced by the AFCA, the AFCA may provide complainant a 
diversity range of remedies if the decision maker decides to uphold the complainant. 
On one hand, the decision maker may require financial firms to do some specific 
 
341 The Terms of Reference of the AFCA, A 14.2. 
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performance. For example, the determination may require the financial institution 
to forgive or variate a debt, to release security of a debt, to refund, waive or variate 
a fee that need to be paid to the financial firm or its agent, reinstate, variate, or set 
aside a contract, to correct, add or delete information about privacy issue, and to 
make an apology to the complainant. Some of these specific performances (or non-
performance), involves monetary value while some are not, which shows that the 
AFCA’s consideration is not limited to monetary issues.  
 
80. On the other hand, the decision maker may also order the financial firm to make a 
compensation to the complainant for direct financial loss and indirect financial 
loss342 . In some circumstances, for example, if an unusual degree of extent of 
physical inconvenience time taken to resolve the situation or interference with the 
complainant’s expectation of enjoyment or peace of mind has occurred, the 
decision maker may even order the financial firm to compensate for complainant’s 
non-financial loss. The amount of value of the compensation shall not beyond the 
cap set by the AFCA. There are several caps for complaints in different natures, for 
example, the cap for a general insurance broking complaint is $ 250,000, while the 
cap for general complaints is $500,000. The cap for in-direct financial loss and for 
non-financial loss is $ 5, 000343.  
 
 
342 Compensation for indirect financial loss will not be considered in general insurance policy 
complaints and another person’s motor vehicle insurance policy complaints.   
343 AFCA Terms of Reference 35  
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81. Besides the compensation, the costs used by complainant to seek remedies through 
the AFCA, such as legal professional cost and the travel cost and the interests may 
also be issued by the decision maker. The amount of costs and interests will not be 
taking into consider when calculating whether the compensation beyond the cap.     
 
82. The AFCA is designed to deal with financial consumers’ complaints on an 
individual basis, so there currently is no collective or mass redress procedure 
involved in the AFCA. However, when the AFCA investigate a complaint or a 
group of complaints, the AFCA may find that there are some issues that may have 
wider influence on other consumers or on the whole financial market. These issues 
will then be noticed as potential systemic issues. Potential systemic issues will be 
sent to the financial firm to give it a reasonable opportunity to respond to it, at the 
meantime, the AFCA shall continue its own investigation and may require the 
financial firm to submit any information or document that AFCA considering is 
necessary to the investigation. If any systemic issue is identified through the 
investigation, the AFCA will refer this issue to relevant financial firms and ask 
them to produce a resolution for this issue. The AFCA will also refer this issue to 
relevant authorities including ASIC, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 
the Commissioner of Taxation, the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, and any other appropriate authorities.  
83. Further, as a part of the investigation and referring to financial firms, the AFCA 
may require financial firms to do or refrain from doing any act to facilitate the 
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investigation, improve industrial practice and issue a mass redress, etc., if AFCA 
believe are reasonable and necessary344.   
84. The AFCA’s service is free of charge for the financial consumers. All operating 
expenditure of AFCA is paid by financial firms through three ways: a member levy, 
user charge and complaint fees. The Australian laws require all financial firms to 
be a member of AFCA and the membership levy is the fee that all financial firms 
need to pay to be a member of the AFCA. The AFCA charges this membership fee 
according to the relative size of the member comparing to other members. A 
multinational bank group may need to pay $26,000 every year while a local 
financial adviser may only need to pay $350.  
85. The user charge is a fee charged for the general use of the AFCA’s service. The 
AFCA charges this fee to promote and rewards the financial firms, which have a 
high rate of resolution at the internal dispute resolution scheme. Members who 
always have no complaint or have only one complaint in last twelve month do not 
need to pay the user charge. For those members who have complaints, user charge 
shall be calculated according to the number and complexity of the complaints 
closed in last twelve months since the date of calculation.   
86. The complaint fees are fees for individual complaints against financial firms. 
Complaint fee shall be calculated and charged on a case-by-case basis. Complex 
complaints and complaints, which are resolved after initial investigation procedure 
needs to pay more complaint fees than those simple complaints or complaints 
 
344 The Terms of Reference of the AFCA, A 17 
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resolved in an early stage. 
Comparison the three chosen financial consumer ADR schemes in 
constitutional and performance criteria 
87. To determine whether these three chosen financial consumer ADR schemes have a 
good design and performance well, the thesis would then test these schemes by 
using the criteria set up in Chapter III. 
88. The first test is in constitutional criterion independence and impartiality. All these 
three schemes emphasized that they are independence and impartial in almost all 
documents they published including but not limited to their rules, advertising, and 
annual reports, etc. All these three schemes operated by independent institutions 
(non-profit company limited) which is governed by independent boards of directors. 
The directors of board are appointed through a due process and are not liable to be 
relieved from their duties without just cause. The FOS and the AFCA collects 
majority of its funds from financial firms, however, this mainly come from a levy 
required or secured by law, which is no link with the outcome of the procedure. 
The other source of funds is user fee and case fee, which is calculated by the 
number of cases and is also no link with the outcome. The FDRC charges from 
both financial firms and consumers, and it accounts for only a small part of its 
income. For example, in year 2020, the FDRC totally charge financial firms and 
consumers HK$ 20,000 while the whole income is HK$ 459,804345. Most revenue 
of the FDRC comes from the interests of its investment.  
 
345 FDRC, Annual Report 2020 access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/html/publications/annualreport.php last visited 20/08/2021 
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89. People in charge of these ADR schemes, such as the Ombudsman in the FOS, the 
mediator and arbitrator in the FDRC, and the Ombudsman, the adjudicator, and the 
panel in the AFCA, are not subject to any instructions from either party or their 
representatives and are paid in a way that is not linked to the outcome. They also 
have a continuing obligation to disclose any circumstances that may, or may be 
seen to, affect their independence and impartiality or give rise to a conflict of 
interest with either party to the dispute they are asked to resolve. For example, 
before appointing an arbitrator, the FDRC will notify the potential arbitrator(s) of 
the nature of the dispute and the identities of the parties. Each potential arbitrator 
must make a reasonable effort to learn of, and disclose to the FDRC, if there are 
any circumstances might preclude himself from rendering an objective, 
independent and impartial determination in the proceeding.   
90. Concern may rise from the fact that all the three schemes have a special relationship 
with local financial authorities. For example, the directors of the FOS were 
appointed by the FCA and the FDRC receives money from SFC and HKMA as its 
seed funds. With these relationships, people may concern that these schemes may 
improper influenced by regulators or governments’ policy interests and lose their 
independence and impartiality. For example, financial firms may be afraid that 
when governments want to win public popularity, the scheme may be favour of 
consumers, while consumers may be afraid that when governments want to protect 
domestic financial firms from international competition, the scheme may take 
financial firms’ side.        
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91. However, the existence of such relationship mainly because these schemes were 
established in the context of regulatory from the very beginning, and some of these 
relationships are even admitted by law346. And there is no evidence proving that 
these schemes suffered any improper influence from the regulators or governments. 
The user’s satisfaction of the FOS and the FDRC is high347 and there is no any 
significant compliance on these schemes’ independence and impartiality. It is true 
that regulators or governments may have policy interests here, otherwise, they 
would not use public funds or promote legislation to establish these schemes. 
However, no matter their policy aims are consumer protection, improving markets’ 
behaviours, or both, wise regulators and governments would know that the only 
way to make their purposes come true through an ADR scheme is to let the scheme 
works independently and impartially, so wise regulators and governments would 
have no motivation to put improper influence on the scheme.    
92. The concern of impartial may also arise from the fact that all the three schemes 
provide consumers and consumers only with free advice service. Some people, 
such as Canadian OBSI, believe that to keep impartial, the financial consumer ADR 
scheme should not give advice348. However, the advice given to the consumer by 
the FOS, the FDRC, and the AFCA is only to help the consumer understand the 
nature of his/her complaint and the potential result in further process. And this 
 
346 For example, the UK’s FSMA 2000 requires FCA to establish a financial consumer ADR scheme. So 
the FCA established the FOS, during the process, appointing directors is a necessary step.  
347 FDRC Annual Report 2020, access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/annualreport/2020/files/download/FDRC_annual_report.pdf last visited 
19/08/2021 
348 About OBSI access at https://www.obsi.ca/en/about-us/about-OBSI.aspx last visited 20/08/2021 
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advice is necessary to rebalance the imbalance of power between consumers and 
financial firms, and help consumers to make a settlement with financial firms. The 
three schemes would not give any advice on financial issues or how to manage 
consumers’ claims, so it is hard to see there is an impartial. Besides, all these 
advices, happens in the initial stage of the process, when the case moves to the 
Ombudsman or arbitration, there would be no such advice.  
93. Another constitutional criterion needs to be test is transparency. The transparency 
criterion requires the ADR scheme to make the information of itself, such as its 
jurisdiction, procedural rules, types of rules may use as a basis for the dispute 
resolution, cost, and average length of the ADR procedure, etc. publicity available 
in a clear and understandable way. The information mentioned above and other 
relevant information can be found on the websites by using ‘search’, and majority 
of these information can be found on home page. The three schemes also publish 
reports to publish relevant data, such as their caseload, average length of procedure, 
categories of complaints, and their budgets, etc. The FOS and the FDRC publish 
annual reports while the AFCA publish one six-month report, two annual reports 
and one two-year report.  
94. The criterion of fairness cares about whether the parties receive a general fair 
treatment during the whole process of the procedure. Although the three schemes 
use different techniques and approaches, the FOS and the AFCA use mainly 
Ombudsman model and investigation approach, while the FDRC use arbitration 
model and adversarial approach, the procedural fairness of the parties in these 
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procedures were generally protected. Both parties in these procedures have 
opportunity to express their point of view and submit evidence; both parties are 
informed that in some situation, they cannot use a legal representative, but they can 
always seek a professional legal advice; and both parties are notified of the 
outcome of the ADR procedure in writing, and are given a statement of the grounds 
on which the outcome is based.  
95. However, concern may rise from the consumer’s unilateral opt-in rights before or 
after the dispute resolution procedure. For example, the FOS provides that only the 
consumer can be the complaint, the financial firm cannot complaint the consumer 
through the procedure. While the FDRC and AFCA provide that if the consumer 
hopes to start the procedure, the financial firm as members of these schemes must 
agree, no individual agreement is needed in this situation; however, if the financial 
firm hopes to use the scheme, an individual agreement must be gained from the 
consumers. Furthermore, the FOS and the AFCA also provide the consumer with a 
unilateral opt-in right on the outcome. In these two schemes, if the consumer 
decides to accept the outcome, the outcome is on both parties. And if the consumer 
refuses to accept the outcome, the outcome is not binding.  
96. This may lead to criticism that the three schemes do not treat financial firms in 
fairness, especially the FOS and the AFCA as they let the consumer unilaterally 
decide whether the outcome is binding. However, defence can be made by arguing 
that as there is a significant imbalance of power between the consumer and the 
financial firm, the consumer’s unilateral opt-in right is a tool to rebalance and to 
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achieve a substantive fairness between the consumer and the financial firm. 
Another defence is the specific criterion of fairness should be decided by 
considering the law in corresponding jurisdictions and the unilateral opt-in right 
provided by the three schemes is either required by law (the FOS), or approved by 
law (the FDRC and the AFCA).  
97. The liberty and legality criteria aim to ensure that the consumer’s right to bring the 
case to the court and special protection provided by law would not be deprived by 
the ADR scheme. Considering that these three schemes provided the consumer 
with unilateral opt-in right in starting the procedure and the FOS and the AFCA 
even provide the consumer with unilateral opt-in right to accept the outcome or not, 
the consumer’s right to bring the case to the court is protected well. Regarding the 
legality criterion, the FDRC use Hong Kong’s law as applicable law, which means 
that the special consumer protection provided by Hong Kong’s law would be 
applied. The special consumer protection provided by law is also likely to be 
applied in the FOS and the AFCA, as these two schemes would deal with the case 
according to ‘what is fair’ by considering all relevant principles, rules, and 
requirements of law. Besides, as the FOS and the AFCA provide the consumer with 
unilateral opt-in right to accept the outcome or not, the consumers could just refuse 
to accept the outcome if he/she believed that the special protection provided to the 
consumer was not applied.  
98. The Confidentiality criterion is also respected by the three schemes. The is no 
specific name would be mentioned in all data, analyse and case study they 
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published, and parties’ argument and evidence submitted during the procedure 
would not be published. In the AFCA, a financial firm’s name may be disclosed 
but only when this financial firm breach the member rules.   
99. After the constitutional criteria, the performance criteria would also be tested. The 
first test is about the time. The FOS resolved 37 percent complaints in 45 days and 
87 percent complaints in no more than 12 months in 2018-2019, the ratio of 
disputes resolved in 45 days decrease to 23 percent in next year but the ratio of 
disputes resolved in 12 months increased to 90 percent349 . This performance is 
generally fine, but comparing to the average time and the media used by EU 
member states’ court in first instance, 233 days, and 192 days350, the advantage of 
the FOS is not that obvious. The AFCA seems performance better in time, as it can 
resolve 60 percent complaints in 60 days351. There is no published data about the 
time used by the FDRC to resolve the complaints, but from the data on the 
clearance rate below, 25 percent to 50 percent complaints may be resolved in more 
than 12 months.  
100.The FOS and the AFCA provides free advice and dispute resolution service to the 
consumer; thus, it is safe to say these two schemes pass the cheap criterion. Th 
FDRC provides the consumer with free advice service but charged dispute 
resolution service. The consumer needs to pay the FDRC HK$ 200 to when he/she 
 
349 FOS, The FOS Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2020, access at 
https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/files/287580/Annual-Report-and-Accounts-for-the-year-
ended-31-March-2020.pdf last visited 23/08/2021 
350 European judicial systems Efficiency and quality of justice CEPEJ STUDIES No. 26 
351 AFCA, Annual Review 2019-2020 access at https://www.afca.org.au/sites/default/files/2020-
11/Annual%20review%202019-20%20.pdf last visited 23/08/2021 
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filled the application form. The application fee of HK$200 is not refundable even 
if the application is later rejected by the FDRC. The mediation fee was HK$1000 
or HK$ 2000 according to the amount of claim. If the mediation could not finish in 
the specified mediation time (4 hours), it could be extended. The fee rate for 
extended time is HK$ 750 or HK$1500 per hour, also according to the amount of 
claim. The total mediation costs are capped at HK$ 20000. If the mediation was 
failed and the consumer hopes to start the arbitration, the consumer needs to pay 
HK$ 5000 for a documents-only arbitration and an additional HK$ 12,500 if there 
is an in-person hearing.  
101.Therefore, the total costs of the consumer to use the FDRC is between HK$ 6200 
and HK$39,500. Although the extended mediation and arbitration with in-person 
hearing are just in special case, so the cost for the majority of cases should no more 
than HK$ 6200, and if the consumer could achieve a settlement in the mediation, 
the cost was no more than HK$ 2,200, the cost was still high the standard of 
consumer dispute as the thesis discussed in Chapter II and III. The practice 
charging HK $ 200 not refundable application fee is also questionable. The policy 
could make the consumer whose complaint was rejected in extremely unpleasant 
as he/she pay HK$ 200 and receive nothing. There is also a danger that such policy 
would also reduce the consumer’s enthusiasm to use the scheme, as they may be 
afraid that their complaints would be rejected. The possibility of this danger is 
significant as the rejection rate is not insignificant. In 2020, among all 35 complaint 
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applications, there are 5 complaints were rejected, the rejection rate is 14 percent352.  
102.The performance in cost may also link to performance in accessibility. In 2019, the 
FDRC only received 707 enquires (0.94 enquiry per ten thousand people) and 20 
complaints (0.03 complaint per ten thousand people)353, while the number in 2020 
was 1159 enquires (1.54 enquiries per ten thousand people) and 35 complaints 
(0.05 complaint per ten thousand people)354. On the contrary, the FOS received 
970,000 enquires (145.54 enquires per ten thousand people), and 569,738 
complaints (85.48 complaints per ten thousand people) in 2019355, and 454,259 
enquires (68.16 enquires per ten thousand people) and 278,033 complaints (41.72 
complaints per ten thousand people) in 2020356 . At the same time, the AFCA 
received 80,546 complaints (31.76 complaints per ten thousand people) in 2019357 
and 72,700 complaints (28.67 complaints per ten thousand people) in 2020358. The 
data clearly shows that the FOS performance best in the total enquires and 
complaints received and enquires and complaints received per ten thousand people, 
 
352 FDRC Annual Report 2020, access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/annualreport/2020/files/download/FDRC_annual_report.pdf last visited 
19/08/2021 
353 FDRC Annual Report 2019, access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/annualreport/2019/files/download/FDRC_annual_report.pdf last visited 
19/08/2021 
354 FDRC Annual Report 2020, access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/annualreport/2020/files/download/FDRC_annual_report.pdf last visited 
19/08/2021 
355 FOS, The FOS Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2020, access at 
https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/files/287580/Annual-Report-and-Accounts-for-the-year-
ended-31-March-2020.pdf last visited 23/08/2021  
356 FOS, The FOS Annual complaints data and insight 2020/21, access at https://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/annual-complaints-data last visited 23/08/2021 
357 AFCA, Annual Review 2019-2020 access at https://www.afca.org.au/sites/default/files/2020-
11/Annual%20review%202019-20%20.pdf last visited 23/08/2021 
358 AFCA, Two Year Report 1 November 2018-31 October 2020 access at  
https://www.afca.org.au/about-afca last visited 23/08/2021 
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the AFCA lags slightly behind the FOS in both data, while the FDRC lags far 
behind the FOS and the AFCA in these two data, which implies the FOS and the 
AFCA’s good performance in the accessibility and the FDRC’s bad performance in 
the accessibility.  
103.The next test is in efficiency, data would be examined in this criterion were 
caseload, which indicates how many complaints were resolved in one year. The 
case load per ten thousand people, the clearance rate, which is calculated by 
dividing the number of resolved complaints by the number of received complaints, 
expressed in a percentage, and the cost per complaint, which is calculated by 
dividing the whole expenditure of a scheme in one year by the complaints resolved 
in the same year, this figure aims to test whether the funds were used efficiently.  
104.The FOS resolved 296, 712 complaints (44.52 complaints per ten thousand people) 
in 2019359, and 247,916 complaints (37.20 complaints per ten thousand people) in 
2020360, while the clearance rate is 109 percent in 2019, and 89 percent in 2020. 
The clearance rate above 100 % indicates the ability of the FOS to resolve more 
cases than received, thus reducing the number of pending cases at the end of the 
year, including any existing backlog. The three data of the FOS in 2019 and 2020 
shows the FOS’s ability to resolved a large number of complaints and the ability to 
reducing backlog when there is any. The FOS resolved 76,681 complaints (30.24 
 
359 FOS, The FOS Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2020, access at 
https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/files/287580/Annual-Report-and-Accounts-for-the-year-
ended-31-March-2020.pdf last visited 23/08/2021 
360 FOS, The FOS Annual complaints data and insight 2020/21, access at https://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/annual-complaints-data last visited 23/08/2021 
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complaints per ten thousand people) in 2019361, the clearance rate is 95.2 percent, 
while the number of complaints resolved in 2020 is 67,042362 (26.47 complaints 
per ten thousand people) and the clearance rate is 92.22 percent. The three data 
show that the AFCA also has ability to deal a large number of complaints every 
year, although there are some backlogs.  
105. The FDRC resolved 15 complaints (0.02 complaints per ten thousand people) in 
2019, the clearance rate is 75 percent363. In 2020, the FDRC resolved 17 complaints 
(0.02 complaints per ten thousand people) and received 35 complaints, the 
clearance rate is 49 percent364 . The data shows that comparing to the FOS and 
AFCA, the FDRC resolved much less complaints, the number of complaints the 
FDRC resolved in one year is about one ten thousand of complaints resolved by 
the FOS in one year and about one thousand of complaints resolved by the AFCA. 
Besides, although the FDRC received much less complaints than the FOS and the 
AFCA, the clearance rate of FDRC is significantly lower than the FOS and the 
AFCA. 
106.Until now, it seems that the data suggests that the FOS and the AFCA performance 
well in criterion of efficiency while the FDRC performance poor. However, there 
is still possibilities that the FDRC was a much smaller institution than the FOS and 
 
361 AFCA, AFCA annual Review 2019-2020 access at https://www.afca.org.au/sites/default/files/2020-
11/Annual%20review%202019-20%20.pdf last visited 23/08/2021 
362 AFCA, Two Year Report 1 November 2018-31 October 2020 access at  
https://www.afca.org.au/about-afca last visited 23/08/2021 
363 FDRC, The FDRC Annual Report 2019 access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/annualreport/2019/files/download/FDRC_annual_report.pdf last visited 
23/08/2021 
364 FDRC, The FDRC Annual Report 2020 access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/annualreport/2020/files/download/FDRC_annual_report.pdf last visited 
23/08/2021 
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the AFCA, with much less budget, so it is may be already good enough for the 
FDRC to do with a small budget. To test this possibility, the thesis will then 
examine the cost per complaint of these three schemes. However, it needs to clarify 
here that as different schemes have different regulations on the start and end dates 
of the financial year, the compared data could only be roughly in the same time.  
107. The over all expenditure of the FOS in the financial year ended on 31 March 2020 
was £ 276.4 million, complaints resolved during this year was 296,712365, the cost 
per complaint was about £ 930. Regard to the AFCA, in the financial year ended 
on 30 June 2020, the overall expenditure was Australian$ 129.3 million (£ 67.24 
million), complaints resolved in this year was 76,681, the cost per complaint was 
Australian$ 1686 (£ 877). For the FDRC, in financial ended on 31 December 2020, 
the overall expenditure of the FDRC was HK$ 9.98 million (£ 0.94 million), in this 
year, number of complaints resolved by the FDRC was 17, the cost of per complaint 
was HK$ 55,152 (£ 5184). The data show that the cost per complaint of the FOS 
and the AFCA are similar, while the cost per complaint of the FDRC is about six 
times as much as the FOS and the AFCA.   
108.In summary, all the three schemes fulfil the criteria of independence and impartial 
in a good way, the transparency is also not a problem. The fairness of these schemes 
may rise some concern, especially the FOS and the AFCA which gives consumers 
unilateral opt-in right in starting the procedure and accepting the outcome. 
 
365 FOS, The FOS Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2020, access at 
https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/files/287580/Annual-Report-and-Accounts-for-the-year-
ended-31-March-2020.pdf last visited 23/08/2021  
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However, a good defence can be made, and it has not caused any significant 
complaints in practice. There is also no significant concern in liberty, legality, and 
confidentiality. In performance, the FOS, and the AFCA performance well in time, 
cost, accessibility and efficiency, the FOS performances better than the AFCA in 
accessibility and the AFCA performances better than the FOS in time. The FDRC 
cannot performances as well as the FOS and the AFCA in all the four issues, 
especially in the accessibility and the efficiency. 
Comparison on the program-design of the three schemes      
109. The three schemes share many similarities in program-design, for example, they 
are all established in the context of regulatory, they all have compulsory 
jurisdiction to some extent, so that they can give the consumer unilateral opt-in 
right to start the procedure, they all use multilayer procedure which including 
mediation to try to resolve complaints at the early stage, etc. However, there are 
also three significant differences in their program-design, namely, fee policy, 
working procedure, and binding force of outcome, and these differences may lead 
to their different performance in practice. 
110.Both the FOS and the AFCA provide the consumer with free service and collect 
their funds mainly from financial firms by charging a levy and case fee. One 
advantage of this fee policy is, the free service is attractive to consumers, 
consumers would be more likely to give it a try if they know they do not need to 
pay for it. This is not only the theory; it could be proved by the comparisons of data 
of complaints received and complaints received per ten thousand people between 
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the three schemes above. Considering four of the five functions of financial 
consumer ADR scheme, dispute resolution, data collected, data feedback, and 
market behaviour improvement366, are all closely link to complaints received by a 
scheme367, this advantage should be given due consideration. Another advantage 
of this fee policy is that it can provide the ADR scheme with a stable income. For 
example, the income of the FOS in 2019-2020 is £ 242.6 million, while the overall 
expenditure is £ 276.4 million368, although there is still a small gap between the 
income and expenditure, the FOS can roughly achieve balance. 
111.The FDRC holds a different fee policy, which charges no levy fee towards financial 
firms but to charge application fee from the consumer and charge mediation and 
arbitration fee from both sides. It is said that this fee policy could prevent vexatious 
actions 369 .However, considering that the FDRC only receives 20 complaint 
applications in 2019 and 35 applications in 2020, this theory does not seem 
convincing. Another claimed advantage is that this policy could help the scheme 
achieve a balance. However, this theory also seems not convincing considering that 
 
366 C. Hodges, ‘Consumer Redress: Implementing the Vision’ No. 16-27 University of Leicester School 
of Law Research Paper; C. Hodges, ‘Consumer Ombudsmen: Better regulation and dispute resolution’ 
(2014) 15(4) ERA Forum 593; C. Hodges, ‘The Consumer as Regulator’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and 
Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free  
Movement and Competition Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 
367 If there are only few people use the scheme, the function of dispute resolution would have few 
opportunities to be used, and it will also lead to the failure to collect enough amount of data; without 
these data, the function of feedback and market behaviour improvement would also become empty 
talk. 
368 FOS, The FOS Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2020, access at 
https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/files/287580/Annual-Report-and-Accounts-for-the-year-
ended-31-March-2020.pdf last visited 23/08/2021 
369 Ali, Shahla F. & Da Roza, A. M. ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in Financial Markets – Some More 
Equal than Others: Hong Kong’s Proposed Financial Dispute Resolution Centre in the Context of 
Experience in the UK, US, Australia and Singapore’ (2011) Vol.21, No.3 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
171 
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the revenue from application fee, mediation fee, and arbitration in 2020 was only 
HK$ 20,000 while the overall expenditure was HK$ 9,974,339370. However, there 
is also a disadvantage of this fee policy that this policy could prevent the consumer 
from use the scheme, as the consumer may do not want to pay as high as HK$ 1000 
or 2000 to use it, and the consumer may be afraid that the HK$ 200 application fee 
becomes meaningless if the application was rejected. This disadvantage could be 
proved by the small number of complaint applications received by the FDRC.  
112.Another difference is in working procedure, an obvious difference is that the FOS 
and the AFCA use Ombudsman procedure at the final stage while the FDRC use 
arbitration after the mediation. However, this difference may not as important as it 
seems, because first, both the three schemes use mediation and other informal 
techniques at the early stage of procedure and most complaints would be resolved 
in the early stage. For example, in 2019-2020, FOS resolved 90 percent disputes 
before the Ombudsman procedure, while in the FDRC, only 14 percent complaints 
lead to an arbitration. And second, although the Ombudsman procedure use an 
investigation approach and the arbitration procedure use an adversarial approach 
in general, the FDRC’s arbitration procedure learns a lot from the Ombudsman 
procedure by also granting the arbitrators power to investigate, so this difference is 
also become less significant.  
113. The main difference between the FOS and the AFCA’s procedure and the FDRC’s 
 
370 FDRC, The FDRC Annual Report 2020 access at 
https://www.fdrc.org.hk/en/annualreport/2020/files/download/FDRC_annual_report.pdf last visited 
23/08/2021 
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procedure, is the former try to minimize the formality of their procedures and make 
their procedure as informal and flexible as possible, while the latter try to keep 
formality to certain extent. This difference can be observed in many places of the 
procedure-design, for example, the FOS and the AFCA do not make a clear 
distinction between different stages of the working procedure, while the FDRC 
makes a clear distinction between the preliminary review, the jurisdiction review, 
the mediation, and the arbitration. The FOS and the AFCA do not require any 
formal agreement was made during the working procedure, while the FDRC clearly 
require the parties reach a separate mediation agreement and a separate arbitration 
agreement. The FOS and the AFCA do not give a clear description on both parties’ 
procedural rights and duties, while the FDRC gives a very clearly and detailed 
description on parties’ procedure rights and duties such as right to choose mediator, 
choose arbitrator, and apply for avoidance and duty to provide corresponding 
copies for any submitted argument and evidence, etc.  
114.These two models both have advantages and disadvantages. Minimum the 
formality could reduce the cost, make the procedure easy to use, and improve the 
efficiency, which can be proved by the high clearance rate mentioned above. 
However, it may also lead to criticism from traditional people who highly value the 
procedural fairness and may lead to many judicial reviews on procedural issues. 
On the contrary, keep certain extent of formality make the procedure easy to be 
accepted by legal professionals, receive less judicial reviews and make the outcome 
may be recognized and enforced out of the jurisdiction, however, it also leads o 
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problems such as increase the cost, increase the difficulty of use, and decrease the 
efficiency. However, these advantages and disadvantages are all about dispute 
resolution, which is only one of the five functions of financial consumer ADR 
scheme371 , if taking other functions such as data collection and feedback into 
consideration, it would be able to say that the FOS and AFCA’s model bring more 
advantages to other functions as the exercise of these functions rely on the scheme’s 
ability to receive and resolved massive complaints.  
115.The difference between binding force of the outcome is the FOS and the AFCA 
provide the consumer with a unilateral opt-in right while the award produced by 
the FDRC binding both parties. Just like the difference between working procedure 
discussed above, both these policies have their advantages and disadvantages. A 
unilateral opt-in right can fully protect the consumer’s right to the court and then 
attract the consumer to use the scheme, while it may also lead to criticism towards 
procedural unfairness. On the contrary, binding on both sides makes it looks fair, 
but may lead to criticism on damage the consumer’s right to the court and 
discourage the consumer from using the scheme. However, the criticism towards 
the unilateral opt-in model may become less convincing, since financial firms may 
be willing to accept such arrangements. For example, there are 77 percent financial 
businesses said that they have confidence in the FOS’s service372. On the contrary, 
 
371 C. Hodges, ‘Consumer Redress: Implementing the Vision’ No. 16-27 University of Leicester School 
of Law Research Paper; C. Hodges, ‘Consumer Ombudsmen: Better regulation and dispute resolution’ 
(2014) 15(4) ERA Forum 593; C. Hodges, ‘The Consumer as Regulator’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and 
Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free  
Movement and Competition Law (Hart Publishing, 2016) 
372 FOS, The FOS Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2020, access at 
https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/files/287580/Annual-Report-and-Accounts-for-the-year-
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advantages brough by unilateral opt-in right may be more certain, considering the 
comparison of the number of complaints resolved between the three schemes made 
above. Besides, if considering other functions of a financial consumer ADR scheme, 
advantages brought by unilateral opt-in model could be more certain.  
116.In summary, all the three schemes fulfil the constitutional criteria well, while the 
FDRC fulfil the fairness criterion a little better. However, the FOS and AFCA 
performance much better than the FDRC in all performance criteria including the 
cost, the time, the accessibility, and the efficiency. Besides, the FOS and the AFCA 
also perform better in giving the consumer advice, collecting data, publishing, and 
feedback data, and improve market behaviour. Considering all these issues, 
although the model of financial consumer ADR scheme is keep evolving, and is 
too early to say there is an ideal model of financial consumer ADR scheme, it is 
still possible to say the FOS and AFCA’s Ombudsman model is currently a better 









ended-31-March-2020.pdf last visited 23/08/2021 
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Chapter VII The Generation and The Construction –Ways of 
Creating Financial Consumer ADR Scheme 
1. In general, there are two ways of creating a financial consumer ADR scheme, the 
generation, and the construction. The generation means a financial consumer 
ADR scheme which is a crystallization of a long-term practice of community 
autonomy373. A financial consumer ADR scheme creating through the generation 
usually means a financial consumer ADR scheme spontaneously created by the 
industry, such as a bank association or an insurance association. The reasons why 
the industry is willing to establish such a scheme could be different. Sometimes it 
is because the industry believes that cost of dispute resolution is too high and they 
hope to reduce the cost by using ADR scheme. Sometimes, it is because they 
hope to improve the consumer’s confidence on the financial service market and 
gain a competitive edge. Sometimes, it is because they need to respond to the 
national policies or pressure from regulators374, and sometimes for a combination 
of the above reasons.  
2. No matter what reasons are, these ADR schemes are not designed or intentionally 
established by the government, instead they are generated from the customs and 
practice of the industry, and meet the needs of the industry. They are regulated by 
their own codes or rules while their results generally have no binding force375.A 
 
373 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 234 
374 Yu Fan, The Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution (Beijing Tsinghua University Press 2007) 
375 Jerome T. Barrett with Joseph P. Barrett, A History of Alternative Dispute Resolution – The Story of 
a Political, Cultural, and Social Movement (Published in Affiliation with the Association for Conflict 
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good example of a generated financial consumer ADR scheme is Netherlands 
KiFiD, which is a financial consumer ADR scheme spontaneously established by 
the association in financial service market. The cost of the KiFiD was covered by 
member fee paid by financial firms and registration fee paid by consumers. 
Financial firms’ minimum yearly contribution to KiFiD was €170 for banks and 
insurers and the lowest contribution for other members was €163. The 
registration fee per case was €25 for traders and €50 for consumers376. Another 
example is the Sweden’s sectoral boards in financial service and insurance, these 
boards are established and funded by traders in these industries377. Examples of 
ADR schemes created through the generation way could also be found in other 
sectors, such as the UK’s private Ombudsman Services provides dispute 
resolution services in the energy, communications, property, and intellectual 
property sectors378.               
3. A financial consumer ADR scheme creating through the construction usually 
means a financial consumer ADR scheme imposed by the government. These 
ADR schemes could be directly created by the government or regulators through 
legislation or administrative order, such as the Hong Kong’s FDRC or by 
modifying or merging already existing generated ADR schemes to a new 
constructed one.  
 
Resolution 2009)    
376 C. Hodges, Iris Benöhr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, ‘Consumer-to-business dispute resolution: 
the power of CADR’ (2012) 13 ERA Forum 199 
377 Ibid. 
378 Ibid. 
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4. For example, the UK’s FOS is required by the legislation, and then created by the 
regulator by merging some already existing ADR schemes created by industry 
into one new scheme. And the Australian AFCA is established by merging and 
reforming two existed ADR schemes. Reasons for the government or the 
regulator to establish these ADR schemes are usually consumer protection, 
improve the consumer’s confidence on the financial service market, and keep the 
health of financial service market. 
5. The constructed financial consumer ADR scheme is regulated by legislation or its 
constitution drafted by the government or the regulator. Outcomes produced by 
those schemes are binding and enforceable to some extent. The constructed 
scheme usually can receive a funds from the government as seed funds, but the 
follow-up funding sources can be diverse. A good example of this kind of ADR 
scheme is the administrative tribunals in UK379. A leading example of constructed 
financial consumer ADR scheme is the UK’s FOS which has already be discussed 
in detail above, other examples including the Irish FSPO, the Italian ABF, and the 
Hong Kong’s FDRC, etc.   
6. Either the generation way and the construction way have its own advantages and 
disadvantages. To be specific, the generated scheme could include sector-specific 
expertise, which a judgement or consumer may not have. Generated ADR scheme 
comes from the actual needs of the community, so it may know better about the 
problems that the community hopes to resolve. Besides, it is easy to the generated 
 
379 Anthony, G., ‘Administrative Justice in the United Kingdom’ (2015) 7(1) Italian Journal of Public 
Law 9 
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scheme to use or accept innovations of ADR technique which may lead to better 
performance. This makes such scheme is usually welcome by the local 
communities and thus can be widely accepted and used. The results produced by 
this kind of ADR scheme are also more possible to satisfy the members of 
community380.  
7. However, the generated financial consumer ADR scheme also has some 
problems. The first problem is in jurisdiction. The generated financial consumer 
ADR scheme usually only has voluntary jurisdiction which means that the 
scheme needs agreement from both financial firms and consumers to start the 
procedure. The problem here is that the financial firms can simply refuse to use 
the scheme if they believe the consumer would not bring the case to the court.  
8. There are two approaches to resolve this problem, the first is that the scheme can 
require financial firms become members of the scheme and regulated financial 
firms by member rules. For example, the scheme can set up a member rule said 
that when the consumer hopes to use the scheme, the corresponding trader as a 
member must agree. However, this leads to another problem that how to persuade 
financial firms to join as member.  
9. The second approach is that the scheme can persuade traders that agree to use the 
scheme could improve their reputation in market and make them be regarded as 
responsible traders who really take care of their consumers, which will bring 
them competitive edge. This theory was also used to explain how to persuade 
 
380 Zhiping Liang, ‘Tradition and Its Change: Law and Order under the Multi-Landscape’ (2005) Vol. 
2005 (1) The application of law 25 
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financial firms to join a membership in the first approach. However, whether 
these two approaches can work well depends on the context in each different 
market. It is true that these two approaches were widely accepted in the Nordic 
states, and in some sectors in other EU Member States, such as Netherlands, 
where there is a mature and competitive market and the culture supports a high 
value of business reputation381. However, whether these two approaches can be 
accepted and work in other jurisdictions, especially those developing jurisdictions 
without a mature market is still questionable.  
10. Another problem is the binding force and the enforcement of the outcome. Many 
generated ADR schemes can only produce outcome without biding force and its 
enforcement rely on financial firms’ proactive adherence to the 
outcome382.Therefore, if the financial firm refuses to enforce the outcome 
produced by the ADR scheme or bring the same dispute to the court, the 
consumer would have no effective counter measures.  
11. An approach to resolve this problem is that the ADR scheme could involve the 
arbitration procedure to produce a binding outcome which can be enforced by the 
court. However, starting an arbitration procedure needs an agreement of 
arbitration made by both sides, which is cannot be secured in all cases. Besides, 
an arbitration award is binding on both sides, so the consumer also cannot bring 
the same case to the court if he/she is not satisfied with the award. This may lead 
 
381 C. Hodges, and Stefaan Voet ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Effective Enforcement 
and Common Principles’, in Hess, Burkhard & Kramer, Xandra (eds) From common rules to best 
practices in European Civil Procedure (Nomos publishing 2017) 
382 Ibid.  
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to criticism towards depriving the consumer’s right to access to the court. Another 
problem is that using arbitration procedure may increase the cost and complexity 
of the scheme. 
12. The second approach to resolve this problem is Dutch approach. In Netherlands, 
the trader association will pay the consumer when the trader in question does not 
voluntarily complies with the decision (deliberately or as a result of 
insolvency)383. This could be a good solution as it secures the consumer’s 
interests gained through the ADR scheme. However, it is questionable that 
whether trader associations in other jurisdictions have willingness and ability to 
take this obligation.  
13. The third approach tries to resolve this problem can be observed in the Nordic 
states, where the culture supports a high level of adherence to decisions by 
(financial) consumer ADR schemes that are not legally binding. In these 
countries, the non-adherence to decisions by (financial) consumer ADR schemes 
would be published. The ADR scheme use this as a deterrence to secure an 
adherence to the outcome. However, this approach relays on a mature and 
competitive market, where the commercial advantages of behaving fairly are 
clear, and that non-adherence would be rare and quickly attract bad publicity384. 
 
383E. Verhage, “The Implementation of the Consumer ADR Directive in the Netherlands”, in Cortes, 
supra n. 11, forthcoming and F. Weber and C. Hodges, “The Netherlands”, in Hodges et al., supra n. 9, 
at 144. 
384 C. Hodges, and Stefaan Voet ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Effective Enforcement 
and Common Principles’ in Hess, Burkhard & Kramer, Xandra (eds) From common rules to best 
practices in European Civil Procedure (Nomos publishing 2017) 
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Whether the approach would work well in markets that do not meet the above 
conditions is questionable.           
14. Another concern of generated financial consumer ADR schemes is as these 
schemes are usually regulated by their own rules, whether constitutional criteria 
for an ADR scheme, such as independence and impartiality, transparency, 
fairness, liberty, and legality385 can be fulfilled386. Besides, ADR schemes created 
by trade sectors are often criticised as being biased in favour of traders rather than 
consumers387. Although whether that is true or not depends on analysis of an 
individual scheme, the generated ADR scheme created by traders has a 
disadvantage in gaining the consumer’s trust.  
15. On the contrast, the constructed ADR scheme is regulated by state’s laws or 
regulations and is usually supervised by the government and subjects to judicial 
review. Therefore, the procedure fairness and the quality of results are secured to 
some extent. Established by the government may also bring the additional 
advantage in gaining the consumer’s trust and confidence in jurisdictions where 
there is a strong confidence in governments. 
16. The constructed ADR scheme also has advantages in jurisdiction. As established 
by the government or regulators, it is possible to the constructed ADR scheme to 
have compulsory jurisdiction to some extent. When the ADR scheme is 
 
385 These constitutional criteria were required by the Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes 
386 See Baifeng Chen, ‘Violence and Humiliation: Dispute Resolution in Chen Village’ 2006 (1) Law and 
Social Science 275 
387 C. Hodges, Iris Benöhr and Naomi Creutzfeldt-Banda, ‘Consumer-to-business dispute resolution: 
the power of CADR’ (2012) 13 ERA Forum 199 
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established through the legislation, the compulsory jurisdiction can be given 
directly by the legislation like the UK’s FOS. And when there is no legislation, 
the government can simply require all financial firms in a given scope must join 
the scheme as a member, and then the compulsory jurisdiction can be established 
by member rules, just like what happens in the Australian AFCA.  
17. Another advantage of the constructed financial consumer ADR scheme is it can 
produce outcomes with binding force and enforceability without using arbitration 
procedure. Again, if there is a legislation, the binding force and enforceability of 
the outcome can be directly given by the legislation, such as what happens in the 
UK’s FOS. And if there is no a legislation, the binding force and enforceability 
can be secured by member rules of the scheme just like what can be observed in 
the Australian AFCA. 
18. Further, the constructed financial consumer ADR scheme can give the consumer a 
unilateral opt-in right, which means that if the consumer accepts the decision, the 
decision would be binding to both sides; but if the consumer chooses to not 
accept it, the decision would not be binding. This unilateral opt-in right would 
encourage the consumer to use the scheme and can protect the consumer’s right 
to access to the court in a high level.  
19. However, the constructed scheme also has problems. For example, there is a risk 
risk of being divorced from actual needs and beyond the ability of using of 
public, which may finally make them not accepted by the public388. It is also true 
 
388 For example, it is not rare to see that there are some ADR schemes were established or transferred 
from foreign jurisdictions by local law-maker without giving an examining of the actual needs in 
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that the constructed ADR scheme may lack of flexibility due to its rigid structure 
and resists innovation389. Therefore, which way is the better way to establish a 
financial consumer ADR scheme needs analysis in the context of individual 
jurisdiction, although an examination of recent established financial consumer 
ADR schemes may find that there seems a trend in leading jurisdictions to 
establish their financial consumer ADR schemes in a constructed way. A possible 
reason for this trend may be that currently the financial consumer ADR scheme is 
excepted to created in the context of regulatory and deliver more functions, such 
as consumer advice, data collection, publicity and feedback, and improve market 
behaviour, besides the dispute resolution.   
20. However, sometimes, it is not these advantages and disadvantages decide, by 
what mean a financial consumer ADR scheme was created. A financial consumer 
ADR scheme was created by industry or imposed by the government depends on 
other elements such as funds, motivation, and market maturity. For example, in a 
mature and highly competitive market, financial firms could realize that 
establishing an ADR scheme to deal with consumer disputes would reduce their 
cost and bring them competitive edge, then they may be motivated to provide 
funds to establish such an ADR scheme. However, in a less mature market, the 
industry may be not motivated to establish such ADR schemes and the 
government is motivated to create such ADR schemes for consumer protection or 
 
context, which soon makes them exist in names only. See Jing Ning, Reflections on ADR Trend, The 
Application of Law, 2005 (2).    
389 C Hodges, Delivering Dispute Resolution: A Holistic Review of Models in England & Wales (Hart 
publishing 2019). 
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improve market behaviour. In this situation, the government would provide funds 
or required the industry to provide funds to establish a financial consumer ADR 
scheme. Therefore, a more practicable approach is when a financial consumer 
ADR scheme is established in either generation or constructed way, try to learn 
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Chapter VIII Establishing Financial Consumer ADR 
Scheme with an Advanced Model in China—Reasons and 
Ways 
      
1. The China’s financial service market used to be very invisible. Before the 1980, 
there is no commercial banks in China, while banking service operated by the 
state-owned banks is very limited. There is no security market or commercial 
insurance market in China at that time. By current standard, the financial 
exclusion is a normality at that time390.  
2. However, with the rapid development since last 80’s, China’s financial service 
market has already become one of the biggest financial service markets in the 
world. Taking the banking service as an example, according to data from Chin 
Banking Regulation Commission (CBRC), in 2020 the total assets of Chinese 
commercial banks reached RMB 239.5 trillion (USD 37.12 trillion), while the 
total debt of Chinese commercial banks reached to RMB 237.3 trillion (USD 
36.78 trillion). In 2019, the accumulated net profit of commercial banks reached 
about RMB 2 trillion (USD 0.31 trillion)391. 
3. While those traditional banking service such as deposition and loan experience a 
huge growth, many new kinds of financial services, such as credit card, mortgage, 
 
390 CBIRC, The history of development of banking in China access at 
http://www.p5w.ne/zt/dissertation/finance/200909/t2573834.htm last visited 20/06/2021 
391 KPMG, Mainland China Banking Survey 2020 access at 
https://home.kpmg/cn/zh/home/insights/2020/11/2020-mainland-china-banking-survey.html last 
visited 20/06/2021  
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consumption loan, payday loan, a variety of financial products, investment 
insurance, third part payment service, and P2P lending form, etc. were introduced 
into or invented in China, making China’s financial service market becomes not 
only one of the main financial markets in the world, but also a center of financial 
invention such as fin-tech (Internet finance) and blockchain currency392.  
4. However, the development of financial service market especially the development 
of financial products not only bring benefits but also bring more and more risks, 
especially to financial consumers. For most Chinese people, financial product is a 
new concept, it was only about 20 years ago that the idea of financial products 
came into people’s lives. The public do not have a good understanding on it, 
however, in order to pursue profits, staff of financial firms tend to exaggerate the 
income of related financial products, deliberately ignore the risk hints such as 
investment direction, investment proportion, realization form of risk return and 
early redemption mechanism of products, thus misleading investors and induce 
them to buy a financial product that they do not really understand.  
5. This mis-selling can be very dangerous for consumers, as they do not really 
understand the risk of financial products and once the risk is come true, they also 
have no ability to afford the possible loss. A similar problem can also be observed 
in the P2P lending forum business. As a financial innovation, the idea of P2P 
lending forum is to facility consumers to lend money to other consumers to gain 
 
392 Huabao Security Annual report of Internet finance industry in 2020, access at 
https://www.fxbaogao.com/pdf?id=2678646&query=%7B%22keywords%22%3A%22%E4%BA%92%E8
%81%94%E7%BD%91%E9%87%91%E8%9E%8D%22%7D&index=0&pid= last visited 20/06/2021 
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profits. However, without regulation and fully understand about the risk, these 
new services became dangerous to Chinese consumers. In 2017-2018, there are 
about 6,000 P2P lending forum firms were involved into the big scandal of P2P 
lending forum’s bad practice. 
6. There is no specific statistics on how many consumers were influenced and how 
much loss were caused to consumers. However, there is data of one of these 
firms, “Aiqianjin”. According to the report, there are 370 thousand consumers 
were influenced and the total loss of consumers can up to RMB 23 billion (£2.65 
billion)393. The risk may also come from other financial products. Another 
example is the recent “Crude oil treasure” incident, in this event, due to the mis-
selling and mis-conduct of the Bank of China (BOC), “Crude oil treasure”, about 
60,000 consumers suffered up to RMB 9 billion (£1.04 billion). Among all these 
60,000 consumers, more than 66% are small consumers who invest less than 
RMB 50,000 (£5750)394.  
7. Further, consumers in financial service market usually has no enough bargain 
ability to negotiated with those large financial firms on the terms of their financial 
service. Considering the complexity and difficulty of financial transactions, some 
consumers even do not have enough knowledge to understand their financial 
transactions. Therefore, financial firms may take advantage of consumers by 
 
393 370,000 people were cheated 23 billion, "Aiqianjin” two years late, but not unexpected, access at 
https://tech.sina.com.cn/roll/2020-07-09/doc-iircuyvk2824840.shtml last visited 20/06/2021 
394 Bank of China "oil treasure" incident: someone lost 800,000 margin, but still owed the bank 1.22 
million, access at https://new.qq.com/omn/20200505/20200505A0OW5V00.html last visited 
20/06/2021 
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using standard terms which consumers cannot really understand. Besides, 
considering that some financial service such as credit card or mortgage may be 
indispensable for consumers’ lives, consumers may have to enter a such contract 
even they do not understand.  
8. Besides the huge gap of bargain ability, there is also a huge gap of ability of 
protecting themselves when things go wrong. Financial companies usually have 
good risk prediction and management systems, take security, and charge before 
they release money. Therefore, when things go wrong, they usually have enough 
methods to secure the safety of their money. When they can go to the court, they 
have experienced in-house lawyer team and are able to afford good external 
lawyer. Financial firms usually have enough ability to protect themselves in or 
out of the court, but this may be different to consumers. Consumers are usually 
ordinary people who do not have much financial knowledge and their economic 
strength is also limited. Once things go wrong, consumers usually do not have 
enough ability to protect themselves if financial firms take an un-cooperation 
attitude. When consumers go to the court, they may find that they are in a 
disadvantageous position in the litigation, because financial firms may have a 
contract term in favour of themselves and consumers do not have as many legal 
resources395 as financial firms have.  
9. All these facts and possibilities show that Chinese financial consumers are 
 
395 By that I mean, financial firms can usually hire better lawyers, have more people to deal with 
evidence collection, have a frequent-user’s advantage and have more enthusiasm to appeal.  
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vulnerable and need special protection from the government. Currently, the legal 
responsibility of financial consumer protection is allocated to the three main 
financial authorities in China, namely the People's Bank of China (PBC), China 
Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) and the China Security 
Supervision Commission (CSSC). 
10. The PBC is the central bank of China, which was established in 1948. Later, the 
Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China in 1995 and 
its amendment in 2003, formally confirm the PBC’s legal status as the central 
bank of China and become the constitution of PBC
396
. According to this law, the 
PBC mainly focuses on monetary policy and supervision of interbank activities.
397
 
The purpose of PBC is mainly to prevent and defuse financial risks and maintain 
financial stability
398
. The PBC is mainly responsible for supervising and 
regulating: (1) the deposit reserve of commercial banks and banking 
institutions;
399
(2) Interbank borrowing market and bond market
400
; (3) foreign 
exchange market
401
 and (4) the banking clearing system.
402
Besides these, the PBC 
also has a general duty to conduct macro-control and promote the coordinated 
development of the banking industry
403
. 
11. Before 2015, whether the PBC has legal responsibility to financial consumer 
 
396 The People’s Bank of China, The History of the People’s Bank of China, access from 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/rmyh/105226/105433/index.html last visited 21/06/2022   
397 Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China (2003) Art.4.  
398 Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China (2003) Art.2. 
399 Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China (2003) Art.32 (1). 
400 Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China (2003) Art.4 (4). 
401 Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China (2003) Art.4 (5). 
402 Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China (2003) Art.4 (9). 
403 Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China (2003) Art.31. 
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protection is unclear. On the one hand, the main purpose of the PBC seems to 
imply that it has duty to protect financial consumers, as mis-conducts of financial 
firms which will damage consumers’ interests may also be argued as a behaviour 
which will cause financial risks or decrease financial stability, so people may 
argue that it is the PBC’s legal responsibility to protect financial consumers to 
prevent this from happening. However, on the other hand, it is also true that the 
financial consumer protection is not a legal responsibility listed in the law and its 
amendment. Some people argue that if there is some mis-conducts of banks that 
will damage both financial consumers and financial stability or may lead to an 
increase of financial risks, the PBC may do something that protect financial 
consumers’ interests, however, that is not to say the financial consumer protection 
is one of the PBC’s legal responsibility. 
12. This debate comes to an end in 2015, as the general office of the state council 
published the Guiding opinions of the general office of the State Council on 
strengthening the protection of the rights and interests of financial consumers, 
which clearly said in its article 2 that the PBC should conscientiously protect the 




13. In 2020, the PBC published the Measures of the people's Bank of China for the 
protection of the rights and interests of financial consumers, which further 
clarified that the PBC has legal responsibilities to protect financial consumers in 
 
404 Guiding opinions of the general office of the State Council on strengthening the protection of the 
rights and interests of financial consumers Art. 2 
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financial service market which is relevant with interest rate, currency, foreign 
exchange, gold, national treasury, payment and liquidation, money laundering, 
credit investigation, marketing propaganda and personal information, etc
405
. The 
publishing of these two legal instruments clearly prove that financial consumer 
protection is a legal responsibility of the PBC.  
14. The CBIRC was established in 2018, by merging the former China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the former China Insurance Regulatory 
commission into a single commission. The main purposes of this new regulatory 
commission are to deepen the reform of the financial regulatory system, resolve 
problems of unclear regulatory responsibilities, cross regulation and regulatory 
gaps existing in the former system, strengthen comprehensive supervision ability, 
optimize the allocation of regulatory resources, better coordinate the supervision 
of systemically important financial institutions, and gradually establish a modern 
financial regulatory framework that conforms to the characteristics of modern 
finance, prevent systemic financial risk from happening
406
.  
15. To fulfil these purposes, it is suggested by the state council that legal 
responsibilities of the CBIRC should include supervising banking and insurance 
industries in a unified way to maintain their legal and steady operation, prevent 
and resolve financial risks, protect the legitimate rights and interests of financial 
 
405 Measures of the people's Bank of China for the protection of the rights and interests of financial 
consumers Art. 2  
406 Xinhua News Agency, Explanation on the institutional reform plan of the State Council, access at 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018-03/14/c_1122533011.htm last visited 23/06/2021 
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consumers, and maintain financial stability
407
. Later, this suggestion was approved 
by the first session of the 13th National People's Congress
408
, means that those 
responsibilities in the suggestion formally become legal responsibilities of the 
CBIRC. The China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was established by 
the State Council in 1998
409
.  
16. When it was established the legal responsibilities of this commission clearly 
listed in law are :studying and drafting policies, laws and regulations about 
security and futures markets; supervising the issuing, transaction, hosting and 
clearing of securities, convertible bonds and security investment funds, 
supervising the behavior of listed companies and their shareholders with 
information disclosure obligations; and (4) supervising the security exchange 




17. Like the PBC, whether the CSRC has legal responsibility to protect financial 
consumer is debated for a long time. Besides, there is also a theoretical argument 
about whether individual investors in security transaction market can be regarded 
as consumers
411
. Just like the debate of the PBC, this debate comes to an end in 
 
407 Ibid.  
408 Xinhua News Agency, The first session of the 13th National People's Congress approved the 
institutional reform plan of the State Council access at 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018-03/17/c_1122549771.htm last visited 23/06/2021 
409 State Council on the issuance of the functions of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
configure internal organs and personnel to inform the preparation of regulations access at 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2010-11/19/content_7710.htm last visited 23/06/2021  
410 Liu Yingshuang, ‘On the Protection of Financial Consumers' Rights and Interests in China--- Also on 
the Protection of Financial Consumers in American Financial Supervision Reform’ (2011) Vol. 33 (3) 
Modern Law Science 137 
411 Ibid.  
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2015, after the general office of the state council published the Guiding opinions 
of the general office of the State Council on strengthening the protection of the 
rights and interests of financial consumers, which clearly said in its article 2 that 




18. The three main financial regulators fulfil their legal responsibility of financial 
consumer protection mainly by using regulatory methods. To be specific, 
financial authorities will supervise financial firms’ conducts and practice and 
estimate whether these conducts and practices will damage financial consumers’ 
rights and interests. Once financial authorities find that there are mis-conducts or 
bad practice significantly damaging financial consumers, financial authorities will 
then require relevant financial firms to stop and correct such conducts or practice 
while sometimes will also issue a formal punishment such as an official warn or 
fine.  
19. A typical example of this kind of protection is supervision and regulation against 
petty consumer loan industry. In 2017, the PBC and the predecessor of CBRC, 
which is one of the predecessors of CBIRC, noticed that there are serious mis-
conducts and bad practice in petty consumer loan industry includes excessive 
lending, repeated credit, improper collection, abnormally high interest rate, 
invasion of personal privacy, etc.
413
Besides there is a serious problem of lending 
 
412 Guiding opinions of the general office of the State Council on strengthening the protection of the 
rights and interests of financial consumers Art. 2 
413 PBC and CBRC, The implementer of the special rectification of the risks in the network small loan 
business of small loan companies case, access at 
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to ineligible consumers who have no or almost no ability to repay the loan, such 
as students in universities
414
.  
20. To protect consumers in this industry, the PBC and the CBRC jointly issued the 
Notice on standardizing and rectifying the business of "cash loan", which clearly 
require all financial firms shall not issue or match loans that violate the relevant 
interest rate provisions of the law and shall not collect loans by means of 
violence, intimidation, insult, slander, harassment, etc.
415
 Besides, this notice also 
requires financial firms to follow the principle of "know your customer", and 
shall not induce borrowers to borrow too much and fall into debt trap in any case, 
while also require all financial firms shall strengthen the security protection of 
customer information, shall not steal or abuse customer privacy information in 




21. The notice also requires the departments and agents of the PBC and the CBRC to 
supervise relevant financial firms according to the notice. For those financial 
firms conduct business in violation of the provisions of this notice, relevant 
financial authorities shall take measures including suspending business, ordering 
correction, circulating a notice of criticism, and canceling business qualification 
 
https://www.ganzhou.gov.cn/zfxxgk/c100475ns/2018-
03/02/content_b9c8f752e1654841850d9fdef807e6c3.shtml last visited 23/06/2021 
414 Mo Cancan, ‘Harmfulness, Causes and Avoiding Tactics of “Campus Loan ” in Colleges and 
Universities’ (2018) Vol.20, No.1 Journal of Shenyang University (Social Science) 92 
415 PBC and CBRC, Notice on standardizing and rectifying the business of "cash loan", access at 
https://www.sohu.com/a/208337905_116173 last visited 24/06/2021 
416 PBC and CBRC, Notice on standardizing and rectifying the business of "cash loan", derived from 
https://www.sohu.com/a/208337905_116173 last visited 24/06/2021 
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to urge them to rectify. For those serious cases, financial authorities can revoke 
the license
417
.   
22. Another good example of protect financial consumers using regulatory methods 
are Chinese financial authorities’ supervision and regulation against the P2P 
lending platform scandal. From 2016-2018, There were about 6,000 P2P lending 
firms were involved in the big scandal of P2P lending form’s bad practice
418
.  
After notice this scandal, Chinese financial authorities soon take measures trying 
to protect financial consumers and prevent further risks. In 2016, the CBRC 
published Implementation plan for special rectification of P2P network lending 
risk. In this document, the CBRC noticed that “Recently, there were a series of 
risk events broke out in P2P lending industry, which seriously damaged the 
legitimate rights and interests of investors, made a great negative impact on the 
reputation and healthy development of the Internet financial industry, and brought 
great harm to financial security and social stability.
419”  
23. To resolve these problems, the CBRC requires relevant authorities, departments, 
and agents to give a full investigation on all P2P lending corporates and divide all 
P2P lending corporates into three categories according to the investigation
420
. 
Corporates in the first category are corporates which are compliance with the law. 
These corporates are allowed to operate under stricter supervision. Corporates in 
 
417 Ibid.  
418 Review of the P2P’s way to death, news access at 
https://new.qq.com/omn/20200719/20200719A08PQ700.html last visited 25/06/2021 
419 CBRC, Implementation plan for special rectification of P2P network lending risk, access at 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-10/13/content_5118615.htm last visited 25/06/2021 
420 Ibid.  
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the second category are corporates not fully legal. These corporates usually have 
problems such as insufficient risk control, lacking self-discipline ability and 
hardly to maintain sustainable operation. These corporates were required to 
resolve their problems within a time limit. If the correction is not in place, they 
shall be ordered to continue correction or be merged by other financial firms
421
. 
Corporates in the third category are corporates which are suspected of engaging 
in illegal activities such as illegal fund-raising, these corporates will be required 
to quit form the market while relevant people may receive further administrative 
or criminal penalty
422
. By doing this, it is announced by the CBIRC in 2020 that 
the risk of P2P lending platform was substantially reduced423.   
24. Besides above, the Chinese financial authorities may also require relevant 
financial firms to arrange a collective redress for consumers damaged by their 
mis-conducts. For example, the CBRC requires all mis-conducted P2P lending 
firms return principal to its customers, firms failed to do that may face a criminal 
investigation. And in the above example of ‘Crude oil treasure’, the CBIRC 
requires the BOC to make a settlement with consumers and compensate 
consumers’ economic lose. The BOC implemented this request and announced 
that it had reached a settlement with its customers and compensated for the 
losses.  
25. The current protection for financial consumers provided by regulators has many 
 
421 Ibid.  
422 Ibid.  
423 21st Century Business Herald Report, access at https://www.sohu.com/a/434949877_772337 last 
visited 25/08/2021 
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advantages. First, as regulators, financial authorities usually have enough power 
and tools to stop financial firms’ mis-conducts and bad practice in a timely way to 
prevent consumers from further damages. Secondly, by using administrative 
power, financial authorities can require financial firms to change or correct their 
conducts or practice to compensate consumers lose or make financial consumers 
will not face similar damage in future.  
26. Thirdly, it has wild range of influence, which can protect probably all consumers 
in financial service market in a single action. Forth, it is accessible to all 
consumers. Consumers almost do not need to do anything to gain this kind of 
protection, even a consumer does not realize he/she suffered a loss will be equally 
protected. 
27. However, protecting financial consumers as supervisors and regulators also have 
deficiencies. Firstly, protecting consumers in this way has a certain threshold. 
Financial regulators usually tend to only notice those serious enough problems. 
So, mis-conducts and bad practice which are not serious may cannot be noticed 
and dealt with by financial authorities as supervisors and regulators.  
28. Secondly, protecting consumers as supervisors and regulators tend to protect 
consumers as a whole and will not protect consumer in the individual case. And 
thirdly, protecting consumers as supervisors and regulators usually tend to focus 
on stopping and correcting financial firms' mis-conducts and bad practice instead 
of making consumers receive compensation. Ordering financial firms issue a 
collective redress is not the practice and it could only be observed in those 
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significant cases which influence a considerable number of consumers. 
29. A possible way for the consumer to resolve the individual dispute is to go to the 
court. The cost of the litigation is charged according to the monetary value of the 
case. The court charges the litigation fee against the plaintiff, which is known as 
an acceptance fee. For those non-monetary disputes, the acceptance fee is from 
¥50 (£5.68) to ¥500 (£56.8)424. For those monetary disputes, the acceptance fee 
depends on the amount of money that is claimed. Claims under ¥10,000 
（£1,137）need to pay a fixed cost – ¥50（£5.68. Claims above ¥10,000 
（£1,137） will be charged on a floating rates basis425. Thus the litigation cost of 
a case is dependent on its monetary value, for example, the cost of a disputes 
which involves about ¥200,000（£22,739） need to pay ¥4,300（£488.9. 
Besides, if an enforcement is applying, the party who applies for it needs to pay 
an additional enforcement fee, which is usually a similar amount of the 
acceptance fee. The “loser pay” may be applied according to the judge’s 
discretion so when the plaintiff win the case, the burden of acceptance fee may be 
reversed to the defendant, while the plaintiff still need to pay an enforcement fee 
if a mandatory enforcement is applied. At first glance, the cost is not high, 
however, considering in 2019, the median per capita disposable income of 
Chinese residents is ¥26523(£3,015), the cost of litigation is not as cheap as it 
 
424 For example, the cost of divorce case without a dispute of properties division is from RMB 50 to 
RMB 300, the cost of case, which is relevant with personal right is from RMB 100 to RMB 500, the cost 
of other non-monetary case is from RMB 50 to RMB 100. The employment dispute is an exception, 
although it sometimes involves a large amount of money, the court only charges a nominate litigation 
fee to make sure that every employee is able to afford an employment litigation.   
425 A 2.5% rate to the part of 10,000 to 100,000 Yuan, a 2% rate to the part of 100,000 to 200,000 
Yuan, a 1.5 % rate to the part of 200,000 to 500,000 Yuan and so on.   
                                                                                       167 
 
looks.      
30. The acceptance fee and the potential enforcement fee only constitute a part of the 
litigation cost as a whole. After the reform of civil procedure, the Chinese civil 
procedure is no longer a simple thing that can be used by any ordinary person 
without the help of legal professionals, as it used to be. During the keeping 
process of legal reform, it becomes formal and complex. Consequently, a 
professional legal representative is now considered as necessary in many civil 
cases as people without legal professional training can hardly fully understand 
his/her case, correctly use his/her procedure rights, submit required documents 
and evidence, fulfil his/her procedure duties in time. The court and judge also 
encourage parties to hire one or more legal representatives as the work of 
experience lawyers can reduce the judge’s workload426. Therefore, lawyer fee 
may also need to be considered in some cases.   
31. The amount of lawyer fee depends on the level of lawyers the parties hire. An 
experienced lawyer in financial service sector can be very expensive while a 
junior associate may only charge RMB 2,000427 (£222.4). However, lawyers in 
different price usually means service in different quality. Those good lawyers 
 
426 The workload of Chinese judge is huge. According to the data published by the supreme court , the 
average number of cases accepted and closed by a single judge in China is 121.4 and 74. Considering 
that there are 250 working days in one year, it means that the Chinese judge need to close a case in 
every 3.34 days. These high workload makes the Chinese judges place a great emphasis on the 
efficiency, thus a legal representative that can help parties to draft documents in legal language and 
reply to court’s requirement of documents is encouraged by the judge. See Supreme Court, Press 
Conference on the Situation of Judicial Enforcement of National Courts in the First Half of 2017, access 
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charge a higher fee for reasons, for their rich legal knowledge and experience, 
their excellent legal skills, or their good records. Hiring a good legal 
representative usually means a possible advantage in the civil procedure while 
hiring a junior legal representative can means a potential disadvantage in the 
litigation. As a result, the lawyer fee becomes a significant obstacle of access-to-
justice for those people who cannot afford for a lawyer or a good lawyer, while 
those people who can afford will also think twice when they hope to initial a 
litigation428.  
32. The cost is not the only element influence the consumer’s decision of whether go 
to the court, whether the litigation will take too much time and efforts will also be 
considered. In China, the first instance of a litigation usually takes up to six 
months to twelve months. And a plaintiff needs to wait up to seven days to know 
whether his complaint is accepted or not. After the first instance, if either party 
decides to appeal, the second instance will usually take up to three months.429 
There is no chance of second appeal so the judgement of the second instance is 
final.430 
33. Six month or twelve month may be regarded as fast for those commercial cases or 
complicated civil cases, which involve many complicated legal relationships. 
Merchants may feel satisfy that their cases which involve much value can be 
 
428 People may argue here that legal aid service is a good idea to resolve this problem, however, legal 
aid may be not an appropriate answer here, we will discuss this in later of this chapter. 
429 See China Civil Procedure Law, Chapter XXII.  
430 See China Civil Procedure Law, Chapter XXIV. 
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finished in up to fifteen months. However, six month or twelve months may be 
too long to the consumer. Litigation sometimes means a long and painful 
experience. After filing a lawsuit, the parties, especially those parties who are 
natural people, may be in a state of long-term tension and pressure. A litigant in a 
lawsuit may need to meet with their lawyer regularly to discuss the case, timely 
response to court requests for submission of documents or evidence and attend 
the trial in court when it is required. These activities may consume a lot of energy 
of the parties concerned and keep them in constant tension and anxiety, which 
will finally put a negative influence on their work and family lives. This stress 
and mental distress may persist until the end of the lawsuit, or even continue to 
exist after the lawsuit is over. In this circumstance, six months may still too long 
to afford. Just like the legal maxim said, justice delated is justice denied431. A 
lengthy time of wait will bring all kinds of inconvenience to parties as well as 
much indirect loss, such as loss of work time and tension, depress anxiety. This 
may in turn enhance the negative image that the civil procedure is too long to 
afford an ordinary person may have.  
34. As discussed above, the cost, time and efforts of the litigation may become 
barriers prevent consumers to bringing their disputes to the court. There is no 
evidence that the China’s litigation system is more efficient than litigation system 
in EU member states and no evidence to show that Chinese consumers have a 
 
431 Suzy Platt (eds), Entry 954. William Ewart Gladstone (1809–98). Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary 
of Quotations Requested from the Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, 1989. 
(Attributed to William E. Gladstone. — Laurence J. Peter, Peter’s Quotations, p. 276 (1977). 
Unverified.) 
                                                                                       170 
 
lower threshold of money involved to bring their disputes to the court. Therefore, 
the consumer’s reluctance to go to the court existing in EU member states may 
also existing in China. Considering that the average income of Chinese 
consumers (€4,226 in 2020432) is lower than that of EU consumers (€13,996 in 
2020433), the reluctance may be more significant in China. Therefore, it is good to 
introduce a financial consumer ADR scheme which provide financial consumers 
a cheap and fast way to resolve their individual disputes, just as what has 
happened in EU Member States. Besides, even the Chinese litigation system is 
cheap and fast, it may be not cheap and fast enough, introducing a financial 
consumer ADR scheme which can resolve disputes in a cheaper and faster way is 
still attractive to consumers and may encourage those consumers who do not take 
any action after disputes arising to act.  
35. There are already some consumer ADR practices in China. For example, there is 
a free mediation service provide with consumers by the China Consumer 
Association, a consumer organization regulated by the Consumer Protection 
Law434. This mediation service aims to help consumers complaint to the 
businesses when things going wrong. A staff of the Consumer Association will 
organize and hold a communication between the consumer and the business to try 
to help them make a settlement.  
 
432 China Per capita disposable income of national residents in 2020, access at 
http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2021-04/09/content_5598662.htm last visited 26/08/2021 
433 Average annual net earnings in the European Union (EU27) from 2013 to 2020(in euros) access at 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1201068/annual-net-earnings-in-the-eu/ last visited 26/08/2021 
434 Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, Art.30 and 
Art.37.  
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36. The service also includes free legal advice to the consumer about his/her problem. 
The service is widely accepted and used by Chinese consumers435. However, this 
service was not widely accepted and used by in financial consumer dispute 
resolution. A possible reason is that this ADR scheme is established to mainly 
deal with disputes arising from quality liability and therefore, lack of expertise 
and experience to deal with financial service disputes436. Another reason may be 
that financial consumers may not realize that these disputes is a kind of consumer 
disputes can thus can be covered by this mediation service, while the Consumer 
Association also does not clarify and give publicity to this point437.     
37. Besides the consumer mediation, there are also other ADR schemes provided by 
regulators. The Financial Consumer Protection Bureau (FCPB), which is one of 
departments of the PBC, established a financial consumer mediation scheme
438
. In 
this scheme, if a financial consumer dispute has occurred, the consumer may first 
complain to the financial institution. Later if the consumer is not satisfied with 
the response of the financial institution or the financial institution has not 
 
435 According to the China Consumer Association’s data, in 2017 the China Consumer Association 
received 726,840 complaints, resolved 552,398 cases (resolution rate at 76 percent) and the 
compensation in total is RMB 516.39 million (60.22 million pounds). See China Consumer Associate, 
Analysis on Complaints Handling Situation of National Consumers Association in 2017 access at 
http://www.cca.org.cn/zxsd/detail/27875.html last visited on 24/05/2018. 
436 Xing Huiqiang, ‘A new way to resolve disputes arising out of financial consumption’ Vol.31(5) 
Modern Law Science 173 
437 Yang Dong ‘Typed Research on Financial Ombudsman Service Scheme’ (2013) Vol.180(4) 2013 Law 
Review  
438 Measures for the Administration of Protection of Financial Consumer Rights of the People's Bank 
of China Art.12.   
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38. After receiving the complaint, the local branch will first examine whether there is 
any violation involved in the dispute. If the answer is positive, the local branch 
will deal with the violation according to the law or forward the case to 
corresponding authorities
440
. However, if there is violation, the dispute will be 
forwarded to the financial institution to give the institution a second chance to 
deal with the complaint.
441
 If the consumer is still not satisfied with the result, the 
local branch of the PBC may organize a mediation
442
. 
39. Another example is the hotline “12378” host by the China Insurance Supervision 
Commission (CISC), which is one of predecessors of CBIRC. The hotline was 
established to receive consumers complains and try to mediate disputes happens 
between insurance corporates and consumers
443
. However, all these schemes have 
their problems. The mediation scheme provided by the PBC is operated by the 
regulator itself, and supervision on financial firms’ violation was also involved in 
to the scheme, which makes the scheme is questionable on constitutional criteria 
such as independence and impartiality. For the hotline “12378”, the rules and 
working procedure of this hotline were not published and thus may lead to 
 
439 ibid 
440 Measures for the Administration of Protection of Financial Consumer Rights of the People's Bank 
of China Art.17.  
441 Ibid.  
442 Measures for the Administration of Protection of Financial Consumer Rights of the People's Bank 
of China Art.20.  
443 Measures for the Administration of Handling of Insurance Consumption Complaints 
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criticism on lack of transparency. Besides, they cannot cover all financial 
consumers in all sections of financial service market. Another problem is that 
they only use mediation model, which cannot produce a binding and enforceable 
result at the end, this will reduce consumer’s confidence in using such services.  
40. All these schemes are not well-publicity, which result many consumers even do 
not know their existence, not to mention use it. This lack of publicity is especially 
serious in the PBC’s mediation scheme. There is no news, no advertising, no case 
report, and no data published about this scheme. There is even no evidence to 
show that this scheme handled any complaint. Just as discussed above, current 
financial consumer ADR disputes in China not have a good performance and a 
good programme-design. In summary, there appears to be a gap for Chinese 
financial consumers to access to justice. On one hand, the cost, time, and efforts 
of the litigation make consumers do not want to bring their disputes to the court. 
On the other hand, current financial consumer ADR schemes cannot provide 
consumers with a cheap, fast, and efficient way to dispute resolution and failed to 
attract consumers to use them. In this situation, introducing a comprehensive 
financial consumer ADR scheme with advanced model would helpful to fill the 
gap and increase the confidence of the financial service market.  
41. There are two ways to introduce this new comprehensive financial consumer 
ADR scheme, one is spontaneously created by industry and the other is impose 
by the government or regulators. Currently there is no any consumer ADR 
schemes established by the industry. All consumer ADR schemes, including those 
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discussed above, are created by the government or regulators. The effort to 
persuade Chinese financial service industry to created a financial consumer ADR 
scheme started a long time ago444, many scholars suggest that Chinese financial 
service industry should establish a financial consumer ADR scheme445, but there 
is no positive response from the industry.  
42. The reason may be that, just as demonstrated in the last Chapter, financial 
industry in a mature and highly competitive market tends to spontaneously 
created financial consumer schemes. However, just like observed by the chairman 
of the CBIRC, the Chinese financial service market has only about 30 years 
history, and there is still a long way to go before it develops a mature market446. 
Besides, the Chinese financial service market is a highly concerted market where 
dominate by those huge financial firms, for example, the four biggest commercial 
banks in China occupy 37.3% market share in banking while the top 5 insurance 
companies occupied 74.7% market share. 447. Therefore, persuade Chinese 
 
444 Xu Huijuan(2005). ‘On Financial Ombudsman System in UK and Protection of Consumers’ Rights 
and Interests – Comment on Our Financial Regulations’ (2005) Vol.1 (2005) Finance Forum 155  
445 Xu Huijuan(2005). ‘On Financial Ombudsman System in UK and Protection of Consumers’ Rights 
and Interests – Comment on Our Financial Regulations’ (2005) Vol.1 (2005) Finance Forum 155; Xing 
Huiqiang, ‘A New Way to Solve Disputes Arising Out of Financial Consumption’ (2009) Vol.31(5) 
Modern Law Science 87; Yang Dong(2013), ‘Typed Research on Financial Ombudsman Service Scheme’ 
(2013) Vol.180(4) Law Review 231; Yin Jianmin, Huang Wei(2013). ‘On Operating Mechanism and 
Inspiration of the Financial Ombudsman Institution in Tai Wan, China’(2013) Vol.7 Shang Hai Finance 
105 
446 Guo Shuqing: China's capital market is not yet mature access at 
https://www.yicai.com/news/2234348.html last visited 26/08/2021  
447 China Bank Regulation Community Annual report of Chinese bank industry 2020 access at  
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/FDF4A782E9E34140B13ACFFE774FAB1A.html last 
visited 26/08/2021and Annual Report of the Chinese Insurance Market 2020. Available at 
http://bxjg.circ.gov.cn//Portals/0/wendang2020/2020%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%BF%9D%E9%99
%A9%E5%B8%82%E5%9C%BA%E5%B9%B4%E6%8A%A5%EF%BC%88%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87%EF%B
C%89.pdf last visited 26/08/2021 
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financial service industry to spontaneously create such a new comprehensive 
financial consumer ADR scheme may be not practicable.  
43. A more practicable way is to persuade the government or regulators to establish a 
such ADR scheme. Just as demonstrated above, the government and regulators 
have legal responsibility to protect the consumers, so it is their legal 
responsibility to introduce a such new comprehensive financial consumer ADR 
scheme to fill the gap of access to justice. Further, introducing such an ADR 
scheme is in line with the policy interests of the government. A good design 
financial consumer ADR scheme can not only provide consumers with a cheap 
and fast way to resolve disputes, but also able to provide consumer advice, collect 
and feedback data, and improve the market behaviour. These functions would 
increase the confidence on the marker and provide the Chinese financial service 
market with a competitive edge in international market. Therefore, persuading the 
government or regulators to create a such ADR scheme is more inline with 
Chinese context.  
44. The new financial consumer ADR scheme could be establishing by learning from 
the Ombudsman model used by the UK’s FOS and the Australian AFCA, which is 
as discussed in the Chapter VI is the current best model in financial consumer 
ADR. Using the arbitration model in China could lead to problems. For example, 
there are already many arbitration commissions in China and all of them can 
theoretically handle financial consumer disputes if financial firms and consumers 
make agreements of arbitration. However, currently it is rare to see that any 
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financial consumer disputes are submitted to any arbitration commissions. The 
reason is that in China arbitration is usually more expensive and longer than the 
litigation. It is true that an arbitration commission specially designed for financial 
consumer disputes may be cheaper and faster than normal arbitration procedure 
but the existing impression in the public mind is not easy to change. Changing 
such image needs much funds and efforts on publicity and once it is not success, 
it would make negative influence on the scheme.  
45. On the contrary, the Ombudsman model is familiar with Chinese people, although 
there is no ‘Ombudsman’ in China, there are many public organizations which 
receive and deal with people’s complaints in China, such as Consumer 
Association. These public institutions perform just like ‘Ombudsman’ which 
makes Chinese people more familiar with this model448. Besides, as discussed in 
the Chapter VI, using the Ombudsman model can make the working procedure as 
informal as possible, which will significantly reduce the cost per complaint and 
improve the user-friendly. The study in Chapter VI also shows that with good-
design, the reduce of formality would not lead concern in constitutional criteria. 
Meanwhile, the minimum of the formality could attract more consumers to use 
the scheme which is helpful for all functions of the financial consumer ADR 
scheme. Besides, as the Hong Kong’s FDRC, which uses arbitration model, 
performs not well, whether the arbitration model can success in the mainland of 
 
448 According to China Consumer Association’s data, in the year of 2018, it received 762,247 
consumer complaints, solved 556,440 cases, and the complaint resolution rate was 73%. See  
Analysis of the Acceptance of Complaints by the China Consumer Association in 2018 available at 
http://www.cca.org.cn/tsdh/detail/28383.html last visited 27/08/2021 
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China where share similar culture with Hong Kong but has no tradition to support 
arbitration, is questionable. 
46. The financial consumer ADR scheme using Ombudsman may be created by the 
Chinese government and regulators in two ways. The first one is to establish such 
scheme by legislation. In this way, the legislation could set up the principles and 
basic rules of the scheme while delegate the details of the program-design to 
relevant financial regulators or to the ADR body. This is the way used in 
establishing the UK’s FOS. The legislation required to establish a FOS institution 
to operate the scheme and delegate the institution to draft detail rules of the scheme. 
The second way is to establish a financial consumer ADR body by the government 
or regulators and then require all financial firms which in the certain scope to join 
the scheme as members. This is the way used in Australia, and Hong Kong, where 
the regulator creates a financial consumer ADR scheme not through the legislation 
and then require financial firms to join it.   
47. Establishing a financial consumer ADR scheme directly by legislation grants the 
scheme many advantages, although it may also bring disadvantages such as the 
rigid structure may make it hard to accept new techniques. For example, the 
authority of the scheme is high as it is directly from the law, and the relationship 
between the scheme and the administrative agents and judicial system is easy to 
deal with as these issues can be directly dealt with by law. It also secures the 
scheme’s independent position from the relevant administrative agents such as 
corresponding financial regulators. Further, establishing by law also makes it easy 
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to secure the binding force and enforceability of the result produced by such 
scheme in a high level. Comparing to those schemes, which must rely on contract 
obligation or administrative regulator’s deterrence to secure the binding force and 
enforceability of their results, the binding force and enforceability of results of a 
scheme directly established by law is protected by law, which is stronger. 
Establishing such a scheme directly by law can also help consumers to establish 
the confidence of the scheme and promote them to try to use it. 
 
48. The second way also has its advantages, making a new legislation in China is not 
an easy thing and it may take several years to wait. However, establishing an ADR 
body by the government or regulators could be much faster. In China, which ways 
would be used to establish such a scheme may depends on whether establishing a 
financial consumer ADR scheme can be done in reasonable time and the level of 
government’s motivation to establish such a scheme. If the government has strong 
motivation to create such scheme by legislation and could make it in a reasonable 
time (for example, in 3-5 years), it would be good to establish a financial consumer 
ADR scheme through the legislation. However, if the government just want to give 
a try of the financial consumer ADR scheme or cannot publish such legislation in 
5 years, it may be good to use the Australian way.  
 
49. If the later way is used, the government or the regulator may further seek the 
legislation to give the scheme a better position in future. And no matter which way 
was used, the ADR scheme should be operated by an independent body to secure 
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the independence and the impartiality. Considering China’s context, this body 
could be established as a ‘Public Institute’, just like the Consumer Association. 
Those already existing financial consumer ADR scheme such as the PBC mediation 
scheme and the insurance hotline may be merged into the new scheme. 
Jurisdiction and scope of the scheme 
50. The new scheme may have compulsory jurisdiction in a given scope of financial 
firms and in a given scope of services, because without compulsory jurisdiction, 
financial firms can easily choose not join the scheme in this situation, the scheme 
would become meaningless no matter how good the scheme was designed. 
Therefore, giving the new scheme such a compulsory jurisdiction through 
legislation or member rules is helpful.  
51. The rules of compulsory jurisdiction may give the new scheme jurisdiction on most 
financial consumer disputes in China. Hereby, a possible draft may be “the scheme 
has compulsory jurisdiction on all disputes, which happens between a consumer 
and a financial firm which are licensed by Chinese authority or regulated by 
financial regulators as a financial institution. If these disputes arising from a 
financial service449 provided by an above financial firm or its agent in the territory 
of China’s mainland. And if the consumer makes a complaint towards the scheme.” 
52. Key issues here are first, the disputes must happen between a financial firm and 
consumer in the meaning of Chinese law as the aim of the scheme is to resolve 
financial consumer disputes and the authority of the scheme comes from the 
 
449 The rules may also specify or make some examples about the financial services under the 
scheme’s jurisdiction.  
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Chinese law so it should consistent with other Chinese law. As we demonstrated 
above, financial firms in China are mainly commercial banks and commercial 
insurance companies and there is no a precise definition of financial consumers yet. 
A common idea of financial consumers is to regard them as those people who buy 
or receive financial services out of professional actions and not include small and 
medium businesses (SME)450. Further, the territory scope should be the China’s 
mainland as Hong Kong and Macao become different jurisdictions which have 
different legal system. It should also make it clear that the compulsory jurisdiction 
can only happens if the consumer chooses to use the scheme as the scheme should 
not become an obstruction if the consumer hopes to directly make a litigation.  
 
53. There is also a need to specify the scope of the jurisdiction. For example, whether 
the compulsory jurisdiction would cover all kinds of disputes or only cover those 
disputes with monetary nature. To make the compulsory jurisdiction only cover 
those disputes with monetary nature or occur monetary loss may help the scheme 
to focus its limited resources on resolving those most important disputes which the 
consumers are suffered economic loss instead of those disputes with no actual 
economic loss and consumers just, for example, feel unsatisfied with financial 
firm’s unfriendly attitude. While accepting such disputes may increase the 
consumer’s confidence on the scheme and may make the consumer like it.  
 
450 It would be good news to establish a comprehensive and efficient financial consumer ADR scheme 
if a law reform can be made to give a precious definition of financial consumer in Chinese law and can 
include SME into the scope of financial consumers but we will not discuss it in detail here as it is not 
the focus of the thesis. 
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54. It should also make it clear that the compulsory jurisdiction should exclude those 
disputes which has too much money involved, as demonstrated in Chapter VI, all 
the three financial consumer ADR schemes in UK, Hong Kong or Australia set a 
cap for the money involved. The reason behind is that, the theory basement of 
establishing a financial consumer ADR scheme is mainly two: first, there is a huge 
gap of bargain ability between consumers and financial firms that need to be 
balance by the third person and second, consumers incline to not go to the court to 
resolve their disputes, so it is good to provide the consumer with a cheap and fast 
way to resolve financial consumer disputes. But these two premises may not exist 
in consumer disputes involved much money. For the first situation, a consumer can 
invest a lot of money into a financial service shows that this consumer has a strong 
ability to protect himself. For example, the consumer could afford to expensive 
lawyer to litigation and could afford a financial professional to provide his an 
independent financial advice. In this situation, it is hard to see there is gap between 
the consumer and financial firm and thus the consumer deserves a special 
protection.  
55. For the second, the main reason why consumer incline to not bring their cases to 
the court is that the money involved cannot cover the cost and time cost for a 
litigation. However, this is not true in a case which involves a lot of money. In this 
situation, a reasonable consumer should have enough motivation to bring his/her 
case to the litigation and therefore there is no need to provide him with a special 
                                                                                       182 
 
procedural protection such as a financial consumer ADR scheme. Besides, the 
working procedure of the financial consumer ADR scheme may be as informal as 
possible and it is questionable whether it is appropriate to handle a case involved 
that much money with such informal procedure.  
 
56. For reasons above, a dispute with too much money involved may should not be 
considered as a consumer dispute, and thus should not be covered by the scheme 
under compulsory jurisdiction. Another reason is that, one important aim of the 
program-design of the scheme is to balance the imbalance of power between 
consumers and financial firms. However, if the value of the dispute is very high, 
then it is reasonable to assume that the imbalance between traders and consumer is 
not existing here. In this circumstance, their disputes may be resolved by litigation 
or other traditional ADR schemes instead of by this financial consumer ADR 
scheme. Therefore, the rules may draw a clear line on this issue, after considering 
the nature and characteristics of financial service and the average economic 
situation of Chinese financial consumers. The specific amount this line may should 
be decided after a careful study.  
 
57. Besides the compulsory jurisdiction, it may also good to add a voluntary 
jurisdiction as a supplement of the compulsory jurisdiction to let those financial 
firms and financial service which are not covered by the compulsory jurisdiction 
have an opportunity to use the disputes resolution service. It does not matter if there 
is no or almost no practice of voluntary jurisdiction as it is only a supplement and 
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has almost no cost.         
The working process of financial consumer ADR scheme in China 
58. The potential Chinese financial consumer ADR scheme may use a multi-layer 
working process which including negation, mediation, and Ombudsman in 
sequence to fully use advantages of different kinds of ADR techniques. This multi-
layer model is used by all the three schemes discussed in Chapter VI, with 
following the same sequence. First negotiation procedure (financial firms’ internal 
redress scheme), then mediational procedure (a formal mediation procedure in 
Hong Kong and more informal mediational procedure in UK and Australia) and 
then Ombudsman or arbitration procedure. This model may also be used in China 
by adopting China’s context.  
59. In China, most financial firms were already be required to have and effectively 
operate an internal consumer redress system. The banking financial institutions’ 
intern complaint scheme is regulated by the “Notice of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission on Improving the Client Complaint Handling Mechanisms 
of Banking Financial Institutions to Effectively Protect Financial Consumers”, a 
regulation published by CBRC in 2012451. In this regulation, the CBRC clarify that 
financial consumer protection is not only a social responsibility of commercial 
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levels of a commercial bank shall appoint a senior manager who is responsible for 
protecting the legitimate rights and interests of financial consumers452. Meanwhile, 
the CBRC requires commercial banks to improve their existing complaints 
processing scheme453 , establish or designate complaints processing departments 
and equip these departments with qualified staff454. These staff shall be able to fully 
understand relevant law, and regulations published by the CBRC, familiar with the 
financial products and financial services, master relevant business practice, have 
the corresponding working ability and treat the financial consumer with fairness 
and sympathy 455.     
 
60. Further, the CBRC requires commercial banks to provide financial consumers with 
'fast track' for compliant handling. Commercial banks should at least accept 
complaints through phone, Internet and mailing while publish these channels on 
their official websites 456 . After accepting complaints, commercial banks are 
required to communicate with consumers through the above channels in a timely 
manner to inform acceptance, processing time limit and contact method457 In the 
process of handling complaints, commercial banks should uphold the principle of 
high efficiency and speed. The time limit for processing shall not exceed 15 
 
452Notice of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Improving the Client Complaint Handling 
Mechanisms of Banking Financial Institutions to Effectively Protect Financial Consumers Art.1 and 2. 
http://www.china-cba.net/do/bencandy.php?fid=89&id=9183  
453 Ibid Art.2. 
454 Ibid Art.3 
455 Ibid Art.4 
456 Ibid Art.6. 
457 Ibid Art.7. 
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working days in principle. If the situation is complex or there are special reasons, 
the time limit for processing may be appropriately extended, but it shall not exceed 
a maximum of 60 working days. The time limit and reasons for extension shall be 
notified to the consumer by means of text messages, mails, letters, etc.458 
 
61. In addition, the CBRC also requires commercial banks to conduct statistics and 
analysis on consumer complaints and report the information to the CBRC once 
every six months 459 . However, if a commercial bank receives a large-scale 
complaint or has a major complaint, which involves the interests of many financial 
consumers and may trigger a mass incident, it shall instantly report it to the CBRC 
or its dispatched offices460. 
 
62. The insurance company and institution’s intern consumer compliant schemes are 
mainly regulated by the Measures for the Administration of Handling of Insurance 
Consumption Complaints, which is a regulation published by the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission461 (CIRC). The instrument provides that it is insurance 
company and institution’s responsibility to establish intern consumer complaint 
scheme and allocate appreciate staff and budget to these schemes462. Besides, the 
legal instrument divides insurance consumer disputes into several categories and 
 
458 Ibid Art.9. 
459 Ibid Art.16. 
460 Ibid Art.15. 
461 The CIRC has already been merged into the BRCC in 2018.   
462 Notice of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Improving the Client Complaint Handling 
Mechanisms of Banking Financial Institutions to Effectively Protect Financial Consumers Art.5 & Art.6. 
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provides that insurance companies and institutions have an obligation to deal with 
consumer complaints relevant with insurance contract terms, sales, underwriting, 
surrender, security, payment, and any other complaint rising from insurance 
consumption463. However, there is no detailed requirements for the intern consumer 
complaint scheme, thus the structure and performance of different insurance 
companies’ intern complaint scheme may vary, mainly depends on their own 
business strategies and policies.     
 
63. When establishing the new financial consumer ADR scheme, further requirement 
on details of those financial firms’ internal consumer redress system may be made 
to improve the quality of intern complaint resolution system to a higher level. Then 
these internal consumer redress systems could be merged into the new scheme as 
the first stage. The new scheme should make it possible to accept complaints 
through all possible ways, such as phone, Internet, mailing and in person. As soon 
as it receives the complaint, the staff may provide free advice to the consumer and 
then tell the consumer to firstly contact with traders, and then back to the scheme 
if not satisfied with the trader’s result or does not receive a result from traders in a 
given time (for example, 60 days). This stage could reduce the burden of workload 
of the new financial consumer ADR scheme and to provide financial firms with a 
second chance to deal with consumers’ complaints without intervention of an 
independent third person. This internal redress first requirement is also accepted 
 
463 Ibid. Art.9. 
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by PBC in its Measures for the Administration of Protection of Financial Consumer 
Rights of the People's Bank of China, where the PBC requires consumers to first 
use financial firms’ internal redress system before complaint their complaints to 
PBC to seek further help464.  
64. A mediation procedure hold by staff may then followed as the second step. 
Currently there are already some practices of mediation between consumers and 
businesses in China. For example, the PBC provided consumers with a mediation 
procedure if consumers complaint to their local branch465 as mentioned above. 
These isolated and de-centralized practice of mediation may be merged into the 
new scheme while the experience comes from these practices may also be learned 
to establish the new mediational procedure. Unlike those formal mediation which 
happens in a meeting room, this mediational procedure may be as informal as 
possible. It may happen on phone, on line or through the exchanging of documents. 
The key points of this mediational procedure are to create both parties an easy place 
to communicate each other in their preferred way without take their too much time 
and effort, while also helps them to understand their position in the dispute and 
what a result may occur if there is no settlement achieved.  
 
65. After the mediational procedure, if a settlement cannot be achieved, an 
Ombudsman may follow. This procedure may be as simple as possible and as 
 
464 Measures for the Administration of Protection of Financial Consumer Rights of the People's Bank 
of China Art.12 
465 Ibid.  
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informal as possible, to encourage consumers to use it and reduce the difficulty of 
using it by consumers, although most disputes may have already be resolved in the 
early stage. Further, to narrow the gap of bargain ability between consumers and 
traders, and reduce traders’ advantages as a repeat user, the procedure may be 
dominated by the Ombudsman instead of using a party autonomy model. The 
theory behind is that the more freedom the parties get, the more advantage traders 
may gain as repeat users. However, if the process of the procedure is mainly 
controlled by the Ombudsman, and both parties just generally do what they 
required to do, it is less likely that financial firms will have big advantage even 
they have more money, better lawyers, and more professional knowledge than 
consumers as the Ombudsman may use his/her position and power to balance it.  
 
Binding force and enforceability of the outcome made by the scheme.    
66. The design of binding force and enforceability of the outcome made by the scheme 
may consider three issues. First, what kind of outcome can be made by the scheme, 
second, to what extent the outcome has binding force and enforceability of the 
outcome; and third, to what extent the court can review the award made by the 
scheme. For the first issues, the scheme may make a monetary award which 
requires the financial firm to compensate the consumer’s loss and reasonable 
interests. However, it is questionable here whether the award can require the 
financial firm to do or not do something, for example, required a bank to provide 
consumers with certain service, to make formal and written apologize to the 
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consumer or remove the consumer from the ban list. Theoretically speaking, to 
force a party to do or not to do something may already beyond the scope of an ADR 
scheme, even if this ADR scheme is a public ADR scheme, as such award may 
relevant with the business decision of a financial firm which should not be directly 
influenced by an ADR scheme. However, sometimes, the financial firm may 
positively make offer on doing or stop doing something to reach a settlement with 
consumers. In this case, if the offer was accepted and a settlement did achieve, the 
award made according to the content of the agreement may include such content.   
 
67. Another issue is the biding force. As discussed above, to be an effective financial 
consumer ADR scheme, it is good to give the award produced by the scheme a 
certain extent of binding force. The main questions that need to be discussed here 
is whether the consumer may be given a unilateral opt-in right to accept the award, 
such as the UK’s FOS model and the Australia’s AFCA model. To give the 
consumer a unilateral opt-in to accept the award is a good choice in theory. The 
main reason to establish an effective financial consumer ADR scheme is consumers 
usually do not bring their disputes to the court, so it is necessary to provide 
consumers with an alternative place to resolve their disputes and protect their 
interests. That is to say, the establishment and operation of the financial ADR 
scheme should never become an obstruction if a consumer decides to go to the 
court to seek remedy, and this is also inline with the liberty criterion of ADR 
scheme. That is why traditional arbitration model is controversial, as the 
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compulsory arbitration agreement will prevent consumers from seeking remedies 
from the court.  
 
68. The innovation of unilateral opt-in right help to resolve this problem. On one hand, 
if the consumer feels unsatisfied with the award produced by the scheme, he/she 
can simply choose not to accept the result and then go to the court if he/she hopes 
to do that. On the other hand, if the consumer chooses to accept the award made by 
the scheme, then it is safe to assume that the consumer would not go to the court, 
with or without the award. Therefore, the right of consumer to seeking remedies 
from the court has not been damaged and even when the award does not fully 
protect the consumer’s interests, a rough justice is still better to no justice.  
 
69. However, to give consumer a such unilateral opt-in right seems not fair in 
procedure and may lead to concern on fairness criterion. Although, it is true that 
the huge gap between consumers and financial firms can be used as a defense for 
this unilateral opt-in right and the practice of UK’ FOS scheme and many other 
schemes may prove that this unilateral opt-in right does not lead significant protest 
in fairness. Another noteworthy point is some scholars in China argued for 
introducing such right466. Besides, although this unilateral opt in right is not known 
 
466 See Ziqiang Yang, ‘Learn from international experience to improve China's financial consumer 
protection supervision system’ (2014) Vol 10 Tsinghua Financial Review 25 and Jianchen Ding, Xiaojie 
Sun and Yaxian Liu, ‘Damage to China's financial consumer rights and interests: characteristic analysis 
and policy recommendations’(2016) Vol.2016 (03) Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University (Social 
Sciences Edition) 16 
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in consumer protection, there is a similar practice in employment protection in 
China. In China, there is a special arbitration scheme namely employment 
arbitration scheme, all employment disputes must firstly be dealt by this scheme 
before they are heard by the court. In this scheme, the employee can always appeal 
to the court if they are not satisfied with the award but employer can only appeal 
for several given reasons on given issues467. This practice shows that it is may good 
to introduce unilateral opt-in right in China, or like the practice in employment law, 
introducing a limited unilateral opt-in right.   
 
70. The third issue is that to what extent the complaint has already been dealt with by 
the scheme can be reviewed by the court. In theory, to help the award made by the 
scheme to have actual binding force to both parties, the scope that can be reviewed 
by the court should be limited. Otherwise, the scheme may just become a first 
instant court or a compulsory in-advance procedure of litigation. An unlimited 
scope of legal review will also damage the consumer’s interests. As comparing to 
the financial firms, consumers are less likely to bring their disputes to the court, 
and that is why a such financial consumer ADR scheme is needed. If financial firms 
are free to appeal all disputes to the court, the financial firm may appeal all award 
that in favor of consumers, by doing so, financial firms can bypass the scheme. 
This will reduce the consumers’ confidence on the scheme as they may find that if 
they hope to get a result in favor of them, they will have to go to the court anyway. 
 
467 Quanxing Wang and Lingling Hou, ‘The choice of labor dispute handling system mode in our 
country’ (2002) Vol. 2002 (08) Labor in China 13 
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They may directly go to court or firstly go to the ADR scheme and waiting financial 
firms to appeal the case to the court and there is no difference. This will make the 
scheme become meaningless,468 and could lead a serious waste of legal resources 
as many cases will be handled twice. Therefore, the scope of legal review may 
should be limited to only important procedural issues like legal review on 
arbitration award.  
 
71. However, this may be not possible in China, as China has a strong faith that court 
should have the power to review all awards made by ADR bodies or even 
administrative agents. For example, according to the China’s arbitration law, the 
party can appeal arbitration award to the court for both procedural issues and 
substantive issues. And this could also be observed in the compulsory employment 
ADR scheme. Another issue needs to consider is if we consumers have no 
unilateral opt-in right to accept the award made by the scheme, limitation on scope 
of legal review may also damage consumer’s right to seek remedies from the court. 
For these reasons, a possible alternative here may be allowing the consumers to 
appeal the award to the court for both procedural and substantive reasons but 
allowing financial firms to appeal only for fundamental procedural or substantive 
mistakes.  
 
468 To be specific, if a consumer hopes to go to the court, he may already do that in the first position. 
To use a financial consumer ADR scheme usually means that the consumer does not want to use the 
litigation. In this situation, even the award made by the scheme is not in favor of the consumers, 
consumers are less likely to appeal it to the court, On the contrary, financial firms can appeal all 
disputes which they received an award in favor of consumers to the court, as they can safely assume 
that consumers in question may has no or less motivation to be involved into the litigation and 
therefore they can easily get a judgement in favor of them through the litigation.   
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Issues on confidentiality and transparency  
 
72. Other issues may be covered by the program-design are confidentiality and 
transparency. The operator of the scheme may be given an obligation to make the 
process of operation of the scheme, the working process of the scheme and the 
other relevant information transparent as much as possible. The operator may have 
the obligation to make an annual report to provide public with information of its 
situation of operation, information of complaints dealt by the scheme, and it is good 
to publish all awards made by the scheme to the public so that the public can 
understand how the scheme work and to expect what possible awards may be made 
to their own disputes. This information would help both consumers and financial 
firms to understand more about scheme, which will increase their confidence on 
the scheme or decrease their concern on the scheme.  
   
73. Confidentiality may also be respected as far as possible. It may be helpful to make 
a balance between the scheme’s obligation to feedback data to financial authority 
and public and confidentiality. This issue may be regulated by clarify what 
information is necessary to publish, such as the number and categories of 
complaints received by the scheme, the details of complaints which go to the final 
step and produced a final award, and the systematic risks or bad practice the scheme 
find out during its operation. On the other hand, the rules may also make it clear 
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that some information may not be published except special situations happened. 
For example, information such as the name of both parties, the proposals made by 
the financial firms during the process of dispute resolution and the statements and 
arguments parties exchanged during the process, documents submitted to the 
scheme by both parties as evidence, and all other information submitted to the 
scheme as required. To publish this information may bring both parties with 
negative consequence, especially for the financial firms, as this may damage their 
reputation and put a negative influence on their future business. However, there 
may also be some exceptions, for example, if such information were required by 
the court or financial authority for the need of another litigation or investigation, 
then this information may be provided according to the requirement.        
 
 
Issues of the relationship with the financial authority       
74. An financial consumer ADR scheme may have a close relationship with 
corresponding financial authority. This close and cooperative relationship would 
benefit both the financial regulators and the scheme. On one hand, the data 
collected by the scheme on financial service market during its operation can help 
financial authorities understand the popular issues and problems or systematic risks 
in the financial service market. With the data provided by the scheme, the financial 
regulators can realize and locate the problems and risks in financial service market 
in time and the try to resolve them before the explosion of these problems. On the 
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other hand, the financial authorities can become a backup of the scheme. The close 
relationship with financial authorities will make financial firms pay more respect 
to the scheme and less possible to breach the rules or their obligations under the 
rules of scheme.  
 
75. However, the close relationship between the financial authorities and the financial 
consumer ADR scheme may also damage the independence of the scheme if there 
is no clear rules to draw the line of this relationship. Therefore, it is helpful to 
clarify their relationship in the program-design, to secure and regulate their 
cooperation and information sharing. For example, a separate memo of 
understanding could be signed between financial authorities and financial 
consumer ADR scheme to make sure that they can cooperate, share information 
but should not put unappreciated influence of each other.  
Issues of budget and fee 
 
76. A financial consumer ADR scheme could work effectively and smoothly without a 
health financial situation and continuous income to provide the scheme with 
enough budget. The scheme may expect to receive public funding as initials or 
supporting in its firs several years. However, the scheme finally needs to collect 
enough money from other place to cover its expenditures. There are currently two 
possible fee policies. The first is to collect funds from financial industry through 
levy and case while charge no fee towards the consumer, as the UK’s FOS and the 
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Australian AFCA. The second is to charge case fee towards both consumers and 
traders but traders pay more than consumer, as the Hong Kong’s FDRC. The 
comparison study in Chapter VI shows that the first approach leads to a good 
performance while the second leads to financial difficult. Besides, the second 
approach may also prevent the consumer from using the scheme. This may also 
true, in the context of China, as Chinese consumers are sensitive with the cost to 
dispute resolution. And therefore, almost all current existing financial consumer 
ADR services in China are free for consumers. Thus, it may be good to the new 
scheme to not charge to consumers, but charging from the industry.    
 
77. The rules of budget and fee of the scheme should then, clearly set out that the 
scheme does not charge to consumers, it’s funding and budget can come from a 
levy paid by all financial firms which are under the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
scheme and case fee paid by the financial firm on a “pay as you go” basis. The levy 
rate and the case fee for per case can be decided by the government or delegated 
financial authorities after considering all relevant circumstances and arguments 
from the financial firms or financial industrial association.  
 
78. In summary, the new financial consumer ADR scheme in China may look like that, 
it may be imposed by the government or regulators through or not through 
legislation, with merging existing ADR practice into it. It may be operated by an 
independent public institute. A multilayer working process where, negotiation 
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procedure, mediation procedure, and Ombudsman, are used in sequence may be 
the working procedure of the scheme. It may have characteristics as follow: 
compulsory jurisdiction on most financial firms and financial service, ability to 
produce binding and enforceable results while consumers have unilateral opt-in 
right, easy to use, transparent, fast, having a close relationship with financial 
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Conclusion 
1. In summary, in many jurisdictions, there is a trend to introduce financial consumer 
ADR schemes in financial service markets to provide the consumer with a cheap, 
fast, and efficient way to resolve financial consumer disputes, for example, the FOS 
in UK, the FIDReC in Singapore, the FSPO in Ireland, the “dispute resolution 
organizations” in Japan, the AFS in Malta, the OBSI and ADRBO in Canada, the 
Kifid in Netherlands, the AFCA in Australia, the FDRC in Hong Kong, and the 
ABF in Italy, etc. The reason behind is that there is a significant imbalance of power 
between the consumer and the financial firm and the consumer needs protection. 
This protection includes providing the consumer with both substantive right and an 
accessible way to access to justice. As the research and data show that many 
consumers are reluctant to go to the court due to the cost, time, and efficient for a 
litigation, financial consumer ADR schemes were introduced in many jurisdictions 
to provide the consumer with an accessible alternative, and in some jurisdiction, 
there is even a trend that the consumer ADR scheme may replace the mechanism 
in the court that plays the same role such as small claim procedure.  
2. In China, the financial service market is new, big, and concentrated, the imbalance 
of power between the consumer and the financial firm is significant and examples 
show that the consumer may suffer significant loss in this situation. The Chinese 
financial consumer needs protection, and this protection may come from by 
providing both substantive right and an accessible way to resolve disputes. 
However, in China, consumers may not want to bring disputes to the court for the 
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cost, time and effort, financial regulators may provide collective redress but only 
in those significant cases, and there is no an effective financial consumer ADR 
scheme to provide alternative. Therefore, it seems that there is a gap in access to 
justice in the Chinese financial service market. Introducing a comprehensive 
financial consumer ADR scheme with an advanced model of financial Ombudsman 
may be helpful as such scheme could provide the consumer with a cheap, fast, and 
efficient way of dispute resolution. Further, a such ADR scheme may have other 
functions besides dispute resolution, such as providing consumer advice, collecting 
data and feedback the data to the financial firm, the consumer, the public and the 
regulator, and improve the market behaviour. Therefore, introducing a financial 
consumer ADR scheme with an advanced model of financial Ombudsman may 
provide the consumer with an accessible alternative to justice, increase the 
consumer confidence on the market and improve the international competitiveness 
of the Chinese financial service market.  
3. As the Chinese financial industry seems no motivation to spontaneously create a 
such new financial consumer ADR scheme, the new ADR scheme may be imposed 
by the government or regulators. The new ADR scheme may be created by 
legislation, and when a legislation is hard to make, directly by the government and 
regulators. In the later case, a legislation may be pursued in future. The new ADR 
scheme may be established based on the advanced financial Ombudsman model 
used by the UK’s FOS and the Australian AFCA for their good performance in 
dispute resolution, ability to fulfil constitutional criteria, and possibilities to 
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provide additional functions such as consumer advice, collect and feedback data, 
and improve market behaviour.   
4. An independent ADR body may be established to operate the scheme, to secure the 
independence and impartiality of the new ADR scheme. It may need to have 
compulsory jurisdiction on most financial firms and financial service, so that if the 
consumer hopes to use the new ADR scheme, it would be prevented by the un-
cooperation of financial firms. A multilayer working process where all three kinds 
of ADR techniques, negotiation procedure, mediation procedure, and Ombudsman 
procedure, are used in sequence could be the working procedure of the scheme. As 
such working procedure can take full advantages of different kinds of ADR 
techniques, help to resolve disputes in early stage, and secure a binding outcome. 
The outcome produced by the new ADR scheme could be binding while providing 
the consumer with a full or limited unilateral opt-in right to protect the consumer’s 
right to bring the case to the court. The new ADR scheme may include 
constitutional criteria such as independence, impartiality, transparency, and 
confidentiality, etc. in its rules to show the new ADR scheme highly value these 
principles. The new ADR scheme may provide the consumer with a free service 
and collect its funds mainly form the financial industry by charging a levy and case 
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